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This is a new history of irrigation and food production in twentieth-century India. It seeks 
to challenge the known story of Green Revolution, to question the role of plant breeding 
in the history of twentieth century agriculture and to de-centre the big dam from our 
picture of water and modernity. 
This thesis argues that there is no evidence of a breakthrough in Indian food production 
the 1960s and 1970s where a Green Revolution is typically placed; this was in fact a 
period of relatively slow growth in foodgrain production and yields within an era of high 
growth that had actually begun around 1950. Wheat, which was a small part of India’s 
food basket was an exception to this general trend of slow growth in the 1960s and 1970s. 
I argue that High Yielding Varieties of seeds had little to do with this leap in productivity; 
this was driven by a quick expansion in irrigation facilitated by private tubewells. 
Tubewell irrigation was initiated by the colonial state and interwar India had the world’s 
largest tubewell programme. The ability of tubewells to deliver quick results put them on 
the central government agenda during the Second World War and emphasis on public 
irrigation (whether from tubewells or dams) increased during the Nehruvian period. The 
mid-1960s however saw an emphasis on the private tubewell, based on a vision of the 
peasant as a rational profit-maximizing being who was in conflict with public irrigation 
systems and their equity objectives. The private-profit motive was put at the centre of 
agricultural policy, and aided by the World Bank, the government mounted a programme 
of cheap loans to promote private tubewells which quickly became the most important 
means of irrigation in India.  
Putting the tubewell at the heart of my study allows me to re-conceptualise late twentieth-
century Indian agriculture. By showing how the World Bank and elite development actors 
favoured private tubewells, I argue that rising inequality was built into technology choice. 
This thesis traces the new centrality of the private motive in agricultural policy to 
Theodore Schultz’s theory of the poor but efficient peasant and argues that ideas of 
peasant rationality were also central to the adoption of the HYVs which merely justified 
appropriation of inoptimal quantities of fertilizer by large farmers to produce super-
normal yields even as higher overall production could have resulted from spreading 
fertilizer thin on tall Indian wheat varieties 
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This thesis seeks to challenge the known story of what is called the Green Revolution, to 
question the role of plant breeding in the history of twentieth-century agriculture and to 
decentre the big dam from our picture of water and modernity. The Green Revolution is 
at the centre of late twentieth-century agricultural history in India and the Third World;  
given the marginality of agriculture in accounts of twentieth-century technology in the 
rich world, it  is central to our picture of twentieth-century agricultural technology more 
generally.1 In its simplest form, the story of the Green Revolution goes that many poor 
countries faced a Malthusian disaster in the late twentieth century; a disaster which was 
mitigated by a spectacular growth in the production and yield of foodgrains by the 
adoption of new varieties of seeds developed by plant breeders of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The Indian case serves as the usual exemplar. It is implicitly assumed that 
India’s food production was in stasis until the mid-1960s, when the country adopted High 
Yielding Varieties (HYV) of seeds to achieve a breakthrough in foodgrain production, 
which enabled it to become self-sufficient in food. 2 
In the following ten or so pages I outline in summary my argument and its relation to 
existing understanding as a prelude to a detailed review of the literature.  
While the social effects of the Green Revolution have long been controversial, the basic 
narrative as it concerns increased food production and the causes of the increase has not. 
Nick Cullather’s recent work is the first history which questions this classic story, and his 
critique is largely based on challenging its Malthusian premise; he does this by 
questioning the nature and the severity of the 1966-67 Bihar famine.3 This thesis goes 
further and argues that there is no evidence of a breakthrough in foodgrain production 
                                                          
1 The point that there was an agricultural revolution in the rich world in the twentieth 
century which is scarcely noted in histories of technology has also been noted by David 
Edgerton, “Creole technologies and global histories: rethinking how things travel in space 
and time”, Journal of History of Science and Technology (2007) 1: 86 and David 
Edgerton, Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 (2006), pp. 64-
65. 
2 This is the general impression, most clearly articulated by Govindan Parayil, "The Green 
Revolution in India: A case study of technological change." Technology and Culture 
(1992) 33: 737-756. 
3 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia 
(Cambridge, Ma, 2010), pp. 205-231. 
                                                                         Introduction 
9 
 
and yields in the 1960s and 1970s; indeed there was a slowdown in the growth rates of 
both productivity and production of foodgrains as a whole during the period typically 
identified with the Green Revolution.  
Wheat production and yield did indeed see a remarkable growth from the mid-1960s 
onwards, but as it constituted a relatively minor part of India’s production basket, the 
wheat boom was insufficient to arrest the overall trend of declining growth rates.  As I 
will show, in practice historical studies of the Green Revolution focus on the story of 
wheat in India (without recognising that it constituted a relatively small part of India’s 
food basket), and tell the tale of the development of dwarf wheat varieties by Norman 
Borlaug in Mexico and the spectacular impact they had on India, when used with 
fertilizers. 4  I shall argue that the technology central to the wheat productivity boom was 
not the dwarf seed varieties (or even just fertilizer) but an expansion in irrigation. This 
expansion in irrigation took place through the rise of the private tubewell which the 
proximate and intended cause of the growth of wheat production. As some economists 
have noted, the Green Revolution was really a “tubewell revolution”; noting that a rise in 
yields has been closely predated by a boom in tubewell ownership in major Green 
Revolution areas.5  In other words my contention is that the Indian ‘green revolution’ of 
the 1960s and 1970s was confined to wheat, and was not due to the new dwarf varieties.  
The Green Revolution is not only incorrectly specified; its supposed cause was not the 
one so influentially suggested by the literature.  
Taking a broader view, I argue that there was indeed a general breakthrough in yields and 
production of foodgrains in India. But that breakthrough began around 1950 rather than 
in the mid-1960s and growth rates have been significantly and consistently higher in the 
postcolonial period than in the late colonial period. But the mid-1960s marked the 
beginning of a decade and a half of relative slowdown in the growth of production and 
yields of foodgrains; this was followed by a growth spurt in the 1980s, though the 1950s 
continued to be the decade which saw the best growth performance in twentieth-century 
India.  This has been obscured by the repeated uncritical acceptance of the Green 
                                                          
4 John Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat Genes and the Cold War 
(New York, 1997) is the best example. Also see Cullather, Hungry World. 
5 See for example Robert Repetto, The "second India" revisited: Population, poverty and 
environmental stress over two decades (Washington, DC, 1994), p. 35. 
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Revolution promoters in portraying this period as one of stagnation, in order to grossly 
inflate the relative performance of the period they wish to emphasise.  
My argument is that irrigation was the most significant technical factor in productivity 
change throughout the late twentieth century; its significance for wheat in particular 
increased in the period after the mid-1960s. In the case of rice too, the transformation of 
irrigation systems was the most significant factor in productivity enhancement but the 
challenges posed by diverse economic and agro-climatic issues to effective water 
management in rice cultivation made the transformation of rice irrigation a slow process 
after the mid-1960s compared to the quick transformation and expansion afford by private 
tubewells in the wheat-growing regions of northwestern India. Fertilizer was relatively 
insignificant to wheat production before the mid-1960s and its importance did indeed rise 
rapidly through time though not quite in the form of a spectacular breakthrough as is 
assumed. As for the dwarf wheat varieties, their role was neutral (if not negative) in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the period which forms the focus of Green Revolution studies. 
They did perhaps indeed become significant in a later period as fertilizer use gradually 
rose to a point of declining returns with tall varieties.  New varieties however played a 
significant role in the post 1980 transformation of rice production as their short duration 
photo insensitive qualities enabled the extension of rice cultivation to non-traditional 
regions and seasons more amenable to higher yields through better water management 
with tubewells. 
An understanding of the causes of this temporally and spatially uneven long-term growth 
calls for a new history of agriculture during the entire period. This thesis is an attempt at 
the beginnings of such a history with a focus on irrigation, an input which both historical 
actors and contemporary experts (though not most historians) agree is the most crucial 
one in the Indian context.   
The story of irrigation in twentieth-century India has not been told. The historiography 
has largely confined itself to the colonial period and focusses on large-scale canal 
irrigation systems, and the scant work on water in postcolonial India has focussed on 
Nehru’s dams; indeed the big dam is central to our understanding of postcolonial Indian 
modernity. But despite the centrality of canals, big dams and other centralizing 
technologies in our picture of water and modernity, the larger story of twentieth-century 
irrigation has been a move towards small-scale irrigation systems based on groundwater. 
                                                                         Introduction 
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India leads the world in the volume of groundwater extracted annually and this accounts 
for over two-thirds of Indian irrigation today. The most important means of groundwater 
irrigation in India is the tubewell; India, indeed colonial India, was a pioneer in tubewell 
irrigation.  
The bulk of this thesis is a first history of irrigation in twentieth-century India which puts 
the tubewell at its centre. Far from neglecting groundwater irrigation as the literature 
portrays, I will show that the interwar colonial Indian state did much to promote it and 
was the global pioneer in the large-scale use of tubewells. This emphasis continued in 
Nehruvian India where public tubewells were an integral part of investment in irrigation 
and I will go on to show that there was a massive rise in tubewell irrigation in the 1960s. 
While the value of irrigation was scarcely ever contested, three conflicts shaped irrigation 
development in important ways: between public and private ownership, between large 
and small-scale systems and between agricultural and industrial investment. These 
conflicts came to a head at two different points; the wartime food crisis and the economic 
crisis of the mid-1960s. Both periods saw an emphasis on small-scale groundwater 
irrigation rather than on large-scale surface irrigation development as the key to quick 
results. The wartime crisis put the public tubewell on the central government’s agenda 
and the emphasis on public irrigation continued through the Nehruvian era.  
The crisis of the mid-1960s saw a shift in emphasis from large, long-gestation dam 
projects to small, quick-maturing tubewell schemes, and a shift in central government 
priorities from the industrial to the agricultural. But far more significant was a shift in 
emphasis from public irrigation systems to private tubewells. The mid-1960s saw an 
explicit prioritization of the privately-owned tubewell, based on a model of the peasant 
as an efficient, rational being whose profit-maximizing objectives were in conflict with 
the social equity objectives of public irrigation systems. The World Bank was the chief 
enunciator of this argument, which found ready ears amongst Indian politicians and 
administrators who were seeking to put the private profit motive at the centre of 
agricultural development efforts. Aided by the Bank, they mounted a programme of cheap 
loans and subsidies to promote private tubewells which quickly became the single most 
important mode of irrigation in India, with a spectacular impact on wheat production. 
Putting the tubewell at the heart of such an agricultural history allows us to 
reconceptualise the agricultural policy in a fresh manner. An emphasis on public irrigation 
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systems, whether tubewells or the big dams characterized the Nehruvian era. By showing 
clearly how elite development actors led by the World Bank emphasized the private profit 
motive and thus put private, rather than public tubewells at the heart of the new 
agricultural strategy in the mid-1960s and thus precipitated a private tubewell boom, I 
argue that this was an important episode in the long history of state-promoted market-
oriented development in Indian agriculture. I explore the intellectual backdrop of these 
ideas and argue that their genesis lay in economist Theodore Schultz’s Nobel Prize 
winning theory of the “poor but rational peasant”. Focus on the promotion of an 
indivisible input such as the private tubewell rather than on the ostensibly scale neutral 
inputs such as new seeds and fertilizers highlights the fact that rising inequality was not 
a side effect of policies but consciously built into technology choice.  
Similarly, I shall also demonstrate how the choice of the dwarf wheat varieties was 
motivated not by the need for higher overall production but to ensure supernormal yields 
for a small number of entrepreneurial cultivators; tall Indian varieties and more equitable 
fertilizer distribution would have resulted in higher production with the benefits better 
shared and with more efficient use of scarce inputs such as land and fertilizer. I thus 
challenge the central triumphalist success story of plant breeding – that of a Green 
Revolution caused by new varieties, which is still central to the rhetoric around 
biotechnology today. As a more general aim, this thesis seeks to challenge the continued 
innovation-centredness of our understanding of technology and economic development 
by highlighting the central and leading role played by one of the oldest agricultural 
techniques (irrigation) in what is assumed to be an innovation-driven production boom. 
It also challenges the production-centred narrative on Indian food self-sufficiency by 
arguing that an equally important role was played by logistical changes such as improved 
procurement, building up of a buffer stock to deal with production shortfalls and state 
intervention in the grain markets. 
The history of late twentieth century Indian agriculture has hitherto largely focussed on 
one kind of expert (the plant breeder) and non-governmental institution (the Rockefeller 
Foundation which funded plant breeding research).  This thesis also seeks to expand the 
focus of historical study to new kinds of experts and institutions. Besides the irrigation 
engineer, this thesis strongly emphasizes the role of economists as key experts grappling 
with the problems of agricultural development. In addition to emphasizing the role of 
social scientists as historical actors, this thesis engages substantially with their theory, 
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rhetoric and the application of their ideas, as well as their studies of the impact of technical 
change rather than merely quoting them as fact as is too often the case. It also emphasizes 
the astonishingly neglected role of the World Bank in guiding and financing agricultural 
development in India. In doing so, it emphasizes that agricultural change was as much 
about finance and economic policy as it was about technical change. 
This thesis also contributes to the historiography of technology in which scale is an 
important theme; with the implicit suggestion (made explicit in the work of James Scott6) 
is that that states prefer centralization and gargantuan scale and this has something to do 
with the negative impact of economic development. This thesis shows that small-scale 
technologies such as tubewells and a vision that placed the individual at its heart could 
also be central to “seeing like a state”7 and lead to a diverse set of consequences that while 
not necessarily negative, were far from socially and environmentally optimal. 
Further, this thesis illustrates just how central the argument that existing systems are at 
some kind of technological or ecological limit is to the promotion of new technologies. 
Thus it was argued dams and tubewells were needed as (then) conventional surface 
irrigation development had reached its limits, private tubewells were needed as public 
irrigation systems could not serve the needs of modern agriculture, dwarf plant varieties 
were needed as improved tall varieties had attained their full potential and chemical 
fertilizers were needed as the use of organic manures had reached its full potential. This 
thesis argues that such arguments were usually erroneous and were made to push for far-
reaching social and economic change that had little to do with technology; indeed 
technological change served to deflect attention from far more controversial policy 
change.  
Finally, this thesis makes a contribution to the history of science, technology and 
development in India. Existing work on the twentieth century privileges the rhetorical and 
ideological issues with a consequent neglect of the material aspects of this history. This 
thesis argues that a study of the material is equally important. It also seeks to provide a 
corrective to the neglect of the role of the state in the growing body of work on small 
machines or “everyday technology” of which the tubewell is a prime example. 
                                                          
6 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Ct., 1998). 
7 To borrow from the title of Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
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Cutting across the colonial-postcolonial divide, I argue that there was significant 
continuity between the two; rhetoric mattered little and for the most part, the postcolonial 
state merely scaled up British efforts. The standard position, as exemplified by the 
scholarly work on the Green Revolution, is that postwar “development” was a project 
with origins in America and rooted in Cold War imperatives; this thesis argues that while 
American foundations and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank played a 
significant role, a fuller picture may yet be obtained by concentrating not just on foreign 
institutions but local ones as well. Indeed as I will show, longue durée economic histories 
of India which appear not to have been read by historians of postwar development pre-
empted my arguments about the Green Revolution.  
In the next few sections, I shall further develop my critique of the existing historiography 
of the Green Revolution, irrigation in India, science and technology in India as well as 
Indian history more generally, and lay out my arguments in relation to the existing 
literature. 
Agricultural History: A Green Revolution? 
Despite the seeming coherence suggested by the term, the Green Revolution has many 
meanings in the historiography. At the global scale, it has been taken to mean the increase 
in the production and land productivity of foodgrain cultivation in poor countries after 
the Second World War. But as Jon Harwood has pointed out, this global revolution is 
merely the agglomeration of several regional and national revolutions that took place at 
differing times across the developing world in the postwar period. 8 He has used the term 
to refer to a central European “Green Revolution” during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.9  
The term itself was only coined in 1968 by a USAID administrator to describe a potential 
agricultural breakthrough in South Asia, the Philippines and Turkey to contrast it with the 
Red Revolution promises by Soviet Russia (and Maoist China) and the Shah’s White 
Revolution in Iran.10 But it has been applied to a wide range of national, regional and 
                                                          
8 Jonathan Harwood, Europe's Green Revolution and Others Since: The Rise and Fall of 
Peasant-friendly Plant Breeding (London, 2012), p. 115. 
9 Harwood, Europe's Green Revolution. 
10 William Gaud’s address to the Society for International Development on March 8th 
1968 at Washington, DC. Accessed online at http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-
info/topics/borlaug/borlaug-green.html on 10th August 2015. 
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global contexts. Thus the first such revolution, which became exemplar for all others 
ostensibly took place in Mexico as a result of the work of the Rockefeller Foundation 
between the 1940s and early 1960s, with the Philippines, India and Pakistan following in 
the 1960s and early 1970s. For at least 30 years, donors (the latest being the Gates 
Foundation) have been speaking of a Green Revolution in Africa. In India there are calls 
for a second Green Revolution (to increase yields in the original Green Revolution state 
of Punjab where they have apparently been stagnating since the 1990s),11 a doubly Green 
Revolution (that is productive and environmentally sustainable)12 as well as an official 
government programme called “Bringing the Green Revolution to Eastern India” 
(BGREI) to repeat the Punjab experience in areas still deemed backward.13 
In the Indian case the revolutionary transformation called the Green Revolution is always 
placed in the late 1960s and 1970s. As the Indian case serves as the exemplar, the global 
Green Revolution has typically been periodized during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
historiography of late twentieth century Indian agriculture has thus focussed exclusively 
on the events of the 1960s which is deemed to have led to a Green Revolution; a boom in 
yields which is ascribed to the HYVs.  
While social scientists have produced enough scholarly analyses of the Green Revolution 
“to fill a medium sized public library”14, historical treatments are few and far in between.  
Three key works all pertain substantially to the Indian case; in chronological order, these 
are the works of Parayil (published in 1992), Perkins (published in 1997) and Cullather 
(published in 2010).15 Parayil provides the best specialist exposition of the common 
understanding of the Indian case, defining the Green Revolution as an “increase in cereal 
productivity experienced in some Third-World countries as a result of the change in 
                                                          
11 Anon., "Swaminathan calls for second green revolution", Rediff News 2nd December 
2005. Accessed online at http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/dec/02swami.htm on 10th 
August 2015. 
12 Mae-Wan Ho, "Beware the New "Doubly Green Revolution", Institute of Science in 
Society website, accessed online at http://www.i-sis.org.uk/doublygreenrevolution.php 
on 10th August 2015. 
13 Anon., "India becomes world’s leading rice exporter: CARE Ratings", India Infoline, 
Accessed online at http://www.indiainfoline.com/article/print/news-top-story/india-
becomes-worlds-leading-rice-exporter-care-ratings-114020501004_1.html on 10th 
August 2015. 
14 As put by Cullather, Hungry World, p. 230. 
15 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, pp. 737-756, Cullather, Hungry World and 
Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. 
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agricultural technology during the 1960s and 1970s”; this made India self-sufficient in 
food production.16 By his account, a stasis in the growth of food production led to a near 
famine situation in 1965 due to a neglect of agriculture by the late colonial state and 
Nehruvian India. The “only way” to self-sufficiency was to “introduce modern 
technology that would augment cereal production with land as the fixed variable”; in other 
words to increase yields.17 This happened through the introduction of the new HYVs of 
wheat and rice from Mexico and the Philippines respectively, and led to a remarkable 
growth in yields and production.  Simple as Parayil’s overall schema is, he does attempt 
to posit a longer history of the Green Revolution, dividing it in three phases. The first 
(1952-65) saw the development of a new agricultural research system. The second (1962-
67) saw the reform of the agricultural bureaucracy while the third (1965-75) saw the 
adoption of the HYVs. Placing a premium on scientific research, he sees the most 
important step as the setting up of the agricultural research system, though the new 
varieties were not developed in India. This was so as it enabled a programme of national 
demonstration to popularize the new seeds.18 Parayil’s is an unabashed tale of the triumph 
of science; one of a “relatively successful technology transfer” and “diffusion of 
knowledge”.19 The Green Revolution in India thus was essentially the spread of the pre-
war plant-breeding-led agricultural revolution in Europe and the United States to the 
Third World after some unfortunate decades, and this spread took place through the 
particular HYVs of wheat and rice developed later. 20 The domestic and international 
political-economic context is absent from this early work. Biologist-historian John 
Perkins’ history of wheat breeding goes far in correcting this lacuna, though the focus is 
still on plant breeding.  Perkins argues that concerns of national security and foreign-
exchange management were central to government commitment to wheat breeding in 
India, Mexico, Britain and the United States. For the Americans, foreign aid supporting 
agricultural improvement was tied to strategic cold war aims. Hungry stomachs made for 
communist insurrection; the so-called Population-National Security Theory. Two 
portions of the book concentrate on India: a chapter covering the major developments in 
India’s foodgrain and agricultural research policy, and a long section in a chapter on 
                                                          
16 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, p. 737. 
17 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, p. 741. 
18 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, pp. 737-746. 
19 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, p. 737. 
20 Parayil, “The Green Revolution in India”, pp. 741-44. 
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science and the Green Revolution. Perkins’ overarching tale differs little from Parayil’s, 
except in adding detail to the scientific history of the development and trials of the dwarf 
wheat varieties, and Indo-American diplomatic wrangles over food aid and agricultural 
development; particularly during the mid-1960s. The key players in his schema are plant 
scientists and the politicians who supported them. 21 
Thus both these works essentially tell the story of how India solved its food problem by 
adopting the “miracle seeds”. In doing so, they repeat a refined version of the story told 
by the proponents of the new technology and early eulogists of the Green Revolution 
which included American and Indian scientists, politicians and agencies such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation.  
Nick Cullather’s recent book makes a departure from these works in taking a critical 
approach, and is perhaps the best account of the Green Revolution thus far. He recasts the 
spectacle of the adoption of dwarf wheat varieties in India as merely the final episode in 
two decades of American efforts at remaking the Asian countryside; his is a history of 
American-aided rural development rather than plant breeding alone. The Hungry World 
is an ambitious work exploring the meaning, means and impact of development through 
time and space in the mid-20th century. Beginning with the measurement of human caloric 
needs at the turn of the century and new developments in population theory in the interwar 
years, Cullather argues that awareness the world food problem as perceived in the 1960s 
had less to do with Malthus than with the twentieth-century methods of coding the world 
by numbers. Placing the genesis of the development project in the Depression-New Deal 
era, he goes on to study the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Program. 
This, he argues, was recast with selectively remembered features as a model for economic 
development after the war; it was “an answer in search of a riddle” as other models were 
in play in the late 1940s and 1950s. 22  Subsequent chapters explore the history of these 
models such as community development in India, land reform elsewhere in Asia and 
Tennessee Valley Authority-style dam building in Afghanistan.23  
The second half of the book deals substantially with the events leading up to the Green 
Revolution as generally understood. Exploring debates within American academia and 
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administration over modernization, over food aid to India and over the respective roles of 
agriculture and industry in economic development, he sees the late 1950s as a pivotal 
moment when a couple of influential reports restored the centrality of the population-food 
problem. He moves on to the development of the “miracle rice” IR 8 in the Philippines in 
the 1960s, stressing its importance in furnishing a visual representation of rural 
development. He next explores how agriculture, and wheat in particular, became the 
centre of Indian development efforts in the mid-1960s. This is followed by a study of the 
contrasting American and Indian perceptions of the Bihar famine. The last of the 
historical chapters begins with the story of the miracle harvest of 1968 and goes on to 
explore the socio-political impact of the Green Revolution in various countries. 24 
Cullather’s overall argument is that “development” emerged as a central concern of 
American diplomacy during the cold war. America was influenced by a variety of 
competing ideas in its confrontation with the continent of peasants, and advisers were 
never able to settle on a single consensual model of rural development; theory and praxis 
were driven by a quest for narratives to frame problems. There was a constant quest for 
spectacles to dramatize the fruits of modernity, and the building of transferrable models 
of development was central to this American project. Throughout this period, technology 
was used as a way to avoid historical responsibility and democratic choice. To Cullather 
then, the Green Revolution was the culmination of these models, a term which “lent 
coherence to three decades of conflict, innovation, failure, and success”. Intended as a 
new model rather than as retrospective judgment, the term nevertheless gave a rise to a 
legend; “a heroic parable of population, food and science solidified into history”. 25 
What is notable is Cullather’s challenge to this narrative. He suggests for example that 
the self-sufficiency in rice achieved by the Philippines was a case of outright fraud 
orchestrated by Ferdinand Marcos. Central to his challenging of the myth in the Indian 
case is his questioning of the severity and nature of the infamous 1966 Bihar famine 
through his exploration of how the meaning of famine was contested between the 
provincial, national and American governments in a chapter that ends with an impressive 
paragraph, 
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In the 1970s, social scientists and official commissions produced… a mixed 
verdict on what they called HYVs… [But] a more consequential narrative took 
root in the press and public memory. The green revolution legend, embellished 
after 1970 owes much to [President Lyndon] Johnson’s imagineering. In this 
version, the late 1960s witnessed a historic turnaround in Asia’s food supply… 
This simpler and more satisfying account rests on a claim- Johnson’s claim- that 
India actually had a close brush with its Malthusian limit in 1966. It has become 
the basis for a growing consensus that India’s experience should be repeated. 26 
In addition to questioning India’s brush with its Malthusian limits, there are other passing 
hints in The Hungry World which challenge the classic narrative. Thus Cullather suggests 
that Indians were eating better than ever before in the late 1950s; supply was indeed 
unable to keep up with demand, but the latter was fuelled by rising incomes and evolving 
consumer preferences rather than by population growth. Far from being in decline, Indian 
agriculture was actually experiencing something of an export boom; albeit in cash crops 
such as jute rather than food.27 As for the seeds he questions their importance by quoting 
William Gaud (the USAID administrator who coined the term Green Revolution) who 
said that the new seeds were merely an inducement to get countries to devote more 
resources to agriculture.28 
Parayil and Perkins have assumed that the late 1960s and 1970s saw a boom in foodgrain 
production and have thus focussed on the political-scientific story of how that boom came 
to be. Cullather, with his interest in the intellectual-diplomatic history of development has 
based his critique on challenging the Malthusian premise of the Green Revolution legend, 
seeking to demonstrate how a model based on that shaky premise is being extended today 
as a development solution today in Africa. While none of these works closely examine 
India’s foodgrain production statistics, they do make strong though vague claims about 
production growth and the attainment of self-sufficiency. Parayil makes the claim for self-
sufficiency in a fairly straightforward manner, though he says yields rose steadily from 
1965 till 1975 followed by plateauing and subsequent revival in the late 1980s. 29 Perkins 
writes that the Green Revolution in rice and wheat “did not end the question of agriculture 
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and food production in India but shifted it onto an entirely renewed plain in which self-
sufficiency was a realistic goal.”30 Cullather makes no specific claim in this regard, 
though he indicates that he in in assent with the claim of higher growth, through phrases 
such as “sudden abundance created as much anxiety as sudden scarcity”. In line with 
Parayil, he quotes commentators who proclaimed the Green Revolution dead in the mid-
1970s. 31 These claims are based on a focus on wheat, a relatively minor crop ranking 
third in acreage and production amongst food crops at that time in India, and the 
productivity changes are largely ascribed to HYVs developed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation in Mexico; the transformation and expansion of irrigation has received little 
comment. 
 The theme of inequality is central to the critique of the Green Revolution. Parayil’s 
overwhelmingly techno-enthusiast narrative concludes with an attack on this critique; the 
Green Revolution’s critics he claims, are taking on the “wrong enemy”. Income 
inequality, the chief negative outcome of the Green Revolution had little to do with 
technology but with policies relating to taxation, subsidies, credit and wages; in any case 
according to him, inequality was slowly decreasing in the Green Revolution areas. 32 
Perkins mentions in passing the considerable disquiet over the regional and class 
inequalities inherent in the new strategy,33 which Cullather thinly expands upon. 
Cullather also mentions the inflation-fuelled leftist uprisings in Asia in the 1970s as a 
consequence of inequality and the considerable disquiet in international development 
organisations over the same.34 But exploration of the crucial question of inequality has 
largely been left to polemicists such as Vandana Shiva who focus on its consequences. 35  
There is scarce exploration of the evolving theories in development studies which made 
inequality acceptable in agricultural policy making, whether the application of these 
theories built inequality into technology choice and how policy makers grappled with and 
attempted to mitigate rising inequality. In the domain of intellectual history, studies of 
the Green Revolution have largely focussed on the shift in national priorities from 
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industry to agriculture and Cullather has given the best overview of the same though he 
too has neglected to study shifts in thinking about how agriculture was to be developed 
with the increased resources allocated to it.36 
Further, these histories have largely focussed on the role of the US and Indian 
governments and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, not fully appreciating both the 
advisory and hands on role of the World Bank and Indian financial institutions which 
were crucial in providing credit to cultivators for agricultural development. Finally, their 
focus has been on the process of innovation, technology adoption and policy change, 
giving no indication of the scope of logistical challenges involved in agricultural 
development and building of food-security systems. 
Historical accounts of Indian agriculture have shown some scepticism about Green 
Revolution claims. In his economic history of colonial and postcolonial India published 
in 1988, Dietmar Rothermund has argued that the growth rate of agricultural production 
in the 1950s was not negligible compared to the “much-advertised Green Revolution” 
after the mid-1960s  though this growth came entirely from expansion in area; thus 
deserving of the title “static agriculture”. 37 According to him, the Green Revolution 
“changed the record only in terms of a rapid growth of wheat” and at the macroscale, all 
that changed was that production growth was led by yield growth rather than cultivated 
area expansion. 38 Equally significantly, his chapter length account of the Green 
Revolution period does not at all mention the new seeds but emphasizes the importance 
of irrigation in reducing dependence on the monsoon. 39 
Tirthankar Roy has made the case for looking beyond institutional and class-related 
causes to explain the interwar Indian agrarian crisis, arguing for a need to examine the 
constraints (particularly those of an environmental nature) that limited returns on private 
investment in agriculture. According to him, factors limiting growth included missing 
markets for equipment, lack of cheap credit, low use of organic fertilizer and the high 
expense and uncertain return of investment on wells for irrigation. 40 The last was the 
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most important obstacle to the transformation of agriculture. Not only were wells 
expensive to sink outside of riparian Northern India, but the risk of failure and the cost of 
raising water was high. He has mentioned a government programme to supply cultivators 
with mechanical pumps in Madras, and noted that the spread of such pumps was limited 
before the cheap electric power was available. 41 
While Roy’s focus is on the interwar period, he has made several pertinent observations 
about the Green Revolution. Perhaps the most important of these is that growth rates of 
yields and irrigated area between 1970 and 2000 were not substantially higher than 
between 1950 and 1970. Poverty reduction was however faster in the later period as the 
irrigated area grew faster than population and this growth came from subsidies for the 
more democratic groundwater-based irrigation. Further, he has noted that as the 
fundamental obstacle to agricultural growth in the subcontinent was poor natural resource 
endowment, any agricultural policy that has worked at any time has involved substantial 
commitment of public resources to irrigation; in that sense whether a breakthrough 
happened in 1950 or 1970 is immaterial. Finally he has noted that while HYVs were not 
available in the 1920s, even traditional seeds were then operating well below their 
potential; indeed he has noted that substantial yield transformation was possible with the 
right combination of water, manure and traditional seeds. Thus to him, that it was well 
possible that had a concerted effort been made to reduce the cost of private investment, 
an “indigenous Green Revolution” would have occurred much earlier. 42A rethinking of 
the Green Revolution has also been suggested by Jon Harwood who has brought issues 
of technology and inequality to the fore by focusing on the rise and fall what he calls 
“peasant friendly plant breeding”. He argues that there are policy lessons to be had for 
present day practitioners of agricultural development from the Central European “Green 
Revolution” that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as 
from colonial-era agricultural development efforts; the latter suggestion is of particular 
relevance to this thesis. While his study of Central European agricultural development 
focusses on plant breeding, he has pointed to the importance of agricultural improvement 
efforts other than plant breeding; indeed, he has used his study to argue that the Green 
Revolution package was not the only way to boost productivity.43 In engaging with the 
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critique of the Green Revolution, he has emphasized how the new varieties’ massive 
requirement of water precluded their adoption by small farmers,44 and has also mentioned 
the unsustainable mining of groundwater this has resulted in.45 He has pointed out the 
importance of extension infrastructure in addition to research, and has rightly argued that 
the neglect of this aspect by both donors and governments was in part responsible for the 
rise in inequality.46 While he has argued that the public sector research that underwrote 
the Green Revolution differs fundamentally from the present day research into GM crops 
which is governed by the profit motive of the private sector, he has failed to fully 
recognize the centrality of the private profit motive in the Green Revolution of the 1960s 
and 1970s.47 
Historiography of Irrigation 
In Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, Karl Wittfogel argued that 
the social organization required to manage large-scale interventions into natural hydraulic 
regimes for irrigation have been closely associated with the concentration of power in 
elite hands; this was in fact an explanation for how absolutism in the orient was more 
comprehensive and brutal than in western societies.48 Attempts to generalize the insight 
of Wittfogel’s study of China have seldom borne fruit49 and the general idea of a 
“hydraulic society” is a somewhat unfashionable concept in academia today. 
Nevertheless, an obsession with the relationship between large-scale systems, power and 
social hierarchy continues to be central to studies of irrigation and the big dam is central 
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to our picture of water and modernity This is exemplified by Donald Worster’s study of 
water in the American West which he explicitly grounds in the Wittfogelian tradition 
(albeit with some qualification), arguing that large dams and canal systems have edged 
out the small farmer in favour of large capitalist farms and led to a redistribution of power 
to economic and bureaucratic elites; a state of affairs he contrasts with the more localized 
means of irrigation usually favoured by the native Americans.50 This association of 
modernity with large scale, centralized forms of water governance is also exemplified in 
James Scott’s influential book, Seeing Like a State where he argues that “legibility” is 
fundamental to the exercise of the high-modernist developmental power of the centralized 
state; while irrigation is not one of his case studies, he explicitly contrasts (in tabular 
form) the illegibility of “local customary use” and “local irrigation societies” with the 
legibility of the “centralized dam” and “irrigation control”.51 Most studies of water in the 
twentieth century then, focus on large-scale surface systems such as high dams.  
In the Indian case, the focus has been on the large perennial canal irrigation systems 
pioneered by the British in India. The historical study of canal irrigation in India was 
arguably pioneered by Elizabeth Whitcombe in the early 1970s with her book on the 
United Provinces, which challenged the then prevailing notion of colonial irrigation as 
having had an overwhelmingly positive impact. On the contrary, according to her, canal 
irrigation was accompanied by grave ecological consequences such as waterlogging and 
soil salinization; it merely created pockets of prosperity in a sea of depressed peasantry. 
52 This was countered a decade later by Ian Stone, who argued that Whitcombe had 
overstated the negative impact of surface irrigation; to him, canal irrigation was an 
“appropriate technology” which released overwhelmingly positive expansionary forces. 
To him, canal irrigation was the cause of the dynamism of agriculture in western UP as 
compared to other parts of the province. 53 
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Larger arguments in the irrigation historiography have since moved on from whether 
canal irrigation had a positive or negative impact to the political, economic and social 
aspects of these systems. In his study of the Punjab canal colonies, Imran Ali has argued 
that there was a tension between the economic and political agendas of the colonial 
dispensation. Thus economic growth was accompanied by underdevelopment as the 
development of capitalism was defeated by the colonial state’s embrace of archaic social 
institutions. 54 On similar lines, David Gilmartin has argued that the experience of canal 
irrigation in Punjab was characterized by tensions between what he called “imperial 
science” and “scientific empire”. While the former enabled the British to take control of 
nature and expand its revenue potential; the latter, in forcing the British to adapt practices 
to local political hierarchies and to the exploitative character of colonialism itself, 
constrained the transformative potential of large irrigation systems. 55 Finally, the Punjab 
case has also been studied by M. Muzaffakarul Islam who has argued that the British built 
the Punjab’s canals not for famine prevention or due to a “Paternalistic ethos” but to 
expand the tax base, better equip India to fulfill her role as a supplier of agricultural raw 
materials and to pay for imports from Britain. Canal irrigation did result in higher yields, 
but the performance was suboptimal due to the wasteful and inefficient use of water. Full-
scale capitalism failed to develop due to the existence of a vast pool of small farmers and 
labourers who would pay a high price for tenancy rather than work as wage labour; this 
proved more profitable to large land owners than hiring labour. 56 
We also have two chapter length overviews of colonial irrigation history more generally. 
In a nod to the “oriental despotism” idea, Headrick has argued that the British were driven 
by the “logic of benevolent tyranny” in their pursuit of gigantic irrigation schemes in 
India and Egypt. 57 Whitcombe has also written a chapter–length overview of colonial 
irrigation in which her essential argument is that despite some impressive achievements, 
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the narrow financial viewpoint taken by the administration prevented greater 
development of India’s water resources.58 
These histories of irrigation all end with the completion of the last great colonial irrigation 
works in the interwar years and there is hardly any work which take the story forward 
into the postcolonial years. The scant work studying water resources in the later period 
focus on the ideological and rhetorical aspects of the big dams, the construction of which 
became prominent in Nehruvian India. In an excellent study of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority and the Damodar Valley Corporation it inspired in India, Daniel Klingensmith 
seeks to explore how dams have been politically imagined in the twentieth century and 
argues that proponents of dams were well aware of their potential for environmental 
destruction but overestimated their ability to deal with the consequences. 59 In his study 
of the Hirakud dam, Rohan D’Souza thus argues that despite being celebrated as an 
apolitical consensus, TVA-style Multipurpose River Valley Development was introduced 
in India in the 1940s as the colonial state, Indian capital and sections of the nationalist 
leadership were crafting a new rhetoric for continued rule. 60, These works on dams tell 
us little about the concerns of irrigation and agriculture; indeed a careless reading might 
suggest that irrigation as a goal had little role to play in India’s commitment to big dams. 
The arrival of big dam technology from America is thus seen as a decisive rupture in the 
history of water management in India, rather than merely as one step in the long history 
of intervention in natural hydraulic regimes.61  
All these works have concentrated on large-scale projects. Groundwater irrigation has 
largely been neglected in accounts of irrigation in India and elsewhere, perhaps because 
of the perception, to quote Donald Worster, that "Subsurface deposits often require little 
social organization” and, by extension, were either uninteresting or might conflict with 
the association of modernity with centralized forms of water governance.62 In the 
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American case, we have two book length works studying the history of irrigation from 
the Ogallala aquifer on the US High Plains.63  In the Indian case, we have only a single 
brief paper focused on well irrigation. In Gujarat, where there were no large canal systems 
in competition, the colonial government incentivized the construction of irrigation wells, 
and the history of well irrigation in that region from pre-colonial to near contemporary 
times has been studied by David Hardiman. 64 He notes that contrary to a (then) recent 
think-tank report celebrating traditional water management structures, 65 merchant and 
usurer capital were influential to their economy even in pre-colonial times. He details 
British incentives for the construction of wells in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth centuries and argues that it would be incorrect to see the reasons for the present 
crisis in access to water to the commercialization of agriculture and the rise of economic 
individualism during the colonial period. According to him, colonial rule did not destroy 
traditional hierarchical communities, but by granting property rights in land and water, 
British rule strengthened the basis of local elites’ power.66 
Despite not being the focus, groundwater does figure in the historiography of colonial 
Indian irrigation as well. For example, both Whitcombe and Stone agreed that that canal 
irrigation, due to its low cost, led to a decline in irrigation from wells that was traditional 
in western UP. Whitcombe argued that well irrigation was efficient in its use of water as 
it was constrained by the availability of labour and draught power which prevented over 
cultivation and consequent loss of soil fertility; in addition, well irrigation did not lead to 
grave environmental problems like waterlogging which were closely associated with 
canals. 67 However, Stone argued that by releasing the labour and draught power that 
would otherwise have to be employed for well irrigation, canals enabled intensified 
cultivation that would have been impossible with well irrigation.68 The neglect and 
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decline of groundwater irrigation in the colonial period has also been noted by Imran Ali 
who has devoted a brief section to lift and tubewell irrigation in Punjab between 1910 and 
1930 mostly centred on the efforts of the private agriculturalist Sir Ganga Ram. Ali has 
attributed the failure to develop tubewell irrigation to the slow spread of electric power 
and to the reliance of the colonial state on intermediaries such as Sir Ganga Ram for 
agricultural improvement efforts.69 While Islam has shown that groundwater irrigation 
saw a resurgence in early twentieth-century Punjab and thus argued that the picture of 
decline gleaned from the UP studies could not be generalized,70 the overall picture of 
small-scale irrigation in the historiography is still one of governmental neglect if not 
decline as suggested by Whitcombe’s overview of colonial irrigation.71 
These passing references scarcely do justice to the importance of groundwater irrigation 
in India, which leads the world in the volume of groundwater extracted annually; 
irrigation from groundwater accounts for two thirds of India’s irrigated acreage. Such is 
the perceived importance of groundwater to the Indian economy that a World Bank 
estimate in the 1990s suggested that the ability to extract groundwater for irrigation 
contributed 10% to India’s GDP.72 The economist Tushaar Shah has argued that the larger 
story of late twentieth-century irrigation in south Asia is one of a regression from the 
largest centrally managed surface irrigation system in to world to an anarchy of privately-
owned pumps.73 To a lesser extent, this has been a global trend led by northwestern India, 
the south China plains and the US high plains. The neglect is to be lamented not merely 
because tubewells became more important in the postcolonial period which has been the 
subject of few histories; not only was the tubewell arguably central to postcolonial 
agricultural development, but as I will detail, colonial India saw the first large-scale use 
of tubewells anywhere in the world. 
History of Science and Technology in India 
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There exists a rich historiography of science in colonial India and it is well recognized 
that science is central to the understanding of colonialism and of modern India more 
generally. This historiography, which is concerned with the nature of the colonial 
encounter addresses itself first to the question of “Science and Empire” and only then 
with Indian history.74 The scholarly study of this question of how science moves from the 
metropolis to the colony is traditionally dated to Basalla’s three stage diffusion model.75 
It began to be challenged from the late 1970s onwards with the backlash against 
modernization theory and the rise of dependency theory; this challenge has been central 
to the historiography. 
This challenge takes the form of several non-mutually exclusive strategies. To begin with, 
it emphasizes the concept of colonial science as embodying the specificities of the 
colonial relationship in any given locality and the struggles and negotiations that 
characterized the growth and spread of science in India. By demonstrating that the 
economic needs of the colonial government shaped the work of scientists, it argues that 
science was as much constructed in the colonies as “Western science” was spread.76 
Another strategy stresses the agency of Indians by emphasizing the struggle, resistance 
and subversion inherent in reinterpretation of Western science in the Indian context.77 Yet 
another position emphasizes that syncretism was central to the evolution of science in the 
colonies which was a marriage between Western and Indian practices; as Kapil Raj has 
noted, South Asia was an active though unequal participant in the world order of 
knowledge.78 
The intellectual, the rhetorical and the discursive, rather than the material have dominated 
the historiography of technology in the twentieth century; this is in contrast to studies of 
the genesis and impact of technologies such as large-scale irrigation, the railways and the 
telegraph in earlier periods. The concern of historians studying this period is with the 
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interlacing of science, technology, modernity and nationalism and scholarly work is 
centred on analysis of the discourse by scientists and nationalists. Gyan Prakash thus 
argues that for the colonial authorities, India’s resources were to be acted upon by the 
“technologies of government”; nationalists’ critique of colonial rule rested on the idea 
that the British had not gone far enough in developing India through science, technology 
and industrialization. Gandhi, whose views lay entirely outside the spectrum of 
conventional ideas in his trenchant critique of modernity was sidelined by dominant 
nationalists and thus began the love affair with science and technology in Nehruvian India 
and beyond. 79  
However, the material must play an important role in studies of technology, for doing 
may illustrate more significant continuities than analysis of sharply polarized opinions 
might suggest.  Further, bridging the history of colonial technology and postcolonial 
“development” may help challenge the idea, exemplified in the works on the Green 
Revolution, that the latter had origins exclusively in interwar United States. But, as 
Christopher Baker has argued, the postcolonial government inherited considerable “work 
in progress” from the colonial state.80 Studying a period that cuts across the divide of 
1947 may help test our assumptions both about colonial technology and postcolonial 
development. There is a growing interest in emphasizing the colonial origins of 
development, best exemplified in Joseph Morgan’s recent work which builds upon the 
studies of Helen Tilley in Africa and Suzanne Moon in the Dutch East Indies.81 His work, 
which is centred on the growing networks of expertise around the Colonial Office in 
London (which mostly engaged with Africa) argues that scientific experts rose to 
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unparalleled authority under late British imperialism which was an imperialism of 
science; these experts prefigured ideas of restraint and long-term sustainability.82 
With the exception of the  work on dams which I have previously discussed, histories of 
science and technology which engage substantially with postcolonial India have 
privileged scientific research and independent India’s engagement with the “cutting 
edge” science and technology fields of the day; mostly (nuclear) physics.83 But in an 
attempt to provide a corrective to this focus on the big, there is a growing interest in 
studying “everyday technology” in the non-western world; this was the subject of a 
special issue of Modern Asian Studies in 2012 as well as a recent book by David Arnold.84 
In his study of bicycles, typewriters, sewing machines and rice mills, Arnold argues that 
a study of these “small machines” can enable the discipline to move away from a 
chronicling of British rule (that apparently comes from a focus on big technologies such 
as railways and large-scale irrigation schemes) to a study of the “inner histories of India”. 
The intimacy offered by “everyday technology” associated as it was with myriad forms 
of appropriation, modification and cultural context he argues, will also help counter the 
“diffusionist model”.85 While offering a rare and interesting account of small machines 
which have thus far escaped the attention of historians of India, Arnold’s work has little 
to offer by way of any larger arguments. Combating diffusionism has been the central 
project of the historiography of colonial-era technology for a quarter of a century now 
and it is unclear what a turn towards the small can add to that project. While the 
historiography of technology in colonial India and beyond must indeed address issues of 
culture and society as much as it addresses questions of the state, it does not follow that 
the history of small machines must be a history of society alone, or indeed that the history 
of big technology be a history of the state alone. While Arnold does not quite suggest 
small technology as a means of subversion, the state is largely absent from his work 
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except as an occasional regulator and user of small machines. In an epilogue titled “The 
God of Small Things” he stresses the importance of small technology by referring to the 
small pumps “responsible for the greening of so much of the Indian countryside” in 
contrast to Nehru’s dams which have become mired in high environmental and social 
costs. 86  The special issue of Modern Asian Studies also carries an article about small 
pumps in Vietnam which privileges the role of local enterprise and innovation.87 But these 
works scarcely do justice to the importance of these machines and their centrality in a 
state-sponsored scheme of agricultural transformation. 
David Edgerton has argued that rather than replacing a focus on “high-tech, masculine, 
industrial technologies” with a focus on “the low tech, the feminine and the domestic”, 
we need to engage with both to get a sense of the “material basis of human existence”, 88 
though he is often misunderstood as arguing for studying the small rather than the large. 
This thesis thus focusses is not on small-scale technology (like tubewells) alone, but also 
on the concurrent investment in big dams.  The issue is which technologies have which 
effects, and in much literature particular technologies are systematically overemphasized, 
usually some (but not all) novel technologies. In the case of agricultural development the 
HYVs have been gross over emphasized, neglecting fertilizer and especially tubewells; 
furthermore a whole series of economic innovations have tended to be ignored. Finally, 
it is guided by another (lesser known) argument of David Edgerton’s; that the idea of a 
world at its “technological limits” which is often used by technology promoters is usually 
erroneous.89 This thesis thus engages critically with the arguments of technology 
promoters rather than state them as fact which is too often the case in histories of 
technology in general and of the Green Revolution in particular.  
However, excessive focus on innovation and context that has led to the privileging of “the 
question of technology”. As David Edgerton has argued, we need a new post contextualist 
history of technology that seeks to address historical questions and produce a new 
understanding of historical events, rather than merely seeking to contextualize technology 
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with existing known histories. 90 This thesis is thus concerned not with irrigation alone 
but with rethinking the changing nature of the state and economy in twentieth-century 
India. 
History of Contemporary India 
Despite the oft-lamented fact that histories of India end in 1947, 91 that line has been 
breached more frequently than is acknowledged. The first significant general history of 
independent India, India Since Independence (published in 1999) authored by Bipan 
Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, a group of historians at the 
Jawaharlal Nehru University displayed some of Rothermund’s scepticism. Thus they 
claim (albeit with little more than outline figures for expenditure) that the Nehruvian state 
did not neglect agriculture. Crucially, they recognize that the impact of the Green 
Revolution was not due to production growth alone but a rapid increase in  marketable 
surplus as gains were mostly made in regions already producing more than they 
consumed; it was this rather than aggregate production growth which enabled the 
government to procure food and build buffer stocks.92 
But despite this recognition, the authors are in agreement with the argument that by the 
1960s, growth through traditional means was reaching its limits which was overcome by 
“critical scientific breakthroughs”.93 According to them, the new strategy helped India 
maintain growth rates of production achieved in the 1950s and the Green Revolution put 
an end to “India’s ‘begging bowl’ image”. 94 Thus this work is largely celebrates the Green 
Revolution’s achievements in food production and poverty reduction. 
In the absence of substantial historical work, political scientists are usually relied upon to 
provide a picture of the Indian state. Some of these works effectively count as primary 
observations if not actor accounts; for example one of the best known political scholars 
of India is Francine Frankel who came to study the Green Revolution in the 1960s, 
working closely with institutions such as USAID and the World Bank, and this thesis uses 
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(and engages substantially) with her book on the Green Revolution.95 In the late 1970s, 
Frankel also wrote a detailed study of India’s political economy. Her central argument is 
that India’s political framework was designed to uphold the interests of the propertied 
classes; as key subjects such as land reforms were left to the provinces which were 
politically controlled by the landed elite, any revolution was necessarily gradual. From 
the early 1960s, Nehru’s authority declined and his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri shifted 
the balance even more in favour of provincial power and landed agrarian interests.96  
Lloyd and Susan Rudolph’s In Pursuit of Lakshmi (published in 1987) also serves as a 
reference work on the Indian State. Rural class polarization, they argue, has been limited 
by the preponderance of the “bullock capitalists”; cultivators who benefited from the 
Green Revolution but largely rely on family, rather than wage labour. 97 With the bullock 
capitalists as a hegemonic rural class (who they emphasize, are not kulaks) uniting the 
interests of capital, management and labour, class politics has not made much headway 
in the countryside; this the emergence of this class has helped strengthen national centrist 
politics. The Rudolphs place much emphasis on the role of these bullock capitalist as a 
“demand group” which has played an increasingly important role in India politics since 
the late 1970s, but their work tells us little that is unknown about the processes of policy 
and technical change that made this class powerful.98 
Another influential work of political science is Sunil Khilnani’s The Idea of India which 
like India Since Independence was published around the 50th anniversary of 
decolonization. In a chapter titled “Temples of the future” (after the epithet Nehru gave 
to big dams), Khilnani starts with the claim that “India in the 1950s fell in love with the 
idea of concrete” and says that half a century later, most agree that the Nehruvian 
modernist vision was grandiose, irrelevant and destructive; dams have come to be seen 
as a “fantasy insensitive to ecological limits” which turned citizens into refugees.99 His 
engagement with the Nehruvian period though, focusses mostly on planning for 
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industrialization; on agriculture he argues that the “agricultural policies of the Green 
Revolution managed to break India’s dependence of food imports” in the 1970s.100 
Finally, we have the best known history of independent India; Ramachandra Guha’s 
popular India After Gandhi. A magisterial work exceptional in scale, it attempts to make 
few specific arguments, but references within supports the general picture of Nehruvian 
neglect of agriculture and a Gandhian critique of his big dams101 as well as a necessary 
and successful Green Revolution. 102 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters covering the period between 1900 and 1980. The 
first chapter focusses on the story of the classic Green Revolution sets the argument for 
the rest of the thesis. It argues that a breakthrough in the land productivity of foodgrains 
actually took place around 1950 and the productivity gains in wheat from the mid-1960s 
(and later, in rice) had to do more with the transformation and expansion of irrigation 
with tubewells rather than new seed varieties.  
The next three chapters tell the story of irrigation development in India from about 1900 
to the mid-1960s when the emphasis was on publicly-owned systems.  Chapter 2 explores 
the colonial origins of tubewell irrigation and presents an overview of state stimuli to 
groundwater irrigation in late colonial India taking the Indian Irrigation Commission of 
1901-03 as its starting point. The bulk of the chapter is centred on the career of Sir 
William Stampe, a British engineer who was the force behind an important rural irrigation 
and public tubewell programme in interwar India and served as Irrigation Adviser to the 
Government of India during the war. Besides demonstrating the attention paid by the 
colonial government to small-scale irrigation works, I argue that colonial engineers such 
as Stampe developed a small-scale, rural-agricultural vision for technology in India which 
was in sharp contrast to the large-scale, urban-industrial vision of nationalist technocrats. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of irrigation planning in India between 1950 and 1965 
with a focus on dams. I argue that Nehruvian India devoted much public investment to 
irrigation (and by extension, to agriculture), but the push for the same came from the 
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states rather than the central technocratic elite. I further argue that India’s commitment to 
big dams was not merely a result of the ideological example of the TVA but of long held 
aspirations of Indian irrigation engineers. In Chapter 4, I shall show how postwar India 
took up not just large dam projects but also public tubewell irrigation schemes; large 
projects resulted from the execution of Stampe’s grand plans after his departure from 
India and these were scaled up with American aid in the 1950s. 
Chapters 5 traces evolution the evolution of India’s New Agricultural Strategy in the mid-
1960s and argues that it was underpinned by Theodore Schultz’s theory of the rational 
peasant; ideas of peasant rationality were central to the choice of the dwarf wheat 
varieties.  Chapter 6 tells the story of how World Bank advice based on these ideas, 
together with unprecedented drought, a crisis of public finances and new ideas about the 
water needs of crops put the private tubewell at the centre of the discourse and practice 
of irrigation in India in the mid-1960s. The final chapter focusses on the activities of a 
public sector financial company called the Agricultural Refinance Corporation which 
played a central loan in promoting groundwater irrigation through cheap loans to 




Chapter 1: Green Revolution? 
 The late 1960s is where a breakthrough in twentieth-century Indian food production is 
typically placed. The key claims of this “Green Revolution” are that there was remarkable 
growth in the production and yields of foodgrain and that these productivity gains were 
largely due to the introduction of High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of seeds.  In this 
chapter, I shall challenge both these claims and argue that the revolutionary 
transformation of production and yields of foodgrains began around 1950. The 1950s saw 
India’s best performance in the growth rate of production and yield of foodgrains; the 
1960s and 1970s were in fact a period of slower growth, though the performance was 
much better than in any period during the colonial era.  
The standard periodization stems from a focus on a technological transformation in the 
1960s in production of wheat, a relatively minor part of India’s food basket. I shall argue 
that while it was indeed the case that India’s wheat production and yields attained a new 
plane in the late 1960s, it merely followed a less spectacular revolution in the 1950s. 
HYVs developed by the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico are conventionally seen as the 
main cause of this Green Revolution. I shall however argue that the technology central to 
this transformation in the 1960s was irrigation-expansion through private tubewells rather 
than new seed varieties. In fact, inefficient in their use of fertilizer, the HYVs likely 
impeded the efficient growth of wheat yields in the country.  
I shall then turn attention to rice which has received scant historical attention in the Indian 
context despite being preponderant in India’s food basket. I will show that rice production 
too had two underwent two revolutions. While the first which started towards the end of 
the War was more spectacular than the corresponding revolution in wheat; the second 
began later (around the mid-1970s) and was less spectacular than the second wheat 
revolution. These growth spurts were interspersed by a period of slow growth in the late 
1960s and 1970s, making for the low growth of overall foodgrain production in India. 
I shall argue that tubewell irrigation lay at the heart of the rice revolution as well. The 
qualitative advantages of private tubewells over canals such as reliability and individual 
control played a greater role in the transformation of rice production compared to wheat 
where the advantage of private tubewells was mostly confined to an increase in the water 
supply. This they did by enabling some rice cultivators to break free of monsoon cycles 
and traditional irrigation schedules, thus enabling the extension of high-yielding rice 
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cultivation in nontraditional seasons and regions. Thus the second transformation of rice 
production began with the use of tubewells (installed to irrigate the wintertime wheat 
crop) for monsoon rice cultivation in Punjab which had never been a traditional rice-
growing region. They also enabled the cultivation of rice in Bengal during the summer, 
an excellent season for rice cultivation but for the want of water.  
Varietal improvement played a greater role in the second rice yield revolution than it did 
for the more spectacular revolution in wheat; for the short duration and photoperiod 
insensitivity of some new rice varieties enabled the expansion of rice cultivation to 
nontraditional seasons and areas. However, the Green Revolution in rice was seemingly 
disappointing as the transformation in traditional rice cultivation was slow. In large part, 
this was because rice was cultivated on a massive national acreage in comparison to 
wheat. Thus government resources were too small to effect a quick transformation in rice 
cultivation with a mere shift in national priorities; in any case there was no significant 
increase in the emphasis on rice production in the 1960s. Technologically, high quality 
water management was the key issue in the transformation of rice production and this 
proved intractable for many reasons. Canal irrigation systems in rice tracts were 
rudimentary and offered no means of controlling water to individual fields; watering 
schedules too were rigid and unpredictable. The new varieties chosen proved unsuitable 
to interplay of monsoon cycles and traditional irrigation schedules. The spread of private 
tubewells in traditional rice areas (to transform cultivation in traditional and 
nontraditional seasons) and was slow due to tenurial conditions and the high cost of access 
to water resources. 
The term “Green Revolution”, with the new seeds as its central motif was coined in the 
United States to project the idea that overseas aid was easy and effective, at a time when 
foreign aid was being increasingly questioned in that country. Plant breeder Dr. Norman 
Borlaug was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 and the Rockefeller Foundation 
quickly appropriated all credit for any increased production, forcefully claiming that the 
seeds alone were central to high yields. As it became clear that production gains were 
largely confined to wheat in northwestern India, scholarly studies only intensified their 
focus on new seed varieties rather than the general question of increasing production. 
Critics of the Green Revolution, historians among them, chose not to challenge the 
standard seed-centric narrative and infact attributed a wide range of social ills to the new 
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seeds; this was due to an obsession with the idea of recent research an innovation driving 
revolutionary socio-economic change. 
The statistical sources for this chapter include the annual Area Production and Yield of 
Principal Crops in India produced by the Ministry of Agriculture. Corrections for that 
data series sourced from George Blyn’s pioneering study of colonial India1 and data from 
an International Food Policy Research Institute publication for the postcolonial period.2 
The conveniently categorized statistics on the Directorate of Rice Development’s website 
have also been used. Other sources include the memoirs of the then Secretary of 
Agriculture B. Sivaraman3 and of the Agriculture Minister C. Subramaniam4 which are 
surprisingly under-used by historians considering the interesting accounts they offer of 
policy formation around the HYVs. The research papers and general articles of social 
scientists (mostly economists in the Economic and Political Weekly) are another source. 
Use is also made of technical literature; particularly a book summarizing research on 
dwarf wheats published in 1979 by Punjab Agricultural University plant breeder Khem 
Singh Gill.5 Finally, extensive use is made of the annual Economic Survey of India 
published by the Ministry of Finance.6 
I 
Despite the Green Revolution being the focal point of the limited historiography of 
agriculture in postcolonial India, we have no clear picture of its overall impact on 
foodgrain production. It is conventionally assumed that a Green Revolution put India’s 
foodgrain production on a higher plane of production and productivity growth from the 
late 1960s onwards and histories such as those written by Perkins do little to dispel this 
notion, though he hints of occasional spectacular increases in production in the earlier 
period.7  Nick Cullather’s recent critical account mentions how that the CIA proclaimed 
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the Green Revolution dead by the mid-1970s.8 Parayil places the Revolution between 
1965 and 1975.9 Alone in providing statistical evidence to buttress the claim of a Green 
Revolution, Gurcharan Das does so in passing by comparing figures for production 
growth before and after 1945; strangely he chooses to ascribe the revolution  technology 
and policy change in the mid-1960s.10 A more critical perspective has been taken Dietmar 
Rothermund who argued that growth rates after the mid-1960s merely kept up with the 
1950s growth rate entirely due to a spurt in the production and yields of wheat. The causes 
of this yield boom have almost universally been attributed to the HYVs.11 Cullather hints 
that other factors were at play but does not detail quite what those were.12 Again, 
Rothermund does not mention the seeds at all and stresses upon the role of booming 
irrigated wheat acreages.13 Tirthankar Roy’s paper on late colonial Indian agriculture too 
displays skepticism towards both the periodization and the causes of late twentieth-
century productivity gain and emphasizes the centrality of irrigation to any successful 
agricultural policy in India.14 
Little historical insight exists on the transformation in the cultivation of rice, India’s most 
important crop, except that it too had something to do with plant breeding.15. Francesca 
Bray has written an excellent study of rice production over hundreds of years across a 
wide swathe of East Asia and her book tells us much of the great challenges in the 
improvement of rice agriculture due to the fact that the relationship between varieties, 
seasons, irrigation and human society was already excellently optimized in traditional rice 
economies.16 Her book provides no coherent story of the Indian case; while the seemingly 
easy revolution in rice production in the 1950s negates her argument that traditional rice 
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cultivation was optimized and hard to improve, the slower growth in rice production in 
traditional areas and seasons from the 1960s onwards buttresses her focus on the 
challenges in modernizing rice cultivation.  
Locating Agricultural Revolutions 
Official statistics on agricultural production in India have been compiled since 1891-92, 
though there are several issues with coverage of areas and methods of production and 
yield estimation. George Blyn’s seminal work in correcting anomalies and filling gaps in 
the official data17 are usually taken to constitute definitive statistics for the colonial 
period; his estimates of growth rates of area, production and yield of foodgrains are 
summarized in Table 1.1. As can be seen, the last six decades of colonial rule saw a 
significant decline in yields of foodgrains; mostly led by declining rice yields. The 
acreage under rice also grew slowly, making for an overall slow rate of growth of 
foodgrain production. Acreages and yields of wheat increased faster than that of 
foodgrains as a whole; though with both increasing at the rate of less than half percent, 
the performance of wheat production in India was far from stellar. 
Some detailed analysis of the period from 1931 onwards is called for. The scenario of 
absolute decline if rice yields and (slowly) growing yield of wheat appears to have 
intensified by the 1930s; wheat yields rose 0.87% a year in that decade compared to the 
average of 0.38% for the whole period, while rice yields declined faster (1.51%) than they 
did for the period as a whole (0.24%). However, at least the intensification of the overall 
trend in yield growth appears to have abated in the decade ending with the war and Indian 
independence; rice yields declined at only 0.48% at a time when wheat yields too were 
declining at 0.2%. In the growth rate of acreage however, the general comparative trend 
between wheat and rice in the 1930s and 1940s was the reverse of the one for the period 
as a whole; the area under rice grew at a rate higher than that under wheat. This trend was 
stronger  through the war as the decade ending in 1946 saw the rice acreage grow at 1.23% 
compared to just 0.29% in the case of wheat. The 1940s saw an impressive turnaround in 
the landscape of rice production; not only did acreage increase at a high rate, but the 
decline in yields also slowed down substantially. Rising war time prices of rice resulted 
in diverting of more (and better) land to rice cultivation; the Grow More Food scheme 
also clearly had some impact. In contrast, wheat yields declined during this last decade 
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of colonialism (though still slower than rice) and the growth in the area under wheat 
slowed down. 




















Rice 0.18 0.52 1.23 -0.24 -
1.51 
-0.48 -0.09 -1 0.76 
Wheat 0.49 0.39 0.29 0.38 0.87 -0.2 0.84 1.38 0.08 





Table 1.1: Annual growth rate of area, production and yield of foodgrains in India, 
1891-1947. 
Source: Compiled from George Blyn, Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability and Productivity 
(Philadelphia, Pa, 1966). Total Foodgrains includes Rice, Wheat, Jowar, Gram, Bajra, Barley, Maize and Ragi. 
 
Thus independent India inherited a bleak (but improving) landscape of rice production 
and a better (but deteriorating) wheat production; making for an overall food production 
situation similar to that of rice. How did food production fare in the decades since? As 
the official statistics in Table 1.2 show, in the first decade of planned economic 
development in India (the 1950s) food production grew at over six times the highest rate 
achieved during the colonial period. While this spectacular production growth slowed 
down in the 1960s, it has been much higher than the colonial period throughout the 
postcolonial period. Yield growth in the 1950s too represented quite a leap from the 
negative growth rates seen before 1947.  
Decade ending 







1960-61 1.7 4.9 3.1 
1970-71 0.7 2.8 2.1 
1980-81 0.2 1.8 1.6 
1990-91 0.1 3.1 3.0 
2000-01 -0.5 1.1 1.7 
Table 1.2: Annual growth rate of area, production and yield of foodgrains in India, 
1950-51 to 2000-01. 
Source: Computed using Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, Production and Yield of Principal 
Crops in India (New Delhi, 1951-2001). 
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Thus the decades of the 1960s and 1970s when a “Green Revolution” supposedly took 
place was actually a period of considerably slower growth within the postcolonial period. 
The growth rate of yield picked up during the 1980s, only to fall again in the 1990s, 
showing no clear long-term upwards trend (see Table 1.2) over the highs seen in the 
1950s. 
The particularity of wheat 
As the policy change and technology adoption that led to the Green Revolution are 
typically placed in the mid-1960s, it may be useful to do a detailed comparison of the 
postcolonial period of economic planning before and after 1965. The growth rate of food 
grain production between 1965 and 1979, during the Green Revolution was about 2.8%; 
this was lower than the remarkable 4.1% achieved during 1951-65. The growth rate of 
yield in the 1965-79 period, at 2.2% was also lower than the 2.7% achieved during 1951-
65.18 This general lowering of the rate of growth of yield is remarkable, considering the 
fact that this was a time when massive sums were spent on introducing modern inputs 
into Indian agriculture. 
As for the growth in yields of individual crops, only in the case of wheat was the rate of 
growth of yield (at 3.9%) higher during the Green Revolution than the rate in the 
preceding period (2.3%). For rice (corresponding figures are 1.5% and 3.5% respectively) 
and other cereals (1.7% and 2.4%), the growth of yield declined during the Green 
Revolution. 19 Yields of pulses which grew at 1.2% before 1965 saw an absolute decline 
at the rate of 0.07% during the Green Revolution; this is significant as pulses are an 
important source of protein in the Indian diet and could not be easily imported as they 
were not a widely traded international commodity. More remarkable is the fact that very 
promising new seed varieties had been developed not just for wheat and rice but also for 
jowar, maize and bajra; the latter saw a yield growth rate of 5.9% (second only to wheat’s 
7.3%) in the period from 1965 to 1972.20 This growth run, which was described by some 
as “one of the most outstanding plant breeding success stories of all time”21 ended by the 
                                                          
18 From an analysis of Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, 
Production and Yield of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 1955-1985). 
19 From an analysis of Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, 
Production and Yield of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 1955-1985). 
20 V.S. Vyas, India’s High Yielding Varieties Programme in Wheat 1966-67 to 1971-72 
(Mexico City, 1975). 
21 Glenn W. Burton and Jerrel B. Powell, “Pearl millet”, Advances in Agronomy 20.  
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mid-1970s and it was acknowledged that the growth could largely be ascribed to a long 
spell of good monsoon years.22 
While the statistics underlying the above analysis continue to be widely published and 
used by the government, at some point it was felt that data collection practices had 
substantially underestimated production in the early 1950s; as a result a volume 
containing “adjusted estimates of production” was published in 1965 using some standard 
formulae for corrections. If production of the early 1950s had indeed been 
underestimated, it would imply that the actual growth in the pre-Green Revolution period 
was lower than suggested by the above analysis. Table 1.3 shows the statistical analysis 
conducted by others on the new data following the best recommended econometric 
practices; for example growth rates are only compared between particular “peak years” 
where there was no sharp production decline in years too close to either end point. The 
years ending 1966 and 1967 have been neglected as the production drop due to drought 












                                                          
22 N. S. Jodha, "Prospects for Coarse Cereals: Permanent Constraints of Jowar and 
Bajra", Economic and Political Weekly (1973) 8: A145- A150. 
23 Sarma and Gandhi, Production and Consumption, p. 32. 











1950-65 1.3 2.7 1.4 
1968-76 0.7 3.2 0.4 
1976-84 0.2 1.9 0.2 
    
 Yield 
1950-65 2.2 1.3 1.4 
1968-76 1.2 2.2 1.5 
1976-84 1.8 3.7 2.3 
    
 Production 
1950-65 3.5 4.0 2.8 
1968-76 1.9 5.5 1.9 
1976-84 2.0 5.7 2.5 
Table 1.3: Adjusted annual growth rate of area, production and yield of foodgrains 
in India, 1950-1984. 
Source:  J. S. Sarma and Vasant P. Gandhi, Production and Consumption of Foodgrains in India: Implications of 
Accelerated Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation (Washington, DC, 1990). 
As can be seen, the growth rate of foodgrain production in the period 1950-65 has never 
been equalled since then. As for yields, there was a marginal increase (in no way 
suggesting a revolution) in the growth rate during the period 1968-76. There was indeed 
substantial growth in the period between 1976 and 1984, but none of these changes is 
comparable to the leap in the 1950s from the negative or negligible growth rates in the 
late colonial period. The transformation in the decade from the late 1970s was long after 
the policy change of the mid-1960s; this reflected the moderate success of the long 
“complicated business of development” which was precisely what Green Revolution 
policies were designed to avoid according to William Gaud, the USAID administrator 
who had coined the term. 24 In any case, the fragility of this statistical revolution is 
                                                          
24 As quoted in Kusum Nair, Land and Labor in Agriculture in Asia and Africa 
(Riverdale, Md., 1983), p.67. 
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underlined by the fact that 1983-84 was a particularly good year; foodgrain production 
fell in subsequent years and would equal the 1983-84 figure only in 1988-89.25 
Thus it is not surprising that despite the heralding of a Green Revolution, there continued 
to be great concern among economists whether India was finally on track to solve her 
production problems. In the late 1970s, TN Srinivasan wrote that “there is as yet no Green 
Revolution”26 and A Vaidyanathan summarized the experience of the past decade, 
Optimism may well have been justified a decade back. At that time, it seemed that 
given the abysmally low productivity and technological level of Indian 
agriculture, rapid growth should be relatively easy to achieve… The advent of the 
HYVs in the mid-sixties lent greater confidence to this view. 
But the fact that after a decade of accelerated irrigation development, fertiliser 
use, and the rapid spread of HYVs, growth rates of production have not increased 
and may in fact have fallen compels a sober re-assessment... naive optimism of 
agricultural prospects in the face of such experience can only further compound 
these problems.27 
The increase in the growth rate of yield was entirely confined to wheat. In the case of rice 
(India’s main food crop) the growth rate of yield between 1950 and 1965 remained 
unparalleled. As late as the 1980s, there was considerable controversy over whether 
growth rates had declined. 28  
Thus when it comes to a possible Green Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, we are left 
with the peculiar case of wheat. Indeed many Indians never took to the phrase Green 
Revolution, preferring to refer to a ‘wheat revolution’.29 Wheat was India’s third most 
important food crop (after rice and jowar) and contributed a mere 14% of India’s 
                                                          
25 Computed using Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, 
Production and Yield of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 1979-90). 
26 T.N. Srinivasan, “Trends in Agriculture in India, 1949-50-1977-78”, Economic and 
Political Weekly (1979) 14: 1283. 
27 A Vaidyanathan, “Performance and Prospects of Crop Production in India”, 
Economic and Political Weekly (1977) 12: 1355. 
28 Sarma and Vasant P. Gandhi, Production and Consumption, p. 83.  
29 See for example, T.N. Srinivasan, "The Green Revolution or Wheat Revolution", in 
M.L. Dantwala (ed.), Comparative Experience of Agricultural Development in 
Developing Countries of Asia and the Southeast since World War II (Bombay, 1972), p. 
407 
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foodgrain production on about 11% of India’s foodgrain land in 1964-65. Of the entirely 
unremarkable increase in India’s foodgrain production in the 14 years since then, wheat 
contributed nearly 55%, and wheat yields grew at a high rate of 3.8% during this period 
compared to only 2.3% in the preceding period.  
Wheat: The beginnings of revolutionary production 
Between 1961 and 1972, the production of wheat in India increased by 150% (see Table 
1.4). This growth came from a 50% increase in the area under wheat and a 70% increase 
in the average yield; this is the production boom most identified with the Green 
Revolution. 
  
























‘51 10.0 34 6.4 0.64 1.6 55 1.3 0.82 
‘56 12.7 33 8.6 0.68 2.0 52 1.8 0.91 
‘61 12.9 33 10.6 0.82 2.2 51 2.5 1.16 
‘64 13.5 35 9.9 0.73 2.4 56 2.8 1.20 
‘65 13.5 37 12.1 0.90 2.5 57 3.4 1.37 
‘66 12.5 43 10.4 0.83 2.4 64 2.8 1.17 
‘67 12.8 48 11.4 0.89 2.4 71 3.5 1.51 
‘68 14.9 43 16.5 1.11 2.6 67 4.8 1.83 
‘69 15.6 50 18.7 1.19 3.0 79 6.0 2.04 
‘70 16.8 51 20.1 1.20 3.2 82 6.9 2.17 
‘71 18.3 54 23.2 1.27 3.4 83 7.5 2.18 
‘72 19.1 54 26.5 1.39 3.5 86 8.0 2.28 
 
Table 1.4: Wheat Production in India, 1950-1972. 
Source and Notes: Compiled from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian Agricultural Statistics (New Delhi, 
1952-1975). Punjab figures for 1951 included PEPSU which was later merged into the state. The province was 
bifurcated into Punjab and Haryana in 1966, but all the figures in this table correspond to the undivided state. 
Despite its low share of overall food production, wheat was important to food policy due 
to its disproportionate contribution to urban consumption and a demand which rose faster 
with incomes than that of coarse cereals like jowar. From the mid-1950s onwards, the 
government imported large quantities of wheat (equalling about a quarter of domestic 
production) mostly from the United States under the very favourable terms of the PL 480 
programme. This enabled the government to create a “psychology of abundance” through 
cheap sales of imported stock without having to rely on local procurement.30 
Nevertheless, domestic wheat production too grew at nearly 4% from the early 1950s to 
the mid-1960s, higher than the 3.5% achieved by rice and the 2.8% achieved by 
foodgrains as a whole. This increase however came mostly from an expansion in the area 
under wheat rather than from growing yields; wheat yields grew at 1.3% during the period 
compared to rice which grew at 2.2%. Commentators often blamed the easy availability 
                                                          
30 Nilakanth Rath and V.S. Patvardhan, Impact of Assistance under PL 480 on Indian 
Economy (Pune, India, 1967), p.2. 
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of wheat under the PL 480 programme for the lack of a strong domestic wheat production 
policy.31 
In 1951, the use of fertilizers on the crop was fairly negligible; irrigation was perhaps the 
chief determinant of yields. A little over half the area under wheat was irrigated in Punjab, 
while the average for all of India was about a third; the average yield in Punjab was higher 
than the all India figure by nearly a third. Indeed in some good years in the 1950s, some 
districts of Punjab had yields over 5 times as high as dry districts in other parts of the 
country.32 Revolutionary yields could clearly be achieved with just irrigation. 
In light of the recommendations of the Ford Foundation’s Report India’s Food Crisis and 
Steps to Meet It, 33 in 1960, the Government of India started the Intensive Agricultural 
Development Programme (IADP) to improve agriculture using existing knowledge in 
areas selected for having assured water supply (from irrigation and rainfall) as well as an 
adequate agricultural extension service built up during a decade of community 
development. Of India’s 315 districts, seven (one in each major agricultural state) were 
initially picked; two of these were important wheat producers.34 As an area with already 
high yields which devoted a substantial share of its (mostly private well) irrigation to 
wheat, Ludhiana (Punjab) was perhaps a natural choice. The other was Aligarh (UP), 
which benefited from the Upper Ganges Canal, India’s oldest public tubewell network, 
in addition to a growing number of private tubewells. 
The IADP was to be based on a 10 point programme of credit, inputs of fertilizers, seeds& 
pesticides, assured prices, improved marketing, improved water & farm management, 
direct farm planning, village planning, analysis & evaluation and administrative changes. 
There were substantial deviations from this plan; two of which were significant. The idea 
of assured prices was given up on the grounds of high costs. Improvements in water 
management, particularly significant in the rice tracts, also proved hard to implement. 
                                                          
31 For an excellent contemporary analysis of the PL 480 programme, see Rath and 
Patvardhan, Impact of Assistance. 
32 See Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, Production and Yield 
of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 1950-1960). 
33 Agricultural Production Team (Ford Foundation) and Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, Report on India's food crisis & steps to meet it (New Delhi, 1959). 
34 Carl C. Malone and Sherman E. Johnson, "The Intensive Agricultural Development 
Program in India", Agricultural Economics Research (1971) 23:25-35. Malone and 
Johnson were closely associated with the IADP. 
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The Irrigation Department disavowed all responsibility for infrastructure beyond outlets 
serving several farms, while efforts to stimulate “voluntary group action” in villages had 
“minimal effect” as technical skills were not available; thus Ford Foundation funds for 
the improving water management remained unutilized.35  
In the wheat growing areas, the programme emphasized the expansion of acreage with 
“more local irrigation” referring to wells and tubewells; by 1966, 300,000 additional acres 
of wheatland were under irrigation in these districts. Increased fertilizer use was also 
important to this “production package”; indeed it was used an index of the adoption of 
the package. The fertilizer use per development block in the IADP wheat districts, which 
were about equal to their state averages in 1959-60 increased by 370% in 1963-64, as 
compared to the state average of 178%. These efforts, together with a 20% increase in the 
area under wheat led to a more than doubling of wheat production in the two districts by 
1966; before the advent of the higher yielding varieties as a 1971 study authored by the 
IADP’s architects emphasized.36 
Steamrolling the Mexican varieties 
The High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) being referred to were the dwarf varieties developed 
in Mexico in the early 1960s by Norman Borlaug of the Rockefeller Foundation using 
seed material from Japan. Samples of these were obtained by the Indian Agricultural 
Research Institute in Delhi in 1963. These were approved for cultivation in irrigated 
wheat lands in 1965, though they were not cultivated on any significant scale for food 
(rather than seed or demonstration) production before 1967-68 when about 18% of the 
wheat area was planted with them.37 
The Agriculture Minister C. Subramaniam and his secretary B. Sivaraman give differing 
accounts of how the seeds were adopted and both accounts demonstrate that the decision 
was far from uncontroversial. According to Subramaniam, Dr. Ralph Cummings of the 
Rockefeller Foundation approached him in late 1964, complaining of resistance from 
Indian scientists in clearing the seeds for commercial cultivation despite spectacular 
yields achieved on research farms. Subramaniam called in a panel of scientists, 
                                                          
35 Dorris D. Brown, Agricultural Development in India’s districts (Cambridge, Ma, 
1971). Brown was closely associated with the IADP. 
36 Malone and Johnson, "Intensive Agricultural Development Program", p. 29. 
37 M.S. Swaminathan, “Foreword” in Khem Singh Gill, Research on Dwarf Wheats 
(New Delhi, 1979), pp. v-vi. 
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economists and administrators to discuss the problem over two or three days. Amongst 
the scientists, the seniors took a conservative view and argued that it was better to 
continue with the Indian breeding programme; while HYVs might have had heavy yields 
in controlled conditions, the “illiterate and tradition bound” Indian peasant would not take 
to the transformation of cultivation practices they demanded. Younger scientists however 
opined that “technology was bound to yield results”. Economists questioned the policy of 
concentrating all available fertilizer on the new seeds, arguing that production with so 
much fertilizer would be uneconomic.38 In fact David Hopper, an influential Ford 
Foundation economist who attended these meetings went so far as to say that the scientists 
and the economists came to a “clear consensus” on prohibiting the use of the new seeds. 
But a small group who felt that “technological innovation” was the only hope managed 
to influence the politicians who decided to adopt the new seeds overriding all objections.39  
According to Sivaraman, he learnt of the new seeds from the technical head of the seeds 
department in the agriculture ministry in June 1965 who showed him impressive results 
of trials conducted at two locations with the Mexican seeds; Sivaraman thus decided to 
push a food-production strategy centred on the new seeds. But as policy was being 
formulated later that year, he discovered that he had only been shown the results of two 
out of fourteen trials; in all the other trials, one or another local variety had performed 
better than the Mexican varieties. He ordered the Agricultural Commissioner to proceed 
at once to the twelve other stations, check if protocols had been followed and seize all 
records of the trials. Yet, even before a full enquiry could be made, Sivaraman appears to 
have made up his mind in favour of the dwarf varieties. He argued that prior experience 
had taught him that Indian research workers never kept to protocol. As the new varieties 
had not been developed in India, he felt that their poor performance in the trials was the 
result of an active lobby for varieties developed in India. He argued that as American 
experts had been monitoring the trials in the two locations where the Mexican seeds 
performed well, there could have been no fudging of results; thus trusting the integrity of 
American scientists over Indians.40 
                                                          
38 C. Subramaniam, The New Strategy in Indian Agriculture: The First Decade and 
After (New Delhi, 1979), pp. 30-33.  
39 W. David Hopper, “Distortion of Agricultural Development Resulting from 
Government Prohibitions”, in Theodore Schultz (ed.), Distortions of Agricultural 
Incentives (Bloomington, In, 1978), pp. 69-71.  
40 Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, pp. 299-304.  
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The full data had also made its way to Dr. VKRV Rao, the Planning Commission member 
in charge of agriculture who then made grave accusations against Sivaraman and 
particular scientists, though his ability to create trouble was limited by his unwillingness 
to put the accusations in writing as Sivaraman demanded. But Rao continued to resist, 
delaying his approval of the programme for over a year before eventually resigning to 
contest elections in 1967. The programme however went ahead without his approval; as 
Sivaraman boasted, “it was steamrolled”.41 Whatever the details of the particular events, 
this “steamrolling” has been seen as exemplar of not giving in to irrational fears about 
new technology; David Hopper later used the perceived success of the new varieties to 
argue for a limit to government prohibitions on technologies including DDT. 42   
High Yielding Varieties? 
The specific problem ostensibly addressed by the new dwarf plants was called lodging. 
While increased use of fertilizers was seen as important in increasing yields, traditional 
varieties of wheat were tall and had a weak, spindly stalk. Under heavy fertilizer dosages, 
these could not bear the increased weight of the ears and fell over and lodged, or fell over. 
Being short, and having a high grain to straw ratio, the dwarf varieties were resistant to 
lodging at much higher levels of fertilizer application.  
But in addition to the much emphasized problem of lodging, a key parameter in the 
fertilizer-variety relationship was the additional yield that could be obtained from every 
pound of additional fertilizer. This was represented by a curve between yield and fertilizer 
application; the usual form was an inverted U-shaped curve with diminishing marginal 
returns with increasing fertilizer application. As the new seeds, together with  greater 
availability of fertilizers were being publicized, two  economists B. S. Minhas (a Stanford 
trained economist at the Indian Statistical Institute) and T. N. Srinivasan (a Yale trained 
economist also with the Indian Statistical Institute) used these curves to publicly question 
India’s fertilizer programme in early 1966. 43 The government had recommended a 
fertilizer dosage close to the limit of lodging for the dwarf varieties; any remaining 
fertilizer was to be spread thin at much lower dosages over the irrigated and unirrigated 
local varieties. According to Minhas and Srinivasan, the higher response of all varieties 
                                                          
41 Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 304.  
42 Hopper, “Distortion”, p. 71.  
43 B. S. Minhas and T. N. Srinivasan, “New Agricultural Strategy Analysed”, Yojana  
(1966) 10: 20-24 
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to fertilizer at low dosages implied that greater production would result from the same 
amount of fertilizer if it was less concentrated on the dwarf varieties alone. Upto 50% 
higher total production could be achieved by reducing the dosage on the dwarf varieties 
to less than 50% of the government-recommended dose and using the fertilizer thus saved 
on tall wheat varieties. Substantial (though lesser) reductions in fertilizer dosages would 
also be called for if profitability to the HYV farmer, rather than total production were to 
be maximized. Ridiculing the aspirations of plant breeders such as Dr. M. S. Swaminathan 
who asserted that it was possible for India to produce 100 million tonnes of food grains 
on 25 million acres (compared to the then record of 77 million tonnes on 230 million 
acres), the article contended that even if such a miracle was possible, it was not 
economically sound. To them, the “enthusiasm of extremely high dosages” stemmed from 
a lack of appreciation of optimal allocation of resources.44 While many might have 
questioned the policy of concentrating resources from the point of view of equity, Minhas 
and Srinivasan questioned it from the perspective of production, on the altar of which 
long standing ideas about equity were being ostensibly sacrificed. 
To C. Subramaniam, this critique was “devastating”; he later wrote that the authors had 
been mistaken in assuming limited fertilizer availability without looking to the future 
when the same would be plentiful.45 Sivaraman wanted to issue an official rejoinder and 
turned to the Ford Foundation’s David Hopper, who advised him to do nothing; according 
to him, people in India had too much time for arguments.46 The lack of a response was of 
course because the argument was sound; fertilizer would be a precious commodity for 
several years in India, because of low domestic production in the 1960s and the oil shocks 
of the 1970s. It was only in 1968, the year of the bumper harvest that three Rockefeller 
Foundation economists were confident enough to publish a paper arguing that the article 
had been based on outdated data; more recent trials supported the policy of concentration. 
While Minhas and Srinivasan had questioned only fertilizer allocation and not the dwarf 
varieties themselves, the response felt the need to add that in any case, there was no 
                                                          
44 Minhas and Srinivasan, “New Agricultural Strategy”, p. 20. 
45 Subramaniam, New Strategy, p. 81. 
46 Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 304.  
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necessity to rely on data; the overwhelming acceptance of short varieties by cultivators 
was ample testimony to their superiority.47 
The reason Minhas and Srinivasan did not question the dwarf plants themselves had to 
do with the published data available to them. The undefined “irrigated local” wheat 
variety was assumed to yield 1 ton per hectare with no fertilizer, as compared to 1.65 
tonnes in the case of the dwarfs; hence they recommended that even with no fertilizer, as 
long as enough dwarf seeds were available, it made sense to plant the entire irrigated 
wheat acreage with the new seeds. But the former was an unreasonably low number; 
irrigated districts in Punjab growing locally improved varieties sometimes exceeded the 
figure in the 1950s. Comparisons published later referred to specific locally developed 
varieties, most notably C-306 which was approved for cultivation in 1965, the same year 
as the dwarf wheats. C-306 was developed by Ram Dhan Singh who had trained under 
Sir Albert Howard, the father of wheat research in India. Initial comparison in 1964-65 
only appears to have been conducted at a high 80 kg of nitrogen per hectare; even so, in 
Ludhiana it yielded 3997 kg/ ha, coming in second amongst the five varieties tested, only 
surpassed by Lerma Rojo 64 at 4598 kg/ha; other dwarf varieties performed poorly. 48 
Indeed, C 306 was classified as a HYV and included within statistics for the same until 
1970;49 it was later recommended only for unirrigated conditions.50  
Between 1966 and 1969, trials were conducted in India with varying fertilizer dosages. 
These showed that with no fertilizer applied, the tall varieties did better than the dwarfs. 
At low dosages, they produced higher yields than dwarf varieties; an advantage they lost 
somewhere between 40 and 80 kg of nitrogen per hectare. Yet, even at the very high level 
of 200 kg of nitrogen/ ha, their yield was only 20% lower than the best dwarf varieties. 




                                                          
47 Ralph W. Cummings, Jr., Robert W. Herdt and S. K. Ray, "New Agricultural Strategy 
Revisited", Economic and Political Weekly (1968) 3(43):A15 -A23. 
48 Gill, Research, p.84. 
49 Vyas, India's High Yielding Varieties Programme, p.39. 
50 Gill, Research, p. 132. 










Mean red dwarfs 
Sonora 64 and 
Lerma Rojo 64 (30 
trials, yield (kg/ha) 
Mean amber dwarfs 
Sonalika, Sharbita 
Sonora, Kalyan 
Sona, S 331 69 
trials), yield (kg/ha) 
0 2100 1800 1920 
40 3180 3060 2980 
80 3550 3760 3850 
120 3600 4190 4180 
160 3650 4150 4430 
200 3510 4180 4400 
Table 1.5: Response of wheat varieties to fertilizer application. 
Source: As quoted in K.S. Gill, Research on dwarf wheats (New Delhi, 1979), p. 88.  
Such was the faith in the new seeds that the efficient fertilizer use of tall varieties has 
largely gone unnoticed. Even critics who termed the new seeds were not high yielding 
varieties, merely high response varieties did not mention the fact that there was such a 
thing as the former and those were the Indian tall wheats.51 This carelessness made for a 
general idea that fertilizers and HYVs were complementary technologies in every way. 
When a study in the 1970s found that the efficiency of Indian foodgrain production in 
using inputs (land, irrigation and fertilizer) had decreased drastically in the period 
between 1960 and 1974 as compared to the 1950s, the author found it baffling that the 
same had occurred during a period which saw the rise of HYVs which were ostensibly 
well suited to fertilized agriculture.52 Of course it was true that even with traditional 
varieties, efficiency of resource use would have decreased with the increasing quantity of 
inputs. When another economist referred to the better yields of tall varieties at low 
dosages than HYVs and sought to challenge the same,53 the economist community was 
astounded. Such was the faith in HYVs that one respondent claimed that he knew of no 
scientist or economist who assumed that tall varieties had better yields at low dosages 
than HYVs; thus the very premise of the original paper was flawed.54 Thus it came to be 
                                                          
51 See for example Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez Alier, Varieties of 
Environmentalism: Essays North and South (London, 1997), p. 111. 
52 A. Vaidyanathan, "Performance”. 
53 Kirit S. Parikh, “HYV Fertilisers: Synergy or Substitution: Implications for Policy 
and Prospects for Agricultural Development”, Economic and Political Weekly (1978) 
13: A2-A8. 
54 A. Vaidyanathan, "HYV and Fertilisers: Synergy or Substitution?: A Comment", 
Economic and Political Weekly (1978) 13: 1031-1035. 
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believed that HYVs were miracle seeds, more efficient than conventional varieties, a 
belief which has remained central to accounts of the Green Revolution.  
The higher yields of tall varieties at lower fertilizer doses strongly suggests that the 
transformation of wheat production could have been achieved (and more cheaply) without 
the dwarf varieties altogether. This could have been done by spreading the fertilizer thin 
on tall Indian varieties in irrigated land across India, rather than just on dwarf varieties in 
some areas. While a statistical picture of fertilizer use in the 1960s in India is not 
available, it is unlikely that even a significant proportion of farmers in Punjab’s most 
advanced districts were facing the problem of lodging. Before the dwarf varieties were 
released, the Ford Foundation estimated that fertilizer sales in Ludhiana had barely 
attained a third of their potential, and surveys found that only 3% of irrigated farms used 
the recommended fertilizer dose, and the average dose was only 36% of the 
recommendation.55 After the HYVs were released, with 86% of its land irrigated in 1972 
the average yield in Punjab was 2.28 t/ha; barely higher than what could have been 
achieved with tall varieties and no fertilizer whatsoever. Even Ludhiana, the most 
progressive of wheat districts only achieved an average of 3245 kg/ha by the mid-1970s; 
it is unlikely that lodging was a real problem for the overwhelming majority of its 
cultivators in the mid-1960s.  Indeed, a chief complaint of all studies of the Green 
Revolution was that the Indian peasant did not apply anywhere close to the recommended 
dose of fertilizers on the dwarf plants.56 
Thus the growth of wheat yields in the late 1960s and the 1970s did not require dwarf 
wheat varieties and their adoption made for very inefficient fertilizer use. But it is indeed 
possible that they were a crucial technology later as a larger proportion of farmers began 
to use high fertilizer dosages. Thus a study found that for all food crops in Asia as a whole, 
“modern varieties” contributed barely a fifth of the yield growth during the “Early Green 
Revolution” from 1961-1980, though they contributed nearly half of the (slower) yield 
growth during the “Late Green Revolution” from 1981-2000; in the developing world as 
a whole, modern varieties’ contribution to yield before 1980 was even lower. “Other 
                                                          
55 As quoted in C. A. Robertson, G. R. Saini and R. K. Sharma, “The Package 
Programme: an Appraisal”, Economic and Political Weekly (1966) 1:79-85. 
56 Even Sivaraman had to lament this, see B. Sivaraman, “Scientific Agriculture is 
Neutral to Scale: The Fallacy and the Remedy”, Journal of the Indian Society of 
Agricultural Statistics (1973) 25: 75-90 initially delivered as the Rajendra Prasad 
Memorial Lecture at Kalyani University on 27th December 1972.  
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inputs” accounted for the lion’s share of yield increases throughout the period from 1961 
onwards all over the developing world.57 
Irrigation and the Wheat Revolution 
Stretching at least as far back to early colonial India, irrigation was seen as of prime 
importance in increasing agricultural production; this was both through increased yields 
and the ability to grow crops which would be impossible without irrigation. The standard 
yardstick (criticized as too conservative by many) for increased production from 
irrigation used since the Grow More Food campaign during the Second World War was 
half a ton per hectare. 58 By that yardstick, wheat production in large parts of India could 
be doubled just with irrigation. But both in Punjab and India as a whole, the rate of growth 
of irrigated wheatland in the 1950s was less than the rate of growth of the wheat area as 
a whole; the proportion of wheatland irrigated remained at about a third in the country 
during the decade. This, together with the general lack of technology change in wheat 
cultivation was blamed on the lack of incentive as prices had been actively kept low using 
PL 480 supplies.59 
The trend reversed in the next decade, with the annual growth rate of the area of wheat 
irrigated in Punjab achieving a high of nearly 38% between in 1968-69. The state went 
from irrigating half its wheat land in 1961 to irrigating 86% in 1972. India as a whole 
went from irrigating a third of its wheat land to well over half. In fact, the country went 
from dedicating barely an unchanged seventh (15.1%) of its irrigated area to wheat in 
1961 to over a quarter (26%) in 1971 and nearly a third (31.2%) in 1977; reflecting the 
increased concentration of national resources on what was initially a minor crop. In 
relative terms, rice, the most widespread food crop saw a decline in its share of the 
national irrigated area from 44.7% in 1961 to 33.9% in 1977.60 
On its own, this spectacular growth in irrigation was at least as important to the yield 
revolution as fertilizers. In addition, it provided the base for fertilizer use (as money was 
seldom risked on fertilizers for rainfed fields) and enabled the application of the latter 
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over a wider area. Finally, besides protecting crop from drought, irrigation also facilitated 
a shift from lower yielding crops such as millets to higher yielding crops such as wheat. 
All these aspects together made for a huge impact on yields; for example in 1983-84 (a 
good monsoon year when such differentials are expected to be smaller than usual) 
foodgrain yields on irrigated land were on an average 2.3 times the yields on unirrigated 
land with the effect being most significant in low rainfall states such as Punjab and 
Haryana where wheat was dominant.61  
The importance of irrigation was widely acknowledged by all actors; in a parliamentary 
speech in 1966, the minister C. Subramaniam said that while he was emphasizing the new 
seeds and fertilizers, water was necessary to push through the programme; without it one 
could not “just throw the seeds and fertilizer and ask the farmer to produce”.62 Sivaraman 
went further and in a lecture to young civil servants in 1970, he said that the New 
Agricultural Strategy was “based on irrigation” and only later mentioned fertilizers and 
seeds.63   
Though the new seed varieties were developed in Mexico primarily to enable higher 
fertilizer use, irrigation had played some role in thinking about the lodging problem in 
India. Most of India’s wheat production is spring wheat. In Europe, these short duration 
crops are sown in April or May and harvested in August or September. In India however, 
these were sown in October-November and harvested in March-April. High temperatures 
in March would subject the plant to intense atmospheric and soil drought, necessitating 
irrigation for optimum yields. This would however result in lodging, which could also 
happen due to rain, hailstorms and wind in late March, resulting in production instability. 
According to the scientist Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, together with fertilizers and disease 
resistance, this was at the centre of his study of Indian yield stagnation in 1962.64 From 
the plant breeders’ perspective, dwarf varieties enabled protective irrigation. Unlike 
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fertilizers, there’s no suggestion that water was seen as a productive input which the plant 
would use in heavy quantities to produce high yields. 
It is a commonplace in economic literature of recent years that much of the HYV 
irrigation boom in the 1960s came from tubewells,65 and private tubewells quickly 
became seen as a crucial. There were various reasons for this. The most important was 
that irrigation in itself led to higher production and tubewells were a quick way of 
extending irrigation. For reasons I will discuss in subsequent chapters, private tubewells 
were being privileged by policy in the mid-1960s; incentive prices were also offered for 
wheat which made for a quick payback of private investment on tubewell. The precise 
extent to which the new wheat irrigation came from tubewells is hard to estimate, as we 
only have statistics for source-wise irrigation for the total net irrigated area, rather than 
for each crop. In Punjab as a whole, the net increase in the groundwater-irrigated area 
between 1965-66 and 1971-72, even if entirely devoted to wheat could account for less 
than two thirds of the increase in irrigated wheatland between 1965-66 and 1971-72. 
Canals contributed significantly to the increase in irrigation of wheat as demonstrated by 
the case of districts such as Hissar (in Haryana which was carved out of Punjab in 1966) 
where there was practically no tubewell irrigation but the area of wheatland irrigated 
nearly doubled between 1966 and 1972 to contribute a fifth of Haryana’s irrigated 
wheatland.66 
Challenges of adapting to tradition, irrigation and monsoons: The 
“Unrevolutionary” case of rice 
Unlike wheat, there were no spectacular gains in the yield or production of rice, India’s 
major food crop in the late 1960s (See Table 1.6). A doubling of production over 1960-
61 levels would not take place until 1988-89 and average yields only doubled by the late 
1990s. Production and yields in 1967-68 were about 20% higher than the previous two 
drought years but still lower than the 1964-65 high. The rate of growth of production of 
and yield of rice was lower in the period 1967-1979 than it had been in 1952-1965 despite 
the adoption of HYVs, in sharp contrast to experience of wheat as the official Economic 
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Survey of India (ESI) for the year 1979-80 noted.67 Even as some had proclaimed a Green 
Revolution in rice in the late 1960s, as late as 1978, the ESI merely noted that it appeared 
that rice production was tending to stabilize at a disappointing level of six to eight million 
tonnes higher than early 1960s levels, though it was “too early to make a firm assertion”.68 
That caution was well founded, for soon, the 1979-80 drought led to a 21% decline in rice 
production. This indicates the importance of irrigation; the percentage of the rice crop 





(mn tons) Yield (kg/ ha) 
Area Under Irrigation 
(Percentage) 
1950-51 30.81 20.58 668 31.7 
1955-56 31.52 27.56 874.4 34.9 
1960-61 34.13 34.58 1013.2 36.8 
1963-64 35.81 37 1033.2 37.1 
1964-65 36.46 39.31 1078.2 37.3 
1965-66 35.47 30.59 862.4 36.5 
1966-67 35.25 30.44 863 37.9 
1967-68 36.44 37.61 1032.1 38.6 
1971-72 37.76 43.07 1140.6 37.2 
1972-73 36.69 39.24 1069.5 39.1 
1978-79 40.48 53.77 1328.3 41.6 
1979-80 39.42 42.33 1073.8 42.8 
1983-84 41.24 60.1 1457.3 42.7 
1988-89 41.73 70.49 1689.2 45.8 
1999-00 45.16 89.68 1986 53.9 
Table 1.6: Rice production in India, selected years. 
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Area Production and Yield of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 
1950-2001) for various years. 
The seemingly slow growth in yields was in part due to past good performance of the 
previous period when much of the low hanging fruit had been exploited; rice had led the 
exceptional yield growth of the 1950s. Government efforts at propagating generally 
improved cultivation had focussed on rice, and the rice districts also used a larger amount 
of fertilizers. It is likely that the most advanced irrigated rice districts of southern India 
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might have indeed been approaching levels of fertilizer use which made for declining 
returns; the same Ford Foundation study which noted low fertilizer use on wheat in 
Ludhiana noted that fertilizer sales in the well-irrigated West Godavari district (Andhra 
Pradesh) had already attained 105% of the potential, though this was quite an exceptional 
case. 69 
Attempts at improving rice cultivation made in the 1960s made painfully slow progress, 
and the centrality of irrigation reform as the solution to the problems of rice was 
unchallenged. As Subramaniam recalled, the changes in watering patterns required were 
more significant for rice than they were for wheat, terming this problem a completely new 
area in India which called for much study. 70 Water conveyance in rice tracts was not 
through individual field channels but relied on flooding from field to field; irrigation to a 
particular field could thus not be individually controlled. In addition, fertilizer applied to 
one field would wash into others thus making the system unconducive to the 
individualistic application of fertilizer by a small number of farmers. Subramaniam noted 
that during a drought year in Thanjavur, the irrigation reservoirs ran dry and water was 
supplied only once a week; yields were strangely the best that year. Experts felt that the 
cracking of the soil after a good wetting aired the roots, but Thanjavur traditionalists 
“would not listen”. Traditionalists also believed that having at least 150 mm of standing 
water on the crop helped controlled weeds; to Subramaniam, this was a lazy way of weed 
control and he argued that the experiment had established that better water management 
could improve the yields of even traditional varieties. 71 More generally, Subramaniam 
felt that the most important obstacle to implementation of the new programme was a 
conflict between the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments. The latter had a rigid 
schedule for releasing water which they regarded “as the Bible” and would not budge 
from; their attitude was that “agriculture existed for irrigation and not the other way 
round.” 72 
While critiquing irrigation practices was an easy way for the Agriculture Minister to shift 
the blame to Irrigation Departments and to tradition, at least in the case of the rice HYVs, 
there appears to have been a grave mismatch between the needs of the seeds on one hand 
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and irrigation and monsoon schedules; Francine Frankel, a young political scientist 
commissioned by USAID to study the Green Revolution in 1969 has extensively 
documented the same. Unlike the dry growing season for wheat in India, rice cultivation 
traditionally engaged with the monsoon; this was one reason local varieties were very 
well suited to any given clime. In the West Godavary district for example, over half the 
land was irrigated from canals since the middle of the nineteenth century. Normally, 
cultivators planted paddy in June with the arrival of the south west monsoon, transplanted 
in mid-July and harvested in December after the retreat of the northeast monsoon. Being 
long duration and sensitive to the length of the day (a feature called photo-period 
sensitivity), varieties local to the area flowered when the length of the day reached a 
critical number of minutes; thenceforth maturity arrived at a fixed time after an interval 
sufficient for the retreat of the monsoon, so the rice could be harvested under sunny 
skies.73 
But the much heralded technical breakthroughs achieved by the IR-8 rice strain developed 
in the Philippines were precisely the opposite: they were short duration and insensitive to 
photoperiod. If planted in June, the HYVs would mature by October; the harvest thus had 
to take place in heavy rains, leading to crop losses. It was the dry early summer, from the 
end of January to late April or May which was most suited for these varieties. One option 
was growing the IR-8 as a second crop during this period; but this was constrained by 
unpredictability in the irrigation of the first crop which made for delays in harvesting. 
Thus even as designed, the canal system was not suited for a break from the monsoon 
pattern, and they did not work well as designed; while cultivators were supposed to 
receive the first watering by June 1st, they were fortunate if it came in by June 15th. Those 
at the tail end of the supply channel had to wait and additional month. This prolonged the 
period of the first crop well into December, reducing the possibilities of a second crop. In 
any case irrigation was insufficient during the period of the second crop; the systems 
supplied water only with the onset of the monsoon and the supply, inadequate as it was 
even when available, lasted only until mid-March. Efforts to change cultivation cycles 
resulted in little more than devastating pest attacks. 74 
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Similarly, Thanjavur, the rice bowl of Tamil Nadu, was irrigated by the Cauvery both 
from an ancient delta system and by the Mettur dam. But as Frankel put it, “the irrigation 
position was less favourable than first appeared”.75 The canal system depended for 
supplies on rainfall; this often led to delays in releasing water from Mettur. The uncertain 
water situation limited double cropping to low lying land close to the canal outlets. 
Monsoon delays pushed harvesting well into October, leading to serious crop damage 
from rains. In addition, this delay led to a delay in planting the second crop which would 
then face acute water shortages from February. According to Frankel, one reason why the 
HYV programme was more successful in Thanjavur than in other places was that unlike 
IR 8, the locally developed ADT 27 seed used in Thanjavur had a high resistance to 
lodging in rains but the gains in this most advanced rice district were still decidedly 
limited. 76 
Tubewells and Rice: Revolution as a process of slow change 
To Frankel, groundwater irrigation could be the solution for the problems of the rice 
districts. While ADT 27’s prime success was its ability to be successfully cultivated on 
land that did not absolutely require tubewells (or borewells as the local system was 
called), only a cultivator with a tubewell could achieve optimum yields. Tubewells 
offered many advantages, such as not having to wait for the release of water from Mettur 
before sowing, and the protection of yields from water shortages during key stages of the 
growth cycle. Tubewells could also better ensure a second crop enabling agricultural 
diversification. Similarly in West Godavari, the problem could be solved with the use of 
a filter point, as a version of the tubewell was known in southern India. This would enable 
a crop to be planted by early May, transplanted by mid-June and harvested by mid-
November leaving enough time for a second crop of HYV seeds. Water shortages towards 
to end of the season could also be made up with a tubewell, which could enable double 
and even triple cropping. 77 
But as Frankel noted, the vast majority of Thanjavur’s small farmers did not have the 
resources to tap groundwater aquifers and were reluctant to risk high expenditures on 
fertilizers as long as water control was uncertain; the largest gainers were big farmers 
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with the ability to invest in filter points or in borewells. 78 In West Godavari, at the time 
of Frankel’s writing in 1969, loan policies had been liberalized and nearly 66,000 acres 
were irrigated in the district by groundwater. However, the vast majority of cultivators 
who had less than the 5 acres required to afford a tubewell had been excluded, not just 
from the HYVs but also from the general gains in output that came with assured irrigation 
water: more efficient use of modern inputs, intensive cropping and diversification. In 
pockets where these constraints had been overcome, even small farmers made impressive 
gains. 79 
But overall, the gains were small, for the special conditions which enabled the wheat 
boom in Punjab were simply not replicable. These included tenurial conditions: a 
significant proportion of cultivators in Punjab were peasant proprietors with moderate 
sized holdings who had benefited from an aggressive policy of land consolidation and 
reform in the 1950s; this made for a significant number of holdings where investment in 
tubewells was viable. In fact, Charan Singh, the UP peasant leader (and briefly Prime 
Minister in 1979) retrospectively took credit for the Green Revolution and justified the 
much critiqued limitedness of the land reform he carried out in a previous capacity, 
quoting World Bank land reform expert Wolf Ladejinsky who commented that the 
process in western UP and Punjab had resulted in farm sizes optimal for tubewell 
investment.80 Groundwater was plentifully and widely available at a depth relatively 
inexpensive to pump from and a soft strata which was cheap to drill through. Perhaps 
because India’s rice imports had traditionally been negligible, the commodity had simply 
not been bestowed with the sense of national priority that wheat was; at least initially, 
“incentive prices” were low and there is much evidence that HYV paddy cultivation was 
simply not profitable enough to make the switch81 and invest in tubewells.  
But while scholars concentrated on the reasons for non-adoption of HYVs in the rice-
growing areas in the 1970s, a small breakthrough in rice production was being achieved 
elsewhere. The northwestern plains comprising Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar 
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Pradesh had never been known for rice cultivation. Unlike Eastern India, the rainfall (and 
canal supplies) was inadequate for rice cultivation; and rice was hardly consumed, unlike 
southern India where it was an important cereal justifying irrigation. But during the late 
1960s, changes in cropping pattern took place. Initially, during the tubewell boom 
between 1966 and 1972 the intensity of irrigation use actually fell drastically in Punjab’s 
groundwater-irrigated districts such as Ludhiana, as farmers apparently focussed on the 
dry season winter wheat crop and apparently stopped irrigating less profitable crops 
during the monsoon.82 But through the 1970s, Punjab’s farmers, who had installed 
tubewells in response to price incentives for wheat, consolidated their gains by using 
those tubewells to irrigate rice during the inadequate monsoon. With limited rainfall and 
the controlled application of water enabled by tubewells, Punjab’s farmers were free of 
the constraints that prevented high yields of monsoon rice in traditional rice-growing 
areas.  
The state of Punjab went from producing barely 0.7% of India’s rice in 1960-61 to 1.7% 
in 1970-71 and 7.18% in 1979-80. Figures for Haryana and western UP were less 
spectacular but still impressive. Punjab had already achieved an average yield of 3000 
kg/ ha in 1977-78 (compared to the all India monsoon average of 1274 kg/ha); beyond 
that point, production in Punjab increased mostly due to expansion of the area under rice 
rather than increase in yields, as the all India average yield narrowed the gap by attaining 
about 1800 kg/ha in 1999-2000. The wheat-paddy cycle became the dominant cropping 
pattern in Punjab over the next couple of decades and the state contributed nearly 10% of 
India’s rice production in 1999-2000, even though production in traditional rice areas had 
begun to pick up in the 1980s.83 In the space of a decade, rice had gone from “zero to 
hero” in the Punjab.84 The wheat-paddy cycle became central to the Punjabi economy as 
it continues to be today, sharing much of the blame for the environmental and economic 
crises of agriculture in the state.  
The extent to which the rice boom in northwestern India was the result of active policy is 
unknown; but there was indeed a state stimulus. Punjab’s farmers, having no home 
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market, produced rice largely for a monopoly buyer, the Food Corporation of India, a 
public sector company whose activities I shall detail in a subsequent chapter. With the 
proportion of its rice production procured by the government varying between 75% and 
84% in the 1980s (for comparison, figures for traditional rice-producing states rarely ever 
touched the double digits), Punjab was the top ranking state in contributing rice to 
government stocks since at least the early 1970s, as it continues to be today. 85 Thus the 
boom in Punjabi rice cultivation had a disproportionately significant impact on India’s 
food economy. 
Outside the northwestern plains, the growth in yields of monsoon rice was slow in the 
1970s; according to the Economic Survey for 1980-81, productivity gains had been 
confined to this region as the problems of water management and excessive moisture in 
other areas proved intractable. 86In the quarter century from 1974, the production of 
monsoon rice in Punjab increased by over six times and in Haryana by five times; in none 
of the traditional areas did monsoon rice production even double. 87 
But extension to Punjab was not the only means of break away from the constraints of 
interplay between heavy monsoons and traditional rice cultivation. Besides noting that 
much of the increased rice production came from Punjab, another trend noted by the 
Economic Survey in the 1970s was that a “steadier element” was being provided to the 
growth in rice production by the increase in the cultivation of summer rice.88 As reflected 
in recent statistic collection practices, rice in India really consists of five crops; autumn, 
winter, summer, kharif and rabi. While the old statistics referred to autumn, winter and 
summer, the Directorate of Rice Development has conveniently divided rice production 
into “kharif” (monsoon) and “rabi& summer” (non-monsoon) crops. Summer rice, 
entirely outside the influence of the monsoon contributed a negligible share of India’s 
production before the 1970s. As it was usually grown exclusively under irrigation, water 
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management was easy with no monsoon to deal with; summer rice always had high yields. 
The cultivation of summer rice took off in some parts of Eastern India in the 1980s and 
1990s, concurrent with the Special Rice Production Programme and Special Foodgrains 
Production Programme which targeted selected blocks (subdivision of a district) with 
intensive development efforts.89 The growth in the cultivation of summer rice was closely 
associated with a small tubewell boom in Eastern India during the period. In West Bengal, 
on a quarter of the land, boro rice contributed a third of the production that enabled the 
state to become the country’s leading rice producer by 1999-2000. In a pattern similar to 
the contrast of production and yield growth in monsoon rice cultivation between Punjab 
and the rest of India, average yields of boro rice had increased to 3031 kg/ ha by 1986-87 
(compared to 1364 kg/ha for monsoon rice) and did not increase significantly beyond that 
point. In the subsequent decade, the area under boro rice increased, while the yields of 
kharif or monsoon rice played catch up, increasing yields to nearly 2000 kg/ha.90 This 
revolution is far from complete as the Government of India seeks to increase tubewell 
irrigation in this groundwater rich but economically poor region as part of the “Bringing 
the Green Revolution to Eastern India” programme, even as it is desperately engaged in 
discouraging tubewells through crop diversification in the “original Green Revolution 
states”.91 
Of the 50 million tonne increase in rice production in the quarter century after 1974, a 
fifth has come with the expansion of monsoon cultivation in Punjab and Haryana (which 
account for 8% of the area planted with rice in India; the likely equally significant 
contribution of Western UP on the same lines has not been taken into account as the rest 
of the state cultivates monsoon rice in a traditional fashion) and another fifth has come 
from rabi& summer cultivation (on 10% of the area). 92 The specificities of tubewell 
irrigation played a much larger role in the seemingly less spectacular rice revolution than 
it did with wheat, where irrigation more generally (which happened to be from tubewells) 
was the important driver of yields. For this drastic seasonal and spatial shift in India’s 
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rice production landscape could only have been orchestrated through the decisive break 
in water management practices which tubewells were uniquely positioned to offer.  
HYVs also played perhaps a larger role in this slow growth than they did in the wheat 
boom of the 1960s and 1970s, and in a way that was not easily discernible from 
macroscale production statistics of a very regionally diverse crop. Dharm Narain, the 
pioneering econometrist of Indian agriculture had argued that the primary driver of grain 
yields before the 1960s Green Revolution had been “locational shift”, that is by exploiting 
the comparative advantages of regions; rather than the “pure yield effect” which could be 
attributed to technology change and was what predominated in the early Green 
Revolution period. This “unfinished work of Dharm Narain” was the subject of 
considerable debate and in 1986, C.G. Ranade corrected some data anomalies and 
extended his work, coming to the exact opposite conclusion: locational shift was a more 
important factor after the 1960s than before; driven by the extension of rice cultivation in 
Punjab and Haryana. But as Ranade pointed out, this locational shift owed much to 
technical change, as it had been enabled by the adoption of short duration varieties 
suitable for the agricultural cycles of northwestern India.93 Thus it was in the case of the 
slow revolution in rice rather than spectacular case of wheat that the qualitative 
advantages of new technologies such as plant breeding and tubewell irrigation made a 
significant difference.   
The Making of a Legend 
In a speech before the Society for International Development in Washington, DC on 
March 8, 1968, USAID administrator William Gaud, spoke of a revolution in food 
production, one he called “The Green Revolution” as opposed to a Soviet Red Revolution 
or the Shah’s White Revolution. Thus was coined the term. A careless glance at Gaud’s 
speech might give one the impression that the revolution had already taken place; indeed 
in conclusion he asserted that “the story of the Green Revolution is not a story of failure, 
it is a story of success.” A closer examination reveals that speaking before the impressive 
1968 wheat harvest was in, Gaud was merely predicting a revolution based on the 
gargantuan efforts India and Pakistan had put into enhancing wheat yields; it is highly 
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probable that his confidence also reflected knowledge that the El Nino event of 1965-67 
was expected to abate, resulting in a rapid recovery of agriculture the world over. The 
speech was really directed at increasing the American overseas aid budget at a time when 
Congress had cut the presidential international aid request by 30% and scandals had 
“given foreign aid as much publicity over the past couple of months as the program 
normally receives in the course of a year”. Many claimed that foreign aid did not work, 
and the Green Revolution’s “story of success” provided “much evidence to the contrary”. 
While Gaud mentioned fertilizers and policy changes, he centred his story on an easy 
economic transformation that could be achieved with the dissemination of a cheap 
technology (seeds) developed by Western aid agencies.94 
In 1969, after a successful harvest or two, Norman Borlaug wrote an article titled “A 
Green Revolution yields a golden harvest” asserting that technology could be more 
revolutionary than any “ism”. To him the Green Revolution resulted from the 
“transplants” of HYVs which proved that such “transplants” were possible if scientists 
won the battle with the government for attractive grain prices and cheaper inputs such as 
fertilizers and pumps. According to Borlaug, the swift spread of the Green Revolution 
had shattered economists’ hypothesis that revolutionary growth in agriculture could only 
be achieved after decades of gradual development. Like other early studies, Borlaug 
prevaricated when it came to evidence of the importance of the new seeds in increased 
production. He spoke of demonstrations of yields of 5000 kg/ha compared to a normal 
700 kg/ha; a comparison applicable perhaps only between a poor Bihar farmer’s 
unirrigated field and a controlled experiment in Ludhiana. In a way of presentation that 
would become standard for propagandists of the new seeds, he stated that only 18% of 
the wheat acreage was sown with the new seeds in 1967-68; this produced 36% of the 
total harvest. 95 Quite apart from the question of how he ascertained these figures from 
India’s poor agricultural intelligence system, this was far from impressive. In 1966-67, 
the state of Punjab had produced 21% of India’s wheat on 9% of its wheatland and the 
contrast is likely to be even more impressive if production from Punjab’s irrigated 
                                                          
94William Gaud’s address to the Society for International Development on March 8th 
1968 at Washington, DC. Accessed online at http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-
info/topics/borlaug/borlaug-green.html on 10th August 2015.  
95 Norman Borlaug, Ignacio Navarez, Oddvar Aresvik and R. Glenn Anderson, “A 
Green Revolution Yields a Golden Harvest”, Columbia Journal of World Business 
(1969) 5:  9-19. 
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wheatland could exclusively be taken into account. Such yield differentials have long 
been part of India’s agricultural landscape. 
In 1970, Borlaug was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In that year, J. George Harrar, the 
president of the Rockefeller Foundation belatedly took credit for the Green Revolution 
on its behalf in its annual report. He addressed the voluminous criticism of the Green 
Revolution that had arisen in the short space of two years, mostly on its social and 
economic impact. Crucially, in conclusion he felt the need to emphasize the importance 
of the new seeds rather than the entire input package of cheap fertilizers, subsidized 
irrigation and economic incentives, 
Again and again, the new seeds have shown that they have the capability of 
increasing production where other agricultural improvements have either failed or 
had little effect. In the Punjab region of West Pakistan, for example, the more 
progressive farmers had been installing new tubewells for several years before the 
Green Revolution. But at that time only the traditional varieties of grain were 
available to them. The increases in yield resulting from the new wells alone were 
very small and in many instances did not compensate the farmers for their 
additional inputs. However, with the introduction of the new varieties brought in 
by the Green Revolution, the yields of these same lands with the tubewells already 
installed began to increase spectacularly. In other places, before the new seeds 
were developed, the farmers had tried to increase their yields by buying more 
fertilizer and applying it to the traditional varieties. But the unimproved varieties 
often do not have the capability of responding to increased nutrition during 
cultivation, and the farmer frequently found that the expensive fertilizer did not 
net him any real gains in yield. When he planted the new varieties and used the 
additional fertilizer, he often found that his yields increased several fold.96 
Thus was born “the greatest success in the history of foreign aid since the Marshall 
Plan”.97 As the 1970s wore on, there emerged the inconvenient fact that spectacular 
growths in yield were confined to wheat in northwestern India. It was noticed that HYV 
rice had a much lower penetration than dwarf wheat and thus extension staffs were given 
ambitious targets; as a result, the official adoption rates in some parts of India were three 
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times the actual rate. Scholarly studies also began to concentrate on the reason for low 
adoption rates, identifying the factors (including irrigation) which hampered adoption and 
explaining farmers’ response as rational, recommending either the removal of the 
obstacles or the development of new varieties; agricultural development was increasingly 
reduced to varietal development and adoption alone. Seeds became an important concern 
of the international development community promoted by expert literature with titles such 
as Seeds of Change,98 and the study of agricultural change became increasingly divorced 
from the not inconsiderable matter of production. For example a multi-volume UN study 
of the Green Revolution was titled The social and economic implications of large-scale 
introduction of new varieties of foodgrain. The only set of statistics in the summary 
volume (appropriately titled Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of Want) are the global area under 
wheat and rice HYVs, besides 2 graphs showing the production and yield of wheat in 
India. No mention was made of the production of rice, both Asia’s and India’s most 
important food crop.99 While fertilizer use per hectare was the key quantitative measure 
of the level of agricultural technology in the West, in the poor world, it quickly became 
the area planted with HYVs.100 
That the HYVs had only a marginal role to play in the Green Revolution was well known 
to some; indeed, only a few days after the Green Revolution speech, William Gaud noted 
in evidence to a Congressional committee that the seed-fertilizer technology was 
secondary to price policies, and that the new seeds were merely an inducement for 
countries to allocate more of their resources to agriculture than to industry.101 Whether 
the new seeds even played that limited role in deceiving policymakers is questionable. 
While political rhetoric in India often emphasized the centrality of the scientist as 
embodied in the plant breeder, in their memoirs and other writings, both Agriculture 
Minister C Subramaniam and Secretary of Agriculture B Sivaraman are clear about the 
crucial role of irrigation and price incentives.102 
                                                          
98 LR Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970s 
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99 Andrew Pearse, Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of Want: Social and Economic Implications of 
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100 Dana G. Dalrymple, “The Adoption of High-Yielding Grain Varieties in Developing 
Nations”, Agricultural History (1979) 4: 704-726.  
101 As quoted in Cullather, Hungry World, p. 260. 
102 Subramaniam, Hand of, p. 225.  
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Critics of the Green Revolution; those one might expect to take on and challenge the 
standard narrative put forth by enthusiasts proved on the contrary to be especially 
susceptible to the idea of social change being determined by innovation. A prominent 
example was the scholarly response to the burning alive of 43 dalit labourers by upper 
caste landowners in Thanjavur in 1968. This event, which was widely covered by the 
international press was quickly ascribed to the disruptive social effects of the new 
technology high social cost of the new technology and fears were expressed that the Green 
Revolution was quickly turning red. This was in fact what prompted USAID to send 
Francine Frankel to study the social impact of the Green Revolution. Technically 
something of a distanced actor account (she was also a consultant with USAID during her 
time in India), her study was astonishingly balanced and perceptive, if reflective of the 
faith in plant breeding prevalent in those heady early days.103 However, no impactful 
visible study followed up on her work in either greater detail or in extending the story 
into the 1970s; Frankel’s work on the Green Revolution was overshadowed by her later 
reputation as one of the most prominent scholars of Indian politics, with a book enriched 
in no small measure by access to actors afforded by Green Revolution-era assignments.104 
The alternative narrative wherein seeds were not central did live on in the works of many 
social scientists; Robert Chambers of the Institute for Development Studies for example 
recognized that the central agent in productivity growth was the north Indian revolution 
in water supply. Terming groundwater as “the last frontier”, he argued that few areas of 
technical investment offered as much opportunity for livelihood generation as it did; 
control over groundwater offered an opportunity to decisively shift the balance in favour 
of the poor despite the unfulfilled promise of land reform. With his interest in poverty 
and rural development, he pioneered the discipline of irrigation sociology, engaged with 
Indian irrigation engineers and did much research on how best to enable equitable access 
to water for the rural poor.105 
However, the obsession with idea of recent innovation determining social change proved 
remarkably resilient. The classic tale of the Thanjavur dalit atrocity for example, 
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continued to be repeated in the literature for several years, even after some of India’s most 
senior sociologists contextualized the event as merely one particularly horrific episode in 
a very long history of class and caste conflict in the district. 106 More than in any other 
discipline, the standard narrative of a “Green Revolution” of booming foodgrain 
production driven by innovations in plant breeding has lived on in the historiography, as 
I’ve discussed in the introduction to this thesis. This is in large part due to the fact that 
the historiography is fairly limited, perhaps due to the implicit assumption that the 
standard innovation-centric story tells us all we need to know about what we take to be 
the defining process of twentieth-century agricultural history and contextualizing is all 
that historians need to do. 
Conclusion   
An examination of the statistical record yields no evidence of any revolutionary 
transformation in India’s foodgrain production in the late 1960s and 1970s which is 
implicit in accounts of the Green Revolution. There was indeed a remarkable 
transformation in India’s the growth of production and land productivity of foodgrain; 
but that transformation began more or less after the Second World War and the end of 
colonial rule. The 1960s and the 1970s were in fact a period of slow growth compared to 
the 1950s. 
The sole exception to this trend was the case of wheat, relatively insignificant part of 
India’s food basket. Wheat saw a remarkable transformation in production and yields 
after 1950, and this this trend indeed intensified from the mid-1960s onwards. While the 
growth in yields in the latter period, usually most identified with the Green Revolution 
has usually been ascribed to   seed varieties imported from Mexico, this chapter has shown 
that the technology central to the remarkable post 1960 growth in wheat yields was a 
quick expansion in the area of wheat irrigated by the spread of private tubewells. 
Irrigation in itself contributed substantially to increased yields and also enabled further 
improvements such as higher fertilizer use. The new dwarf seeds were in fact inefficient 
users of fertilizer and equally impressive production gains could have been achieved at a 
lower cost by using lower fertilizer doses over a larger acreage of tall varieties. This 
chapter has thus challenged the key claims in both the overall productionist narrative of 
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the Green Revolution as well as the innovation-centricity of the key case of Indian wheat 
production. 
Being preponderant in India’s foodgrain basket, trends in rice production have more or 
less been the same as the trend in overall foodgrain production; rice saw a revolutionary 
growth in yields and production in the 1950s, followed by a slowdown for a little over a 
decade from the mid-1960s and a less impressive revolution thereafter. After the mid-
1960s, improvements and expansion of rice cultivation was slower than that of wheat and 
its own remarkable performance in the 1950s. In part, this was due to a change in national 
priorities which meant that rice was allocated fewer resources than wheat. But 
improvements to rice cultivation were also severely constrained by the unsuitability of 
the short duration, photoperiod insensitive new varieties to the systems of irrigation and 
cycles of monsoon endemic to traditional rice-cultivating areas. Increases in rice 
production took place in large part through cultivation in non-traditional regions and non-
traditional seasons. The tubewells of Punjab, installed to irrigate wheat during the winter 
were put to use to irrigate rice during the monsoon which was scanty in Punjab and thus 
fields were amenable to better water management with irrigation than in traditional rice 
areas; Punjab became an important rice producing state cultivating the new varieties with 
very high yields. Similarly, the new varieties, coupled with tubewell irrigation enabled 
the cultivation of rice as an additional crop during the non-traditional summer season in 
the traditional rice areas of eastern India which also made for very high yields. This multi-
regional transformation in India’s rice production landscape took place more slowly and 
later than wheat in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s; but the novel advantages of tubewells 
and new varieties played a more important role than they did in the original Punjabi wheat 
revolution. 
The Rockefeller Foundation was quick to appropriate the spectacular harvests of the late 
1960s exclusively to the HYVs developed by it, and Dr. Norman Borlaug was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in 1970. Few questioned the standard story of the wheat revolution as one 
fuelled by dwarf plant varieties, and new varieties became central to Third-World 
agricultural development; as exemplified by the fact that while fertilizer use is the 
standard index of technology in the rich world, in the poor world it is the cultivation of 
HYVs. Despite the disappointing promise of the Green Revolution outside of the case of 
wheat in Punjab (which was in any case not driven by dwarf varieties), critical scholars 
(historians among them) have chosen not to question the innovation-centric story told by 
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Green Revolution promoters. This is due to a general innovation-centred picture of 
science of technology, and the fact that the standard story exemplifies the idea that 
innovation drives social change, which is an important trope in the historical literature. 
Having established the centrality of irrigation in the postwar transformation of Indian 
agriculture, in the next chapter I will detail the colonial origins of the tubewell, the 
technology crucial to that transformation. In subsequent chapters I shall also detail the 
role played by ideology and contingency in the selection of private tubewells as the means 
of irrigation-expansion in the 1960s. Having established the insignificant and likely 
negative role played by the High Yielding Varieties of seeds in the Green Revolution, I 




Chapter 2: The colonial origins of tubewell irrigation 
The general view of colonial irrigation is encapsulated in Headrick's claim that "the 
official mind was attracted to projects of gargantuan dimensions".1 Indeed we have 
several studies on the construction, operation and impact of the large canal irrigation 
systems in colonial India. But as I have noted in the introduction to this thesis, irrigation 
from tubewells has been neglected in the historiography,2 even though India had the 
world’s largest public tubewell programme in the interwar years, and ambitious plans for 
extending tubewell irrigation were made during and after the Second World War. 
In this chapter, I shall give an overview of tubewell irrigation during the first half of the 
twentieth-century in India, with a focus on the remarkable career of Sir William Stampe, 
a British irrigation engineer. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, provincial 
governments attempted to promote private tubewell development, but these efforts were 
limited in their effect as the expensive technology was only viable for large farms and the 
cost of pumping with oil engines in the absence of electricity were high. In the interwar 
years, a breakthrough was made in the United Provinces (UP) where the Irrigation Branch 
under Sir William Stampe harnessed the falls of the Upper Ganges canal with power 
stations to build the first rural electrification programme in India. Stampe pioneered a 
public tubewell irrigation programme in conjunction with the grid, which was the first 
large-scale use of tubewells in India and the largest public tubewell programme in the 
world. Sir William was appointed as an Irrigation Advisor to the Government of India 
during the Second World War. His advocacy, together with a sense of urgency in 
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increasing food production during and after the Second World War was crucial in putting 
tubewells on the central government agenda.  
I shall argue that tubewells (and groundwater irrigation more generally) became 
progressively more important during this period at the local, provincial and national scale 
due to the notion that the possibilities for the cheap extension of surface irrigation were 
close to exhaustion, and due to emergency needs to extend irrigation faster than was 
possible with canal systems. During the Second World War, colonial administrators saw 
India’s food problem as one of wartime production and saw tubewells as a quick means 
of increasing the irrigated area and stimulating food production. While William Stampe 
pushed tubewells as an emergency fix, he saw India’s vast groundwater reserves as a 
strategic resource and his vision for tubewells in India was a grander one than could be 
carried out during war.  
I shall argue that his was a small-scale, rural-agricultural vision for electricity in India 
that was in sharp contrast to the large-scale, urban-industrial vision of dominant 
nationalist planners. I shall illustrate how colonial engineers such as Stampe took great 
interest in small projects, prioritized the needs of the countryside and took pride in their 
service to small-scale industries. This small-scale, rural-agricultural vision for electricity 
was contested by nationalist technocrats such as Meghnad Saha, who saw electricity as a 
large-scale, urban-industrial technology. Gandhi’s oft quoted view was that he did not 
mind villagers using electricity to ply their implements as long as the power houses were 
state owned. 3 I shall argue that the Ganges grid was a colonial vision for electricity that 
would have been more acceptable to Gandhi than the vision of dominant nationalist 
planners. While Stampe later envisioned a massive transformation of the Indian 
                                                          
3 As quoted in Deepak Kumar, “Reconstructing India: Disunity in the Science and 
Technology for Development Discourse, 1900-1947”, Osiris (2000) 15: 241-257 who 
also suggests that Gandhi was politically important to the British in this context, as does 
Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: An intellectual and social history (New Delhi, 
2005), p. 114 who says that "village uplift" was a sphere imperialists and non-imperialists 
could cooperate on; colonial administrators were sympathetic to the non-political "bona 
fide village welfare work" of Gandhi. For the debate on Gandhian ideas, their 
marginalization and subsequent nationalist debates about development which were 
almost exclusively about the modes of large-scale industrialization (socialism, capitalism 
etc.) see Zachariah, Developing India, pp. 156-290. Gyan Prakash, Another reason: 
science and the imagination of modern India (Princeton, 1999), p. 197 too argues that the 
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countryside, his attitude towards scale was one of gradualism and experimentation, of 
starting small and scaling up if the experiment was successful; illustrating one irrigation 
engineer’s caution and thoughtfulness when it came to large-scale intervention into 
natural hydraulic regimes. 
I 
While there has been some mention of wells, the historiography of irrigation in colonial 
India has largely focused on large surface irrigation systems.4  Elizabeth Whitcombe has 
mentioned a small project that harnessed canal falls in Punjab to power 10 tubewells to 
remedy waterlogging in the 1910s and has attributed the failure to expand the scheme to 
the hostility of the irrigation establishment to power production and the low demand for 
power in an agricultural province. She has also mentioned the tubewells of the Ganges 
grid but seen the project more as more of a power production than an irrigation venture. 
But neither this nor other passing mentions gives a proper indication of the scale and 
scope of the UP tubewell programme.5  
The literature on electrification also does not give adequate coverage to such schemes. 
Rao and Lourdasamy have argued that colonial electrical engineers in Madras were only 
"interested in everything big" such as big power plants and large industrial consumers, a 
vision contested by Indians who preferred smaller projects which sought to bridge the 
urban-rural divide by promoting rural and cottage industries.6 
                                                          
4The relative merits of canal and well irrigation are sometimes central to the argument in 
works focusing on canals. Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions has lamented the decline in 
well irrigation in the canal-irrigated tracts of UP, while Stone, Canal Irrigation has 
celebrated that decline, arguing that canals were an “appropriate technology”.  
5 Whitcombe, “Irrigation”, pp. 730-734. In the Punjab case, Islam, Irrigation  has argued 
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oil engines or electricity.  Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism has noted small private 
efforts to harness canal falls in Punjab to power tubewell irrigation and argued that the 
absence of large-scale electrical development in Punjab, together with the colonial 
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tubewell development. 
6Srinivasa Rao and John Lourdusamy, "Colonialism and the Development of Electricity: 
The Case of Madras Presidency, 1900 -47", Science, Technology and Society (2010) 15: 
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Forged in war: An early global history of the tubewell  
A tubewell consists of two pipes in series inserted into the ground and used in conjunction 
with a pump. The first section through the dry strata close to the surface is a standard steel 
pipe, while the second section within the water bearing strata is slotted and is called the 
strainer; this allows the water to be pumped but keeps out the sand. A tubewell is typically 
quicker to install than dig a conventional well; in addition, it taps rich deep aquifers 
enabling a more copious and continuous supply. The device is most suitable for alluvial 
aquifers. 
While devices and methods of water supply akin to the tubewell had been developed since 
the early nineteenth century, it was in the 1860s that the device first found significant 
visibility when it was used on the move by the Northern Army during the American Civil 
War. In 1865, Thomas Dutton and Thomas Maguire of New Jersey patented the device 
and commentators saw the ease of installation and the protection of water from 
contamination (both problems with conventional dug wells) as its key advantages.7  
This “American Tube Well” was licensed by JL Norton of Manchester who made 
improvements to methods of driving the pipes into the ground; patenting these in England 
in 1867 and 1868 as the “Norton’s Patent Tube Well” After successful testing in Chatham, 
the army bought 50 of Norton’s tubewells (to which another 50 were added) in 1867 for 
the Abyssinian expedition. The official record of the expedition had a detailed description 
of the operation of the new device and noted that the tubewell proved to be an 
“exceedingly ingenious method of boring into any material short of solid rock”.8  
The success of the tubewell in that expedition got much popular press. As early as 1868, 
Mechanics Magazine wrote that the Norton tubewell had “gained such notoriety” that a 
description was not necessary; it termed the device “The Abyssinian tube well”, a name 
which stuck. 9 1868 was a year of drought in England making for great interest in the new 
device; a Bath journal wrote that the apparatus showed that the farmer need not lie idly 
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Volume 2 (London, 1870), p. 286. 
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seeing his cattle languish for water.10 In that same year, agricultural journals publicized 
the tubewell all over the British Empire including in an article in the Madras Times which 
emphasized its value for irrigation and the fact that Indian Army personnel who had 
returned from Abyssinia could help with advice.11 The Punjab government even wrote to 
London requesting to be supplied with six Norton’s tubewells in conjunction with steam 
driven pumps for experiments with irrigation.12 
The tubewell saw much use in the nineteenth-century by armies on the move, for watering 
animals and for domestic, municipal and industrial water supply, including within 
England where Le Grand and Sutcliffe of London had bought Norton’s patent and 
improved upon it.13 However, it saw little use for irrigation in early decades. This was 
perhaps because of the lack of a cheap and convenient source of motive power that could 
deliver the massive quantities of water demanded by agriculture. It was only from the turn 
of the twentieth century that the device began to be used in the United States for irrigation 
in California and the High Plains by individual farmers, initially with the spread of boring 
technology and windmills and later with the availability of oil engine and electric pumps. 
An early experiment was in Garden City, Kansas where an electricity plant powered 23 
pumps starting in 1908 which irrigated 5-6000 acres before the government sold the 
system to the Garden City Company which operated it indifferently.14 The use of private 
pumps however did spread on the High Plains; by 1939, 250,000 acres were estimated to 
be under pump in Texas.15 By then however, developments in America had been 
overtaken by the spectacular rise of public tubewells in northwestern India as I will show 
in a subsequent section. 
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 Groundwater irrigation in early twentieth-century India 
At the turn of the century, 19.5% of the area annually cropped in British India was under 
irrigation. Only 42.2% of this area was irrigated by state-owned works while private 
canals, tanks and wells accounted for the rest. Government canals contributed 35.5% of 
the total irrigated area, while private wells accounting for 29.2% were a close second. Of 
the nearly 13 million acres irrigated by wells the Indo-Gangetic plains provinces of UP 
(with 5.7 million acres) and Punjab (with 3.75 million acres) together accounted for over 
two thirds; Madras (with 2 million acres) in the South was a distant third. 16 
Provincial governments across India had various policies in place to promote well 
irrigation including loans and tax breaks. On an all-India basis, of the Rs. 277 lakhs of 
loans advanced to cultivators by the government for land improvement during the decade 
ending in 1900-01, Rs. 242 lakhs was for irrigation improvement. 17 UP had also begun 
assisting agriculturists with the boring of wells to increase their yield while the Madras 
government had developed a very liberal system of government loans for well 
construction, in addition to a commitment to not increase revenue rates due to land 
improvement from wells.  Even in canal-irrigated areas, there were some attempts to 
encourage well irrigation; for example, the commitment to construct a well to tide over 
failure of the rains or canal supplies was a condition of entry into some Punjab canal 
colonies, and Gujarat was toying with the idea of making well construction a condition 
for permitting the cultivation of sugarcane in canal-irrigated tracts. 18 
As wells could be constructed fairly quickly to aid agricultural production, they invariably 
become the focus of drought relief efforts; in UP for example, of the 550,000 new 
temporary wells constructed during the drought of 1896-97, it was estimated that over 
half were constructed with government aid; this was in addition to the construction and 
repair of thousands of permanent wells.19 Thus not only did the kind of wells vary 
considerably among the provinces, but the area irrigated by wells varied considerably 
from year to year; in UP for example, irrigation from wells varied between 3 million acres 
in a year of good rain to over 7 million acres in a drought year. 20 
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The largest share of what could be called development expenditure in colonial India of 
course consisted of large-scale government owned surface irrigation schemes, but there 
was substantial disquiet over the utility of this investment. The Famine Commission of 
1879 had concluded that while there were parts of India where agriculture would be 
impossible without irrigation, there were others where irrigation proved neither 
remunerative to the state nor served as protection from famine. The droughts of the 1890s, 
together with the consequent famines shook the confidence in irrigation as a universal 
famine prevention measures and an Irrigation Commission was appointed to decide the 
future course of irrigation projects.21 
 The Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) with its focus on the “limitation of 
irrigation”22 came very close to questioning the orthodoxy that irrigation was the most 
important technology for Indian agriculture; pointing out that if one accepted that the 
government should bear the cost of irrigating one man’s acre, there was nothing 
preventing another man to demand that it bear the cost of manuring his field. More 
generally, it pointed to several technical and financial difficulties which it felt would limit 
the viability of new large-scale surface irrigation projects: the geographical and surface 
distribution of rainfall would necessitate substantial storage structures which would be 
expensive. On the flat plains of Northern India, such a structure would submerge about 
the same area it could irrigate; in the Western Ghats, not only would the cost be too high, 
but entire towns and villages would need to be uprooted and safety could still not be 
assured. The Commission admitted that many of these difficulties could be overcome if 
cost was of no consequence; but argued that even when the object was famine prevention, 
there was a limit to the cost the general community could be expected to bear to protect 
any given tract. Further, as droughts were not predictable, the Commission felt that it 
would be wasteful to conserve water (rather than use it fully to irrigate) in a reservoir for 
a drought that might or might not strike the next year. 23 While the Commission did relent 
in accepting a fairly large programme of work for the Irrigation Departments, it acted to 
limit the enthusiasm for large projects by showing that most of the new irrigation projects 
proposed by the departments would not meet the strict criteria it recommended for the 
selection of new projects.  
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22 Irrigation Commission, Part I, p. 4. 
23 Irrigation Commission, Part II, pp. 6-25. 
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The Commission was however extremely enthusiastic about private wells as a means to 
increase irrigation; arguing that these were at least as important as large publicly-owned 
works and there was no province in India where well irrigation could not be extended at 
great advantage. It estimated that only 1.5% of the water which percolated into the soil 
was used, and thought that the number could be quadrupled. The Commission noted that 
well irrigation too had some limitations such as the total water available, but while it 
opined that the extension of well irrigation had to be gradual and in keeping with the 
general development of cultivators’ resources, it predicted that well irrigation would 
continue to grow “long after the extension of irrigation by flow had ceased.” The 
Commission did not consider it “over-sanguine” to envisage an eventual doubling of the 
area under well irrigation in India. 24 
The Irrigation Commission recommended several measures for the government to 
encourage well irrigation. The first was a liberalization of government loans for well 
construction. This required lower interest rates, a sympathetic and less rigid collection of 
repayments and longer loan tenures, besides the prevention of corruption by “underlings” 
while granting loans. Making tenancy rights transferrable was also desirable to enable the 
same to be used as a collateral by tenants. In addition to these loans, it also recommended 
outright grants for well construction and opined that governments should share the risk 
of well construction by compensating farmers for failed wells. It further recommended 
that land improved as a result of well construction should be exempted from increased 
taxation. In addition to these financial measures, the Commission recommended that the 
provinces set up agencies to assist cultivators with the sinking and boring of wells. Finally 
it emphasized the need for a survey of artesian water supplies through a programme of 
trial borings.  
By the mid-1920s, some of the provinces had set up establishments to aid cultivators with 
equipment for the boring of wells. There were also technological changes, albeit on a very 
small scale. The Irrigation Commission had noted the use of two steam engines for 
pumping water in Gujarat; the use of pumps grew in that province. In Madras, 
experiments in pumping with oil engines started in 1903 by Alfred Chatterton, the 
Director of Industries, led to a programme of loans to cultivators which had assisted with 
173 engines and pumps by March 1926. However, motorized groundwater irrigation in 
that province faced great challenges due to the low availability of water; this meant that 
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wells often ran dry after a mere hour of pumping. Consequently, a programme of boring 
and deepening of wells to increase their capacity was in progress in Madras.25 
UP and Punjab had already been using aspects of tubewell technology when the Irrigation 
Commission had reported in 1903. In UP’s permanent wells, the practice was to dig 
through the upper strata of clay, loam and sand until the impervious clay bed was reached. 
A hole would be bored through the clay bed to the sandy confined aquifer below and 
water would rise to the level of the well under sub-artesian pressure. In Punjab, a strainer 
pipe would be inserted through this bore to substantially augment the capacity of the 
well.26 When, by the 1920s, the tubewell proper had begun to solve the problem of having 
an uninterrupted supply of water copious enough to be pumped, these prior improvements 
of the well infact made for some confusion as to what exactly a tubewell was; when asked 
by the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1928), the Agricultural Engineer to 
the Government of Punjab replied that it was merely the magnitude of the discharge that 
distinguished a tubewell from an open well.  In any case, by the 1920s, the tubewell proper 
had begun to solve the problem of an uninterrupted supply of water copious enough to be 
pumped. 27  
Having set up a well boring unit pursuant to the Indian Irrigation Commission’s 
recommendations, the Punjab government grew warm to the idea of tubewells and 
appointed TA Miller Brownlie as the Agricultural Engineer to the Government in 1915. 
Brownlie had previously experimented with tubewells for municipal water supply in 
Amritsar and had himself invented a cheap strainer. In addition to a program of improving 
open wells, between 1915 and 1927, the Punjab Agricultural Department had assisted 21 
cultivators with sinking tubewells operated with oil engine pumps. The government was 
planning an experiment of putting down a battery of 16 tubewells with electric pumps to 
be tentatively powered by a small generator to study the economics of tubewell 
irrigation.28 
The UP Agriculture Department had embarked on a more substantial programme of 
assisting and encouraging tubewell irrigation. As the province had exhausted most large-
scale surface irrigation sources, it was felt that the use of underground water through 
                                                          
25 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Interim Report, Volume III: Evidence taken 
in the Madras Presidency (London, 1927), p. 231. 
26 Irrigation Commission, Part II, p.48. 
27 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Interim Report, Volume VIII: Evidence 
taken in the Punjab (London, 1927), p. 187. 
28 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Interim Report, Volume VIII, p. 183-188. 
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tubewells was the only means to extend irrigation. By 1927, when the Royal Commission 
on Agriculture in India collected its evidence, the department had assisted in the 
construction of 200 tubewells, which were estimated to be irrigating 30,000 acres every 
year. Tubewell construction was heavily subsidized by the provincial government; 
besides loans, it provided grants-in-aid of upto Rs. 3000 and a “tubewell subsidy” of Rs. 
6,000. In addition, the well was bored for free by the Department, a job which would have 
cost an estimated Rs. 16,000 if carried out privately and the farmer only paid for the pipes 
and the pump actually left in his possession.29 
Being expensive, tubewells were thought to be suitable only for intensive cultivation; in 
fact they were seen as a “powerful influence” in favour of the same. 30 Operational costs 
being high, they were thought viable only for high value crops such as sugarcane, potato 
and tobacco, and unsuitable for wheat and rice. There were other problems; the cost of 
pumping water with kerosene engines, while lesser than that of raising water by draught 
animals, was still very high. Thus like Punjab, the UP Agriculture Department too was 
also planning an experiment with 10 electrically powered tubewells in Gorakhpur. 31 
Further, tubewells were found to be viable only for farms of at least 150 acres and could 
sometimes irrigate upwards of 500 acres; as the Agricultural Engineer to the UP 
Government Mr. Vicks admitted, his well boring agency was “working for rich men”.32 
To him, the only difficulty in extending tubewell irrigation was one of finance; he argued 
that if the government could raise loans to construct canals, it could do the same for 
tubewells. In a note submitted to the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India in the 
late 1920s, he proposed a Lift Irrigation Department “far bigger than even the present 
canal departments”, which would sink tubewells and sell the water to small cultivators. 33 
Fantastical as the vision was, publicly-owned tubewells powered by electricity would 
quickly become very important in UP. That initiative however came from the Irrigation 
Department, whom Vicks had opined against entrusting the work to, fearing it would 
obscure the importance of tubewell irrigation. 34 
                                                          
29 Royal Commission on Agriculture, Volume VII: Evidence Taken in the United 
Provinces, p. 237-245. 
30 Royal Commission on Agriculture, Volume VII, p. 239. 
31 Royal Commission on Agriculture, Volume VII, pp. 237-245. 
32 Royal Commission on Agriculture, Volume VII, p. 241. 
33 Royal Commission on Agriculture, Volume VII, p. 241. 
34Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Volume VII, p. 241. 
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The Ganges grid35 
With the completion of the Sharda canal in the 1920s, there seemed to be little scope for 
an easy expansion of canal irrigation in UP. Extension of surface irrigation would require 
the building of expensive Himalayan reservoirs which were expected to be unstable and 
silt up soon. 36 A possible means to extend irrigation was by pumping water, either from 
low lying rivers or from the subsoil aquifer using tubewells. The falls of the Upper Ganges 
canal which had been previously used for flour milling37 could be harnessed to produce 
cheap electricity for pumping. In 1927, at the initiative of William Stampe, a 
superintending engineer at the Irrigation Department, a project began to harness four falls 
on the canal to supply power to pump water from the Ramganga river to irrigate high 
ground and to enhance the water supply in the Upper Ganges canal itself by pumping 
water into it from the Kali Nadi river. The total planned generating capacity was 5700 
kilowatt with the pumps on the Kali Nadi and Ramganga being the largest loads on the 
system.38 The transmission system connecting these power stations and pumping 
installations was to be developed to electrify towns, villages and rural tracts in seven 
western UP districts spread over 10,000 square miles;39 this became the first rural-
electrification programme in India.  
From 1927-28, the Irrigation Department began experimenting with tubewells powered 
by the grid.40 Much advantage was seen in the ability of tubewells to irrigate areas far 
from the reach of canal systems and in the flexibility of a tubewell programme which 
could grow slowly with demand, unlike canals which required massive investment before 
                                                          
35 This section draws substantially from my master’s thesis. See Kapil Subramanian, 
Canals, Sugarcane and Tubewells: System Building in an Agrarian Economy 
(Unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, Imperial College, London, 2011). 
36 William Stampe, The Ganges Valley State Tubewell Irrigation Scheme: a system of 
state irrigation by Hydroelectric power from underground sources, 1934/35 to 1937/38 
(Allahabad, 1936), p. 28. 
37 See Whitcombe, "Irrigation", p. 730 and Irrigation Administration Report of the 
United Provinces (Allahabad, 1902-1946), for trends of earning from Upper Ganges 
Canal water power sales. 
38 William Stampe, The Ganges Canal Hydro-electric Scheme: A System of Rural 
Electrification from Low Head Canal Falls (Roorkee, 1931), p. 3. 
39 United Provinces Public Works Department, Irrigation Administration Report of the 
United Provinces, 1927-28 (Allahabad, 1928), p. 72. 
40 Public Works Department, Administration Report, 1927-28, p. 47. 
Chapter 2: The Colonial Origins of Tubewell Irrigation 
87 
 
a single acre was irrigated. 41 By the late 1930s, there were 1500 state tubewells on the 
grid each irrigating about 400 acres of land. State-owned groundwater irrigation grew to 
be very important in UP, irrigating 583,000 acres in 1938-39; about a third as much area 
commanded by the Ganges Canal and about 11% of the total area irrigated by the 
Irrigation Branch that year. 42 This made it not just (perhaps an order of magnitude) larger 
than any organized public groundwater irrigation system but also made western UP the 
world leading region in motorized groundwater-irrigated acreages. 
By the late 1930s, this network of state-owned tubewells became the primary load on the 
electrical system, totalling nearly 20,000 horsepower.43 To serve these tubewells, capacity 
of the generating system had to be more than quadrupled to 27,900 kilowatt between 1935 
and 1939, by expanding the existing stations, harnessing four more canal falls and 
building a large coal-fired plant. 44 Over half the post-expansion capacity of the grid was 
to be allocated to agriculture, largely for state tubewells, but also for private tubewells 
and river pumps. 45 The Ganges grid thus made for a relationship between electricity and 
irrigation rather different than that conveyed by the conventional picture of co-production 
at a big dam where power was produced and irrigation canals led off; an existing irrigation 
system was used to produce power for irrigation, forming a new irrigation system of 
canals, power stations, transmission lines, river pumps and tubewells. Contemporary 
engineers such as JW Meares saw the use of power for irrigation rather than rural 
electrification as the breakthrough the Ganges grid planners had achieved,  
Water and electricity had more than celebrated their silver wedding; the first 
hydro-electric scheme had been executed as long ago as 1898, and much progress 
has been made. The present scheme was, however, a totally new departure...The 
whole outlook which it symbolized was new. It was partly gratifying to [Stampe] 
because, in the report of the Hydro-Electric Survey of India published many years 
ago, he had indicated the great importance of irrigation to uncommanded areas, 
                                                          
41 Stampe, The Ganges Valley State Tube-well Irrigation Scheme, p. 28. 
42 Public Works Department, Administration report, 1938-39, p.38.  
43 Stampe, The Ganges Canal Hydro-electric Scheme: A system of Rural Electrification 
from Low Head Canal Falls. Ultimate Development 1935-38 (Allahabad, 1935), p. 25. 
44 Public Works Department, Administration Report, p.7. This was in addition to 1885 
kilowatt of Oil Engine Backup. 
45 Stampe, Ultimate Development 1935-38, p. 21. 
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areas above the level of gravity canals, which could be carried out from the falls 
of the present great irrigation canal systems of India. The new irrigation ... [will 
be] extended to many other parts of India and prove to be of magnificent service 
to the country and a fine thing for the Government.46 
Tubewells made for a rural electrification very different from the domestic and industrial 
modernization stories told of the west; by 1938-39, the grid earned half its revenues from 
power sales to state-owned irrigation pumps even as they paid lower tariffs than industrial 
and domestic consumers.47 It was power applied to agriculture that rendered viable the 
electrification of small towns, a picture rather different from the notion that rural 
electrification is a non-paying proposition that must be pushed by politics. The centrality 
of the tubewell to rural electrification pioneered on the Ganges grid continued in 
postcolonial India; it is only in the present century that the Indian government’s emphasis 
has shifted from powering groundwater irrigation to village electrification more 
generally.48 The finances of several state power entities have come to depend on tubewell 
politics; a relationship some have termed the energy-irrigation nexus.49 
The Ganges Valley State Tubewell Irrigation Scheme also pioneered publicly-owned 
groundwater irrigation systems. The India Irrigation Commission (1901-3) had seen wells 
as a private enterprise while the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1928) had 
explicitly censured the UP Agriculture Department’s high subsidies for tubewell 
development, arguing that the government’s role should be limited to techno-economic 
studies, technical advice and loans; it opined that “private enterprise in these matters 
should not be discouraged by government competition”.50 Stampe made the case for a 
                                                          
46 JW Meares, "Comments on “The Ganges Canal Hydro-electric Scheme: A system of 
Rural Electrification from Low Head Canal Falls.”" Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 
(1931) 79: 835. 
47 Public Works Department, Administration Report 1938-39.  
48 Until recently, the object of rural electrification in India was “groundwater exploration 
and energization of pump sets/tubewells which has a bearing on agricultural production” 
rather than “village electrification” more generally.Ministry of Power, 
http://www.powermin.nic.in/ , accessed on 15th May 2012. See the section on rural 
electrification. 
49 T. Shah, C. Scott, A. Kishore and A. Sharma, Energy-irrigation nexus in South Asia: 
improving groundwater conservation and power sector viability (Colombo, 2003).  
50 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Abridged Report (Calcutta, 1928), pp 38-
39. 
Chapter 2: The Colonial Origins of Tubewell Irrigation 
89 
 
state-owned system by claiming that despite heavy propaganda, zamindars maintained 
that irrigation, whether through canals or tubewells must be the responsibility of the state, 
and could not be induced to construct tubewells for their tenants’ use. Stampe argued that 
in any case, it would have been difficult to evolve a viable transmission scheme 
embracing scattered tubewells here and there; economic transmission was based on a 
minimum demand per mile of line and no scheme that traversed long distances from one 
enterprising zamindar’s land to the next with little intervening load could pay its way. 
What was called for was a state-owned system, with tubewells spaced a standard 1.4 miles 
apart.51   
Not only did Stampe argue for a public tubewell system, he also attempted to monopolize 
groundwater irrigation in the state tubewell tracts through a UP Underground Waters Bill. 
Indians in the provincial council saw the bill as an attempt to abrogate the constitutional 
rights of zamindars to sink wells, calling it “confiscation without compensation”; the 
principle of which Jawaharlal Nehru, then barely a year out of jail, “had constituted 
himself to be the highest priest.” Eventually, only a weak toothed State Tubewells Act 
was passed, which afforded tubewells the same legal status as canals. 52 Despite the lack 
of a monopoly, state-owned tubewells contributed the lion’s share of UP’s tubewell-
irrigated area. 
The Ganges grid put in sharp focus the contrast in the development visions of colonial 
engineers and technocratic nationalist planners such as Meghnad Saha. "Small" is the 
word that could perhaps best characterize a planned system with an initial capacity of just 
5700 kilowatt spread over 4 power plants53 The "smallness" of the Ganges grid system 
                                                          
51 Stampe, The Ganges Valley State Tubewell Irrigation Scheme, p. 5. 
52 This afforded to the tubewells the same legal status as afforded to canals under the 
North India Canal and Drainage Act of 1873.Tubewells had earlier been covered under 
the weak toothed UP Minor Irrigation Act of 1920. The discussion, coming soon after the 
Government of India Act of 1935 which famously lacked a preamble, also touched upon 
whether constitutional law applied at all in India. Tubewells were initially defined to 
include all motorized wells in addition to artesian wells. Anon, Collection 58/17 
Irrigation - United Provinces State Tube - Wells Act 1936 (1936-37) in India Office 
Records and Private Papers Collection, British Library, London. Reference: 
IOR/L/E/9/387. This new canal-like legal status would allow, for example, the power to 
prosecute water thieves.  
53 Stampe, The Ganges Canal Hydro-electric Scheme, p.  4. The generation capacity 
would be dwarfed even by projects within India, such as a concurrent effort in Madras 
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was a source of pride; a picture of the Palra station with a head of 9 feet was captioned 
"probably the lowest fall installation in India".54  Within the small system, individual 
generation plants would be smaller still and the generation capacity could grow slowly 
with the development of these small stations en route the main transmission line as the 
load developed without overcapitalization of the project at any point, a feature appreciated 
by other colonial engineers such as JW Meares. 55 Meghnad Saha however, saw Stampe’s 
decision to develop small canal falls as the function of an irrigation engineer’s limited 
vision and argued for a large project in the Himalayas.56 
Like the generation system, "small" is the word that best describes the industrial power 
installations; a total of 2670 horsepower or half the total connected industrial load was 
installed in 270 flour mills averaging less than 10 horsepower each. 57 Most electrical 
power was employed in the production process outside of what can strictly be called a 
factory setting; for example, within the entire grid area there existed only one flour mill 
(compared to the 270 electrified) large enough to be classified as a factory.58 William 
Stampe, took pride in the scheme's success in supplying small consumers,  
It has been alleged that the difficulties of supplying a small amount of energy to 
a larger number of urban consumers especially on the industrial side has militated 
against the success of the scheme. From an examination of the figures there 
appears to be no ground for this fear. The fact that out of 635 private motors 
                                                          
30,000 kilowatt in 1937 (both plants were later expanded) or Tata's Andhra Power whose 
capacity was 99,000 kilowatt in 1922, see Central Board of Irrigation, Hydro-electric 
development in India (leaflet, New Delhi, 1948). 
54 Public Works Department, Administration Report, 1929-30, p. 9. It must also be noted 
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55 JW Meares, "Comments”, p. 835. 
56 K. T. Shah, Report of the Sub-Committee on Power and Fuel (Bombay, 1949), pp. 
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57 See J.P. Srivastava, United Provinces Industries Reorganisation (Srivastava) 
Committee 1932-34 Report (Allahabad, 1934), p. 46-48. 
58 United Provinces Labour Department, Annual Report on the Administration of the 
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consumers in the grid area, 520 or 82 per cent have installations of not more than 
10 horsepower is in itself sufficient proof of this.59 
A power installation of less than 10 horsepower was also the criteria that the nationalists 
would soon use to define a "cottage industry," which was Gandhi's preferred mode of 
production.60  
The Irrigation Branch also experimented with small-scale sugar production using 
electricity, but most electric power employed in sugarcane processing was in a hundred 
odd small crushing plants producing gur and khandsari.61 Stampe believed that, 
The secret of the successful development of this scheme appears to be the 
cheapness of the power offered especially in the case of isolated and small 
consumers... [It] is bound to result in the development of many agricultural 
processes hitherto beyond the reach of the rural agriculturist.62 
To Saha however, the idea that electricity could be part of a rural-agricultural modernity 
rather than an urban-industrial one was anathema. He wrote,   
Most of the existing load is agricultural and lasts for a comparatively short time. 
Since from the very beginning the cry had been raised of helping the agriculturists, 
such an unremunerative agricultural load has to be given preference, and no 
industrial load is sought for. Thus the main advantage of the [hydro-electric] 
Systems of supplying large blocks of electrical power at a very cheap rate for 
running industries has been nullified.63 
                                                          
59 William Stampe, "Note on Hydro-electric Development", in J.P. Srivastava, Industries 
Reorganisation, p. 14A. 
60 K. T. Shah, Report of the Sub-Committee on Rural and Cottage Industries (Bombay, 
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61 Gur consists of cakes of unrefined sugar made by open pan boiling of sugarcane juice 
on the farm. Khandsari is "Low quality" refined sugar produced by open pan boiling 
followed by manual centrifuging. Overall sugarcane processing accounted for less than 
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and khandsari.61  Stampe, "Note on Hydro-electric Development", p. 9A. 
62 Stampe, "Note on Hydro-electric Development", p. 13A.  
63 Shah, Power and Fuel, p. 61. 
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An Empire at War: The Irrigation Adviser to the Government of India 
After over thirty years of service in UP, Sir William Stampe retired as Chief Engineer 
and went home to Britain in 1938. In 1940, he was engaged as a consultant on some 
tubewell projects in the princely states of Baroda and Jodhpur. En route back to Britain, 
he discussed tubewells for military water supply in Cairo with Major General Hughes and 
the possibility of a hydro-electric power and tubewell irrigation project on the lines of the 
Ganges grid with the Egyptian authorities. Marshall Balbo in Tripoli was also interested 
in his advice on lowering the cost of tubewell irrigation.64 However, it being April 1940 
with the imminent prospect of war on the Italian frontier, Stampe’s paperwork to fly from 
Cairo to Tripoli was cancelled and he hurried home to be commissioned into the RAF 
Voluntary Reserve.65 
In February 1943, prompted perhaps by the food crisis then developing in India, Sir 
William wrote to the Secretary of State in London with ideas for irrigation projects in 
India that could be executed speedily during the war; as a result of this he was appointed 
as an Irrigation Advisor to the Government of India attached to the Department of 
Education, Health and Lands (and later to the Department of Agriculture after its 
formation).66 For Stampe, the creation of a new appointment in India after his retirement 
                                                          
64 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation Projects in India. Memorandum dated 25th 
May 1943 on suggested procedure for his Indian tour, by F/Lt. Sir William Stampe, C.I.E, 
Irrigation Adviser to Government of India”, 25 May 1943, in National Archives of India 
(NAI) file: Question of Availing Sir William Stampe’s services in connection with 
emergency irrigation works in States. 
65 Sir William Stampe to Sir AV Alexander, 25 August 1947, In Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge file AVAR 5/12. 
66 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation Projects”   The year of his appointment raises 
obvious questions as to its relation with the Bengal famine. Later documents would note 
that his services were obtained “Following the disastrous famine in Bengal in 1943“ see  
J. Thomson, Commonwealth Relations Office to B.J Ellis, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 
10th December 1946, in British Library (BL) file IOR/L/E/8/5515. There is however, no 
direct evidence that the Bengal famine is what prompted Stampe to write to the Secretary 
of State, or that it was the reason for his appointment, as Bengal’s food situation was not 
quite clear until the middle of that year, though the All-India situation was serious enough 
for a Department of Food to be constituted in December 1942; see Henry Knight, Food 
Administration in India 1939-1947 (Stanford, Ca, 1954), pp.57-66. Nevertheless, Bengal 
and Bihar is where Stampe first offered advice on his arrival in India, see Note dated 28th 
June 1943, in NAI file: National Defence Council-Irrigation Projects-Points raised by 
Raja of Bobbili for consideration-Note by Sir William Stampe, I.A. on water versus coal. 
Stampe would later write of the Bengal famine as the point when provinces other than UP 
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was probably a means of combating what he later called “the process of human erosion” 
due to the loss of much knowledge resulting from compulsory retirement policies in the 
Indian service.67 He felt he had much to contribute as he saw irrigation as a solution to 
India’s wartime and postwar food problem.68 He however felt that large gravity canal 
systems could not be completed for decades, and millions would have to starve in the 
meanwhile for lack of foreign exchange. During the war, issues of material and labour 
shortage would preclude any real progress towards large canal systems, and in the postwar 
years, the cost of labour would go up (as it was related to food prices), making such 
schemes expensive. Having previously put under irrigation over 600,000 acres in about 
four year using tubewells in the Ganges Valley, to him the irrigation technology 
appropriate for meeting war time food needs and carrying out postwar reconstruction, 
was not to be large-scale canal irrigation systems but irrigation from tubewells and river 
pumps on low lying rivers.69 He discussed the question of wartime irrigation by cable 
with the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo and with Sir Bernard Bourdillon the 
Governor of Nigeria on his way to India, convinced of the wartime importance and global 
applicability of tubewell technology, 
[The] production problems in certain colonies and in the Middle East are similar 
mutatis mutandis to those under review in India… In fact the whole question is 
one of definite “war” interest as well as of postwar importance.70 
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in British Library file IOR/L/E/8/7431. 
67 William Stampe, “The Himalayan Dream” An address to the East India Association“, 
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68 As he wrote repeatedly, “It is an established fact that the yield of food and other 
commercial crops can be increased by as much as 60-100% by means of systematic 
irrigation in areas of uncertain rainfall.“ See for example, William Stampe, 
“Memorandum dated 24th December 1948 of a talk with Lord Bruce on 16th December 
1948“, in British Library file IOR/L/E/8/7431. 
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70 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation Projects in India. Memorandum dated 25th 
May 1943 on suggested procedure for his Indian tour, by F/Lt. Sir William Stampe, C.I.E, 
Irrigation Adviser to Government of India”, 25 May 1943, in NAI file: Question of 
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in States. 
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Having decided that tubewells would be the solution to India’s food problem, before 
leaving London he discussed the problem of supplying materials for boring and equipping 
tubewells in wartime with British manufacturers. Besides finding possible suppliers, he 
came up with some interesting ideas for supplying machinery such as utilizing the 
fortuitously available pumps for tubewells due to the curtailment of the fire service in 
England which utilized near identical pumps, and the use of reserve engines available 
with the air force in India to power generators and energize tubewells close to airfields. 
To mitigate the problem of hoarding of food, he proposed taking payment for irrigation 
water in wheat, and proposed that the same system be used for other inputs such as 
fertilizers, as it would be a pity to spend public money on irrigation if it was merely to 
result “in the cultivators growing still more grain and then holding on to it whilst the 
towns went hungry”.71 
Besides dealing with these issues, he had to raise the prestige associated with tubewells 
amongst the irrigation bureaucracy. Classified as “minor irrigation”, tubewells seemed to 
have little exciting to offer to the average canal engineer. In a revision of his very first 
memo, he suggested that the world “emergency” be substituted for the word “minor” in 
all files,  
In view of the effect of the word “minor” on the mentality of the personnel 
concerned…. Whereas “emergency” connotes the need for dynamic action, 
“minor” suggests works of a more trivial nature on which the maximum effort is 
not so likely to be exerted.72 
Speed being the essence of the problem, Stampe proposed to use aeroplanes for 
reconnaissance; this would also have the “psychological value of stimulating our local 
staff to the degree of enthusiasm required for tackling emergency measures” and 
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reconnaissance photographs taken could be used to illustrate reports. This request was 
granted and much communication during his tenure was about the availability of 
appropriate landing sites for his aircraft.73 
The period of the Second World War saw the birth of India’s first national food policy, 
the setting up of the central government’s Department of Food, as well as the Grow More 
Food programme which lasted into the late 1950s.74 Stampe’s appointment predated these 
steps and represented a bold step by the Government of India, for the construction and 
management of irrigation was a provincial subject under the Government of India Act of 
1935. While much of that act had been suspended for the duration of the war, the creation 
of a new federal office emphasizes the importance placed by the central government on 
irrigation as a means of stimulating food production during the war.  
While the appointment was of an ad hoc nature and his initial remit was to merely make 
his advice available to any province which desired it with the central government assisting 
provincial projects with priority for machinery and materials, 75 this remit was to grow as 
I shall relate. That the appointed adviser was Sir William Stampe, an expert on tubewells, 
and not, say an engineer from Punjab, which was considered to be at the cutting edge in 
canal irrigation demonstrates that the colonial administrators were convinced that 
tubewells could yield quick results during the war.  
That wartime urgency was crucial in putting tubewells on the central government agenda 
is illustrated by an incident soon after Stampe’s arrival in India. The Raja of Bobbili wrote 
a note advocating the construction of large canal irrigation projects on the lines of the 
great schemes of the nineteenth century. The Raja’s demand that his note be circulated 
for discussion at the National Defense Council created some anxiety among the colonial 
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bureaucracy and their response tells us much about the background to William Stampe’s 
appointment, 
Long Range policy is under consideration in connection with the post-war 
reconstruction. At present we are vitally interested in growing more food… the 
necessity for more food transcends ordinary economic considerations. Moreover, 
conditions after the war may be altogether different from conditions at present... 
In our opinion therefore, it would be a wrong policy to promote long-term projects 
at the expense of short term projects... As for irrigation projects, we encourage 
those which afford promise of quick results. Long-term projects, apart from the 
difficulty of obtaining raw materials and expert personnel without diverting them 
from more essential war production will be of no use to us for increasing food 
production during the present emergency.... The urgent food problem at the 
moment- the problem with which we have our hands full- is a war problem- how 
to produce an increased supply of food in the shortest possible time, indeed, 
immediately… At the moment, what we require is quick return from schemes of 
a kind that can be carried out in the shortest time with the labour and material 
available. It is true that these may have no long lasting benefit in some cases 
though we are trying, especially in the case of Sir William Stampe's proposals to 
fit our emergency irrigation schemes into plans for long-term projects.76 
The colonial bureaucracy then, was primarily interested in what it saw as an urgent 
problem of wartime food production. By the time of Stampe’s arrival in India in late May 
1943 however, it had become clear that India’s food crisis was overwhelmingly one of 
rice in Bengal,77 and by his own admission, he was “out of his depth” when it came to 
rice-growing areas.78 Tubewells had previously been judged too expensive for rice 
cultivation.79 Bengal and Bihar would nevertheless be the first provinces to seek his 
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advice, though early attempts at tubewell irrigation in those provinces would be met with 
frustration as the hand boring methods used to drill the Ganges Valley tubewells were 
inappropriate for the harder strata encountered in eastern India.80 The larger and more 
successful projects he advised on would be in wheat growing areas and bore fruit only 
after the war. However, as I shall relate, his advice, ostensibly for the war, was also a 
long-term vision for tubewells and for rural development in India. 
The Himalayan Dream 
Soon after his arrival in India Stampe prepared a memo in June 1943 for discussion in the 
National Defense Council in case the Raja’s memo was referred to. In it, Stampe lamented 
the lack of appreciation for small-scale power plants, 
It seems doubtful whether the importance of water [power]-even on “low head” 
falls is even now appreciated at its real value… due to the warped commercial 
angle from which most “large scale” civil engineers have  hitherto looked at the 
problem… How often has one heard it said in the good old peace days-’the head 
is too low to be economic’ of ‘the distance is too great to the industrial field 
followed by “put in a steam station!”81 
He went on to give the example of the Ganges grid as an exemplar of the “real value of 
local water power”, as it powered tubewells and river pumps which had irrigated a million 
acres in 1942-43 and produced 400,000 additional tons of wheat. 82 A coal-fired power 
station would have required 5000 wagon trips a year to produce the same amount of 
power; hence on the Ganges grid, “human hunger had been met by local water power 
rather than making inroads on the limited wagon resources of India”. 83 Using this 
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example, he made the case for importing power plants for harnessing the falls on the 
Eastern Jumna Canal, the Sharda Canal and the Sone Canal to irrigate additional land 
with tubewells and produce wheat locally; from the point of view of shipping, this was 
preferable to importing wheat. He emphasized that while these were small-scale 
activities, they could be carried out in wartime; 84 the solution to India’s wartime food 
problem that Sir William championed was based on the local and the small.  
However, Stampe’s long-term vision could hardly be described as small. According to 
him, under the Indo-Gangetic plains lay vast aquifers whose waters were flowing very 
slowly under the effect of gravity towards the Bay of Bengal. To him this was the 
Saraswati river of Hindu mythology,85 flowing “through the dark sands, unconscious of 
administrative boundaries, racial difficulties, political  differences and ‘salutes’, only 
hoping perhaps,  as we do to ‘surface’ and see the dawn of a brighter day.”86This river 
could be the source of all the water required for agriculture and was to be a “vital asset” 
in his plan for India’s postwar development.87 That plan, which he called the Himalayan 
Dream, envisaged the harnessing of the Himalayan rivers with massive power plants and 
was described by him in the manner of a battle, 
The occasion, too, seems fitting when just as the last bomb thud of the most 
destructive conflict in human history is shortly to be heard in the west there should 
be sounding in the east the clear call to this constructive campaign about to open 
on our dusty plains. I refer to the coming fight with Himalayan forces which must 
be subdued in order to link these great reserves of mountain power with water 
which is either seeping silently below the sands of the great plains or flowing 
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down deep-set rivers at too low a level to relieve the cultivator and his tired cattle 
in the fields.88 
The harnessing of Himalayan rivers, like the building of large gravity flow irrigation 
systems, would require time and experience. In the meanwhile, power for tubewell 
irrigation was to be supplied by a scheme of “nursery power plants”, a concept pioneered 
in India by the Electrical Commissioner H.M. Matthews. Small thermal power plants 
(coal fired for the larger networks and diesel fired for the smaller ones) together with a 
local transmission network were to energize small groups of tubewells, between ten and 
hundred in number. Such schemes had been started previously by Stampe in Baroda and 
Kolhapur. With the availability of a base load in the form of tubewell pumping, cheap 
power could be made available for cottage industries such as flour and rice milling and 
oilseed crushing in the countryside. The nursery power plants were to be gradually 
absorbed into the networks of larger coal fired power plants which themselves were to be 
subsumed into hydro-electric networks which were “bound to eventuate” as the 
Himalayan dream took shape.89 
What may we make of the attitudes to scale of someone who extolled the virtues of “local 
water power”, while at the same time envisioning the transformation of a vast landscape 
by large hydroelectric networks? One may surmise that he believed in experimentation 
and gradualism and in the scaling up of schemes once they proved successful, unlike the 
caricature of colonial engineers who could only think big. Even as he advocated a 
campaign to build large dams in the Himalayas, the self-described oldest irrigation 
engineer in India who “had spent 36 years living on the banks of Mother Ganga”, 
cautioned his juniors of the perils of intervening in natural hydraulic regimes, 
I shall presume ... to offer a word of caution to those enterprising engineers of the 
Punjab who propose to subdue certain Himalayan tigers by a frontal attack on 
their main lairs. Personally in my limited experience I have always regarded 
discretion in shikar as the better part of valor. In view of (a) the geological 
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instability of the Himalayan set-up, (b) the technical difficulty and danger of 
dropping stupendous floods on to the unstable river beds, and (c) the appalling 
consequences that would follow a failure, would not such planners do well to 
adopt Mr. Watal's 'appeasement' policy of 'catching the cubs first,' i.e., damming 
the bigger tributaries and thus gaining experience before tackling the tigress 
herself. However, as my more daring friends have engaged an international tiger 
tamer, I must leave it at that.90 
Organizing for Groundwater 
In the process of advising on small emergency irrigation projects in UP, Baroda and the 
North Western Frontier Province, Stampe felt that provincial efforts were being frustrated 
by a lack of technical knowledge of the subsoil strata, a lack of technicians and 
contractors, the difficulty of obtaining equipment, and the high cost and delay in 
procurement from abroad due to the war. In January 1944, he proposed that a Sub-Soil 
Water Section be set up in the Department of Agriculture with a nucleus staff to 
coordinate data, advice the provinces and to carry out trial borings; this was accepted by 
the department and the provinces were informed of the same in early December. After 
Stampe‘s retirement, the organisation was to be merged with the newly set up Central 
Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission (CWINC).91 
However, the methods of hand percussion boring which had been used in the alluvium of 
the Indo-Gangetic plain apparently proved slow and expensive on the harder strata 
encountered in regions such as central Bihar, Rajputana, Kathiawar and Kutch. To 
procure more “scientific and expeditious machinery”, William Stampe and K.D. Sanwal, 
a UP engineer deputed as his technical assistant toured North Africa, the UK and the USA 
where they studied mechanical boring and consulted manufacturers on the adaptation of 
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boring plant to the hard strata encountered in India.92 In America, they studied drilling 
equipment in use in California, around the Grand Coulee dam in Washington, the Boise 
Payette project in Idaho, the Buffalo Rapids project in Indiana and the Klamath project 
in Oregon, besides visiting O.M. Meinzer‘s groundwater research laboratory at the United 
States Geological Survey.93 Stampe procured eight Ruston Bucyrus drilling rigs from the 
UK and three rotary drilling rigs from the United States. In addition, he invited Roscoe 
Moss, a Californian contractor and manufacturer of groundwater equipment to visit India 
and offer advice on tubewell development.94 
Roscoe Moss surveyed large parts of northern, eastern and western India by low-level 
flying in early 1946. He studied existing tubewell practices and recommended that the 
practice of filling the annular space between the screen and the borehole with gravel be 
extended to protect against the pumping of sand and to protect the walls of the bore hole 
from collapse. He recommended gravel shrouded tubewells drilled using rotary rigs that 
Stampe had procured. These did not require casing pipes for drilling, and, having a thicker 
gravel protection than was improvised in earlier screen wells, they could be operated with 
lower cost screens, enabling the consequent use of a larger screen area to increase yields; 
a method which an impressed Stampe called the Roscoe Moss technique.95 
After his travels in America, Stampe set down seriously to set up a Central Groundwater 
Section capable of launching an all India tubewell irrigation campaign and eventually 
realize the Himalayan dream. At a meeting in January 1946 between the Department of 
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Agriculture, the Geological Survey of India and the newly set up Central Waterways, 
Irrigation and Navigation Commission (CWINC), it was agreed that an organisation be 
set up which would eventually be merged with the CWINC; while the CWINC would 
take over research and statistics, the Department of Agriculture would continue to oversee 
the actual development of groundwater resources.96 However, after Roscoe Moss’s visit, 
Stampe felt that this was not enough, and in April 1946 he proposed the setting up of a 
permanent quasi-independent organisation called the Central Groundwater Organisation 
(CGWO), on the lines of the CWINC or the Central Technical Power Board to develop 
India‘s groundwater resources. It was to employ engineers and geologists and have all the 
necessary equipment to drill wells for demonstration, as well as to assist the provinces in 
their plans. “Give us the tools” Sir William wrote, “and we will finish the job”.97 
Despite some hiccups,98 the CGWO was soon constituted, though it had much teething 
trouble, in large part due to Stampe’s departure from India due to illness in August 1946 
even as the reorganization was being implemented.99 Among the developments that did 
take shape before Stampe’s departure was a Central Drilling School that was set up in the 
village of Dhanauri close to Roorkee to train drillers and drilling engineers on mechanical 
boring methods on the few Ruston Bucyrus and Rotary rigs obtained by the CGWO.100 
About a hundred personnel were trained by the school by 1949, when the CGWO was 
closed down, in large part because it was felt that the investment on equipment was not 
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commensurate with results. 101 Despite the closure of the formal organisation, the 
enthusiasm for tubewells that Stampe had kindled within the Department of Agriculture 
was to remain, and the Department would continue to be the nodal central government 
department for tubewell development in the coming decades.  
Righting the wrongs of canal irrigation: The Electrical Federation of India 
The saturation of soil with water to the extent that it becomes unfit for agriculture is 
termed as waterlogging. According to Sir William, in the “Indian Engineer’s sense”, 
waterlogging was a phenomenon closely allied to irrigation and defined it as the rise in 
the water table to the extent that absorption of superfluous surface water into the ground 
no longer took place. In the absence of adequate surface drainage, water accumulated on 
the land at a rate greater then evaporation or transpiration by standing crops.102 
In early 1944, William Stampe was requested by the Premier and the Revenue Minister 
of the Punjab to bring the serious nature of the waterlogging problem to the notice of the 
central government. While the long-term problems of large-scale irrigation systems were 
outside Stampe‘s remit, he wrote a couple of memos to the central government on the 
grounds that “a long-term calamity such as water logging” had a short term bearing on 
the Grow More Food programme and on emergency irrigation. He noted that 50,000 acres 
of land was going out of cultivation annually in the Ravi Jhelum tract due to waterlogging 
and that this was a “very grave menace” threatening the “granary of India.” As “someone 
who had seen something of India’s irrigation problems lately” he saw it as the “gravest 
danger facing India’s food supplies.” Unless urgent steps were taken, “The great canal 
systems will turn against the cultivators of the Punjab-and against India at large-like the 
Punic elephants of old.”103 William Stampe saw four possible solutions to waterlogging: 
to reduce the flow of irrigation water, to improve surface drainage, to line the main canals 
to reduce absorption losses, and to pump water out of the sub-soil reservoir on a large 
                                                          
101 “Tubewell Construction”, in NAI file: Loan from the International Bank for Land 
Reclamation and Tubewell Construction.  
102 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation-Punjab. Rasul Hydel Tube-well pumping 
project (For de-waterlogging and extending irrigation)”, 31 August 1944, in NAI file: 
Rasul Hydel Tubewell Pumping Project- For the Punjab Emergency Irrigation Scheme. 
103 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation-Punjab. Rasul Hydel Tube-well pumping 
project (For de-waterlogging and extending irrigation)”, 31 August 1944, in NAI file: 
Rasul Hydel Tubewell Pumping Project- For the Punjab Emergency Irrigation Scheme. 
Chapter 2: The Colonial Origins of Tubewell Irrigation 
104 
 
scale. Stampe recognized that a reduction in the depth of the water applied to the crops to 
a level “even below the requirement for maximum crop yield” might be better than “to 
prejudice vast areas of cultivation by applying more water than the local soil could 
absorb” and recommended “every possible economy” in the distribution and use of canal 
water. However, as might be expected of an irrigation engineer, he saw the reduction of 
irrigated acreage as a largely negative solution which should be adopted only when all 
other options failed. Lining the canals would be too expensive as it would involve the 
digging of “duplicate canals” while the lining work was in progress. However, even as he 
dismissed lining as too expensive, Sir William admitted that the solution to waterlogging 
necessarily lay in “expensive large scale remedies.”104 
F.F Haigh, a Punjab irrigation engineer had submitted a proposal on the lines of the fourth 
solution, i.e. large-scale pumping of subsoil water. The project envisaged dropping water 
from the Upper Jhelum canal into the lower Jhelum canal at Rasul and harnessing the fall 
using two 11,000 kilowatt alternators. These were to provide power to 2050 tubewells 
each having a capacity of 2-cusecs.The tubewells to be sited along all channels of the 
Lower Jhelum, the Upper Chenab and the Lower Chenab canal systems with a capacity 
of more than 1,000 cusecs where the water table was within 10 feet below the surface. 
About 4000 cusecs would thus be pumped out from the soil and into the canals, to roughly 
balance the total seepage from the canals and to irrigate an additional 750,000 acres. 
While the additional irrigated acres would increase food production, Haigh emphasized 
that it was “from the point of view of water logging that the project would be of most 
value”. In addition to the tubewells, power was to be supplied to small towns and villages, 
as well as the larger towns of Sargodha, Jhelum, Gujerat, Wazirabad, Gujranwala and 
Hafizabad.105 
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A power project executed by an irrigation bureaucracy which generated power from 
existing irrigation canals primarily to energize state-owned tubewells in the countryside, 
with towns being only a secondary concern could not but have been inspired by the 
Ganges grid. As William Stampe put it, Haigh had “gone one better” than him by securing 
the larger drop between two adjacent canals, thereby vastly cheapening the cost of power; 
but the scheme itself was similar to what was carried out in UP under himself. Yet, in his 
initial examination of Haigh’s proposal in March 1944, Sir William was skeptical about 
the possibilities of “strategic results” by the use of tubewells. In his opinion, an individual 
tubewell was limited in its ability to reduce the water table over a large area; Stampe was 
unable to reconcile the idea of using tubewells to lower the water table in the Punjab with 
his opinion that tubewells would not lower the water table in the Ganges valley. Instead, 
to solve the waterlogging problem, he favored a system of “pumped drainage” consisting 
of deep arterial drains leading the surface run-off to the canal banks from where the water 
would be pumped back into the main canal. While not entirely dismissive of Haigh’s 
tubewell proposal, Stampe advised that at the very least pumped drainage also be tried 
out on a small scale; in fact he recommended that all the solutions be experimented 
with.106 
By late August 1944 however, following a discussion with Haigh, Stampe changed his 
opinion on tubewells as a possible solution to waterlogging in Punjab. According to him, 
UP’s state tubewells did not lower the water table as the hours of pumping and the number 
of tubewells had been deliberately restricted in UP for precisely that purpose. Also, the 
subsoil water flowed away freely in the underground aquifer in UP. In Punjab on the other 
hand, it had been long speculated that the free flow of groundwater was restricted due to 
an impervious underground ridge, perhaps an extension of the Delhi ridge. In fact, in 
1939-40, Stampe had declared tubewells unsuitable for use in Rajputana as the region 
was cut off from the Punjab alluvium by the ridge.107 Due to the impervious ridge, 
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Rasul Hydel Tubewell Pumping Project- For the Punjab Emergency Irrigation Scheme. 
107 Committee of Enquiry into the possibility of improving the underground water 
supplies of Marwar, Report on the proceedings and findings by Sir William Stampe and 
the members of the Committee 1939-40 (Jodhpur, 1940) as  quoted in J.B.Auden, 
Introductory Report  on the Ground-Water Resources  of  Western Rajasthan (Calcutta,  
1950), p. 19-20. The existence of this ridge had been indicated by pendulum observation 
by the Geological Survey of India and later by an analysis of oil exploration data by the 
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Punjab’s subsoil reservoir had only an inflow and no outflow; hence if a minimum rather 
than a maximum pumping rate was set, tubewells would indeed help lower the water 
table. Stampe still felt that an “area” treatment based on a system of deep drains and  
pumps would work better than a linear treatment based on tubewells lining the main 
canals, but saw value in Haigh’s plan for gradual development over four years as it would 
enable experimentation with all the possible solutions. Stampe recommended that the 
highest priorities be granted to the project and an official be deputed to visit the UK to 
coordinate matters with the appropriate staff.108 
The possibility of using minor irrigation systems such as tubewells and pumps to fix the 
lacunae of large canal irrigation systems was no doubt one of the reasons William Stampe 
chose to go beyond his beat and champion solutions to Punjab’s waterlogging problem. 
Stampe promoted the scheme as the first step in his proposed “Electrical Federation of 
India”, which was no run-of-the-mill national grid. This plan envisaged harnessing the 
major rivers and using the power therefrom for tubewells and river pumping schemes; 
stable base load thus secured, cheap power could be provided for running cottage 
industries.109 Unlike the urban-industrial vision for electricity of nationalist planners,110 
it was a recognition of the agricultural and the rural as central to India’s future; these were 
not part of a supplementary plan for the new technology.  
The Rasul scheme became the Punjab’s first major postwar reconstruction scheme and its 
foundation stone was laid in November 1946.111 Lying in what became Pakistani territory, 
                                                          
Burmah Oil Company at the request of J.N. Mukherjee, the director of the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute. See J.N. Mukherjee to P.M. Kharegat, 19 October 1946, 
in NAI file: Groundwater Investigation in Punjab by the Burmah Oil Company. 
108 William Stampe, “Emergency Irrigation-Punjab. Rasul Hydel Tube-well pumping 
project (For de-waterlogging and extending irrigation)”, 31 August 1944, in NAI file: 
Rasul Hydel Tubewell Pumping Project. For the Punjab Emergency Irrigation Scheme. 
109 Anon., "Post-war planning and development in India", International Labour Review 
52 (1945), p. 53. 
110 For example, the urban-industrial vision expressed in K. T. Shah, Power and Fuel, 
which I previously contrasted with Stampe’s vision in Kapil Subramanian, “Canals, 
Sugarcane and Tube-wells: System Building in an Agrarian Economy“, (unpublished 
masters dissertation, Imperial College, London, 2011). 
111 Anon., “Rasul Hydroelectric Project: Punjab’s First Major Post-War Reconstruction 
Scheme”, Times of India, 28 November 1946. The number of tubewells planned was 
reduced slightly to 1800. 
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for several years it was the largest hydroelectric installation in that country. Postcolonial 
priorities were however slightly different; only 1373 tubewells were in use by 1955 as 
power had to be diverted “to more urgent industrial work”.112 Nevertheless, the fact that 
the largest power plant in the country was closely associated with tubewell irrigation, 
together with the fact that waterlogging was more severe in Pakistan than in India may 
well have been among the reasons that Pakistan took to tubewell irrigation in a big way 
some years before India did. Tubewells would be central to Pakistan’s anti-waterlogging 
programmes and the Rasul project would be the precursor to larger schemes carried out 
as Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP) with funding from USAID and 
the World Bank. 
Conclusion 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the India Irrigation Commission placed much 
emphasis on private wells as a means to increase India’s irrigated acreage based on the 
notion that the possibilities of easy and cheap expansion of surface irrigation were close 
to exhaustion. It gave a fillip to provincial well-boring agencies which began 
experimenting with assisting in the development of private tubewells on a small scale; 
most notably in UP. While these experiments proved that tubewells held much promise 
by the mid-1920s, extension of the technology was limited by its high capital cost which 
made private tubewells viable for large farms and by the high cost of pumping with oil 
engines in the absence of a rural power infrastructure. 
The Irrigation Branch under William Stampe began a rural-electrification and public 
tubewell irrigation programme in the late 1920s. Within a decade, UP’s public tubewells 
were irrigating a significant 600,000 acres, making it the largest organized groundwater 
irrigation programme anywhere in the world. Besides the pioneering of tubewell 
irrigation, the Ganges grid was significant in demonstrating the pride that colonial 
engineers such as William Stampe took in a project consisting of small power stations 
serving agriculture and rural industry. However, both the Ganges grid’s scale and its 
vision of electrification fostering a rural-agricultural modernity was ridiculed by 
nationalist technocrats such as Meghnad Saha who saw electricity as a large-scale, urban-
industrial technology. Putting visions of technology and development in sharp contrast, 
                                                          
112 James Russel Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammed, The Economy of Pakistan (Oxford, 
1958), pp. 213& 87. 
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the story of the Ganges grid argues against the idea that all colonial engineers suffered 
from gigantism; the Ganges grid was a vision for electricity that would have been more 
acceptable to Gandhi than the large-scale, urban-industrial vision of dominant nationalist 
planners. 
During the Second World War, the colonial administration was interested in stimulating 
food production to meet the immediate needs of a wartime economy. As enhanced 
irrigation facilities were widely seen to be a prerequisite for increasing productivity, an 
Irrigation Advisor was appointed to the Government of India. That the appointee was the 
retired engineer Sir William Stampe who was the father of tubewell irrigation in India, 
rather than a serving canal engineer demonstrates that tubewells, rather than canals were 
seen to offer quick results in stimulating food production. The sense of wartime urgency 
was crucial in putting tubewells on the central government agenda. However, while Sir 
William pushed tubewells as a quick and cheap means to irrigate large acreages in India 
and serve India‘s wartime food requirements, his vision for groundwater irrigation was 
grander. His tenure would have a significant impact on postwar reconstruction and on 
postcolonial economic development in Indian subcontinent for decades to come as I will 
show in Chapter 4.  
Being a gradualist, Stampe appreciated the value of small and localized schemes as they 
could serve as experiments that could be scaled up if they proved successful. He saw the 
vast aquifers below the Northern Indian alluvium as a strategic resource for India’s 
development and his long-term gargantuan vision was to harness the Himalayan rivers to 
power the extraction of this groundwater. Even as he advocated the building of large 
hydro-electric power schemes, he was cognizant of the dangers of intervening in 
Himalayan hydraulic regimes and recommended a policy of learning from smaller 
schemes before pursuing larger ones. This demonstrates that at least some colonial 
engineers were aware of the limits to their knowledge and the adverse impact it might 
have on the local environment.  
His awareness of the potential perils of hydraulic engineering was also demonstrated by 
the priority which he, along with other engineers and colonial-era politicians gave to 
finding solutions to waterlogging in the Punjab which had been caused by the 
indiscriminate development of colonial canal irrigation systems. His preferred solutions 
amounted to solving the problems created by one large-scale, expensive intervention into 
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the nature by another such intervention. The Rasul scheme of harnessing irrigation canals 
to power tubewells to lower the water table in the affected areas, which was championed 
by Sir William became the largest hydro-electric installation in Pakistan as well as a 
pioneer in both tubewell irrigation and solutions to waterlogging in that country. Based 
on that scheme, Stampe developed a vision for the role of electricity in India’s economic 
development with agriculture as its very core. In the next chapter, I will show how the 
interest he had evoked in the central government in the new form of irrigation, as well as 




Chapter 3: Planning Irrigation in Nehruvian India 
The general view expressed in the works of political scientists is that India invested little 
in agricultural technology in the Nehruvian era; this argument is best exemplified in the 
work of Ashutosh Varshney. According to this view, until the mid-1960s, the government 
of independent India pursued an “institutional strategy” in agriculture whereby higher 
production would come from measures such as land reforms, community development 
and cooperatives. After Nehru’s death, this was replaced by a “technocratic strategy” of 
price incentives and heavy investment in agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and cheap 
electricity. It is argued that the Nehruvian state massively underinvested in agriculture; 
investment in dams is dismissed as being merely for power production. 1 In contrast to 
this argument advanced by political scientists, some historians such as Daniel 
Klingensmith and Rohan D’Souza have emphasized postwar India’s heavy commitment 
to big dams. Their essential argument is that late colonial state and the technocratic elite 
in India fetishized the multipurpose river valley development model of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and attempted to use the same to serve their own material, rhetorical 
and ideological ends. 2 
I will challenge these arguments. I shall argue that India commitment to dams was neither 
just for power production nor merely in pursuit of the TVA’s rhetorical and ideological 
example. Irrigation (which the TVA notably did not provide for) was the central concern 
of water management in Nehruvian India as it had been during the colonial period. 
Irrigation engineers, who constituted perhaps the Raj’s strongest technical bureaucracy 
had long wanted to build big dams but had been stymied by the colonial central 
government’s restrictive public investment policy. A combination of factors, including 
the perceived exhaustion of the potential for traditional river diversion schemes, the 
massive funds available for economic development after the war, acute food crises and 
the rising importance of power production and flood control (which could help 
compensate for some of the cost of dams) was what led India to invest heavily in dams in 
                                                          
1 Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural 
Struggles in India (Cambridge, 1998), p. 41. 
2 Daniel Klingensmith, One Valley and a Thousand: Dams, Nationalism, and 
Development (New Delhi, 2007) studies the TVA and the Damodar Valley Corporation 
besides providing an overview of the history of dams in independent India. Rohan 
D'Souza, "Damming the Mahanadi river: The emergence of multi-purpose river valley 
development in India (1943-46)," Indian Economic and Social History Review 40 (2003): 
81-105 studies the events leading to the building of the Hirakud dam. 
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the immediate postwar period. I shall argue that, irrigation was seen as the very basis of 
technical change in Indian agriculture; one which would enable the cultivator to break 
free from dependence on the monsoon and incentivize the adoption of multiple cropping, 
improved seeds, the use of manures and fertilizers and other improved agricultural 
practices. Irrigation thus accounted for a large share of the outlay on agriculture in all of 
India’s Five Year Plans and independent India saw an impressive growth in its irrigation 
infrastructure. In keeping with practice of the colonial period, large surface irrigation 
systems accounted for the lion’s share of state investment in irrigation during the 1950s. 
But as I will show, Nehruvian India also significantly scaled up British efforts at small-
scale irrigation; an obsession with the large scale was thus less central to the period than 
is conventionally assumed. 
The political scientists’ argument about Nehruvian underinvestment in agriculture is 
based on an implicit comparison with the period of the “Green Revolution” that followed 
in the late 1960s and thus fails to emphasize that government spending on  agriculture 
and irrigation in Nehruvian India was massively higher than during the Raj. I will argue 
that while it was true that the left-elite technocrats in Nehru’s Planning Commission may 
have preferred to neglect agriculture in favour of rapid industrialization, they were unable 
to prevent provincial governments from undertaking irrigation projects; such was the 
proliferation of irrigation schemes that resources were stretched thin to the point of crisis 
by the mid-1950s. The story of irrigation thus shows the weakness of Nehru and the 
Planning Commission in the face of provincial demands. 
From the late 1950s however, public irrigation systems in India started running into 
serious difficulties which included not just high cost and financial losses but also a failure 
to utilize the irrigation infrastructure created; as a result planners began to emphasize the 
prioritization of the full development of existing irrigation projects rather than taking up 
new ones. But not only did provincial pressures force the central government to continue 
to commit to new large schemes, they also forced it to adopt a new criteria for sanctioning 
irrigation projects which was less restrictive, using arguments that went to the heart of 
what it meant to be a welfare state. 
A statistical overview of irrigation in postcolonial India 
Between 1950 and 1980, the net area irrigated in India nearly doubled from 20.8 million 
hectares to 38.5 million hectares. The area irrigated by tanks saw an absolute decline 
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during the period as a whole, with a spectacular 37% decline from their peak in 1964-65; 
the area irrigated from “other sources” also suffered a decline during the period. The 
growth in irrigation was led by canals and groundwater. The area irrigated by canals 
increased by an impressive 78% during the period. But by far, the most impressive growth 
took place in irrigation from groundwater, and the total area irrigated by wells and 











































8 9 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 13 14 15 2.2 1.8 
Tubewells   1 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 7 9   
Wells 
6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 8 9 2.1 6.6 
Others  
3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 -1.4 -0.1 
Tanks 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 1.9 -1.7 
Total 21 23 26 27 26 27 27 29 30 31 35 39 1.7 2.5 
Groundwat
er share 
(%) 29 30 30 30 33 34 34 37 37 38 42 46   
Canal share 
(%) 40 41 43 42 42 42 41 41 40 41 40 38   
 
Table 3.1: All India net irrigated area from various sources in million hectares 1950-
80. 
Sources and Notes: Till 1969-70, figures have been taken from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian 
Agricultural Statistics, 1960-70 (New Delhi, 1972). For the years 1970-71, figures have been taken from the 1969-72 
edition of the same publication. Figures for 1975-76 and 1979-80 are taken from the 20th and 22nd edition of respectively 
of Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian Agriculture in Brief (New Delhi) which rely on the same data set. 
Before 1960-61, data for tubewells was included in the figure for wells in general, and in that year only Punjab and 
Pondicherry collected data for tubewells separately. The figure for canals includes private canals which irrigated 
between 0.8 and 1.4 million hectares in the period. Statistics mentioned in the rest of the chapter are not comparable 
with this data as unless otherwise stated, they refer to gross rather than net irrigated acreage; the former double counts 
land irrigated more than once during the year. CAGR= Compounded annual growth rate. 
This era may be divided into two phases: before and after 1963-64. The total irrigated 
area grew at a compounded average of 1.7% per annum during the first period and at 
2.5% during the subsequent period. Canals led the growth in irrigation in the first period, 
contributing over half of the increase in the irrigated area, and their share of the irrigated 
area which stood at about 40% in 1950-51 peaked at about 43% in 1963-64. The rate of 
growth of irrigation from groundwater sources, at 2.1% was about the same as that of 
canals (2.2%) before the mid-1960s. However, in the period 1963-1980, groundwater 
irrigation grew at a spectacular rate of 6.6%; in comparison, canal irrigation grew at a 
measly 1.8%, while tanks and other sources were in absolute decline. The contribution of 
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groundwater to the total irrigated area which stood at 29% in 1950-51, reached near parity 
with canal systems by 1970 and increased to 46% by 1979-80 and continued to grow in 
subsequent decades. This increase was spurred by the growth of tubewells which 
contributed barely 4% of the total irrigated acreage in 1963-64; this rose to 24% in 16 
years with the area irrigated by tubewells increasing by eight times. Hence the overall 
story of irrigation technology in independent India is the growth of canal systems and of 
groundwater irrigation, with the former leading the growth of irrigation infrastructure 
until the early 1960s and the latter from the mid-1960s.  
The rise of storage-based irrigation 
Before the coming of the British, large-scale irrigation systems in India were largely 
inundation canals. These diverted the flood waters of a river into channels for use in 
irrigation elsewhere but usually lacked the headworks to divert the normal flow of the 
river. Colonial intervention in irrigation which began with the repair of these works 
moved on to the development of perennial canals which diverted some of the normal flow 
of the river into canals for use all year round. While these perennial canals had a 
spectacular impact in the regions where they were constructed, they were limited in being 
dependent on the temporal availability of water in the river; not all rivers offered a more 
or less assured adequate flow with sites where the water could be easily diverted into 
canals.   
From the turn of the century, many saw the next step in irrigation development to be in 
the storage of water by the building of large dams and reservoirs, particularly in Deccan 
and peninsular India. But the Irrigation Commission (1901-3) pointed to the technical and 
financial challenges in reservoir construction and instead recommended a large 
programme of perennial canal schemes, mostly in Punjab and northern India where 
potential for the same still existed; this kept the irrigation bureaucracies occupied for the 
next couple of decades. As an alternative to storage reservoirs, the Irrigation Commission 
recommended the use of the natural storage available in underground aquifers through 
private wells as a means to extend irrigation.3 
The UP tubewell scheme was a notable exception to the extension of diversion schemes. 
There was also two exceptional cases of dams built in colonial India. In 1924 the 
                                                          
3 Indian Irrigation Commission, Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission (London, 
1903). 
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engineer-dewan Sir M. Visvesvaraya built the Krishnarajasagar dam on the Cauvery 
River in the princely state of Mysore as the first multipurpose irrigation and power dam 
in India; this project notably predated the TVA.4 The Mettur dam built in Madras a decade 
later on the same river was the only other notable irrigation dam built in colonial India 
and also produced power.5 
By the early 1930s, the last of the great colonial irrigation works had been built,6 and 
these were largely based on diversion of surface water. The general pessimism about 
artificial storage was resented by many irrigation engineers; among them was Nawab Ali 
Nawaz Jung Bahadur, a Cooper’s Hill trained engineer employed by the princely state of 
Hyderabad. Ali chaired the sub-committee on River training and Irrigation of the 
Congress Party’s National Planning Committee formed in 1938 and his view can be seen 
to represent those of engineers and nationalists. Jung Bahadur saw storage as the logical 
culmination of Indian irrigation history which had begun from inundation and moved on 
to perennial canals; what was needed now was the ability to ensure a year round supply 
of water independent of the temporal stream flow. His report argued that in its emphasis 
on wells, the Irrigation Commission had overestimated the potential for irrigation from 
groundwater; not enough was known about India’s aquifers and only under special 
conditions of “climate, crops and markets” could the high cost of raising water be 
justified. 7 The focus of the report was on extending irrigation in the arid uplands of central 
India, where only 10% of the land was irrigated (and only 4% from government canals) 
as compared to the arid alluvial lands (mostly in northwestern India), where almost 46% 
                                                          
4 Henry Hart, New India’s Rivers (Bombay, 1956), p. 120.  
5 Statistics on number of dams necessitate some elaboration. It is usually accepted by 
historians that Mettur was the only dam built in British India, see for example Daniel 
Headrick, Tentacles of Power: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism 1850-1940 
(New York, 1988), p. 182 and Elizabeth Whitcombe, “Irrigation,” in Meghnad Desai and 
Dharma Kumar (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of India (New Delhi, 2005), p. 
720. However, the Indian National Register of Large Dams (2014) mentions 373 large 
dams constructed in India before 1950 and 4846 large dams completed by 2014; this 
figure is not substantially different from the about 4500 enumerated by the World 
Commission on Dams (2000) and cited in Klingensmith, One Valley and a Thousand, p. 
3. However, both of the latter two sources define a large dam as one higher than 15m 
(10m in special cases). If we take the cut off as a height over 100m (or a storage capacity 
over 1 cubic kilometre), which the Indian National Register of Large Dams uses to define 
a “Dam of National Importance,” there were only two such dams completed before 
Independence and 59 completed by 2014.  
6 Whitcombe, “Irrigation,”, p. 730. 
7 K. T. Shah (ed.), Report of the Sub-Committee on River Training and Irrigation of the 
National Planning Committee (Bombay, 1947), p. 47. 
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of the land was irrigated (31% from government canals). The extension of surface 
irrigation to correct this regional imbalance would necessarily require storage in the 
upland topography that dominated central India.8 
There remained the issue of the high cost of storage, which was the primary reason the 
Irrigation Commission had been pessimistic about dams. The criteria for sanctioning 
irrigation projects was a minimum annual return to the government in the form of water 
charges within ten years of commencing operations; this was specified at 6% of the capital 
cost at the time of Jung Bahadur’s writing. To him, this rate of return was high enough to 
be termed “retrograde” and represented “the severest blow to irrigation”. 9 It was unfair 
to compare storage-based irrigation in the upland topography with the works already built 
in the lowlands; the former was of a “superior class”. 10 The report called for a lowering 
of the rate of return required of irrigation projects. 11 
From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, various factors engendered a favourable landscape 
for large storage projects, though these were only taken up after the Second World War. 
With the introduction of provincial autonomy in 1937, most provinces gradually reduced 
the annual return required of irrigation projects to 4% and in 1949 the rate prescribed by 
the Government of India was also reduced to 3.75%.12 The felt need for power and flood 
control (to which a part of the cost of building storage could be ascribed to) lowered 
irrigation’s share of the cost, making it more likely to meet the government’s cost criteria 
for project sanction.13 In any case, the postwar developmental state was expected to be 
less stringent on the cost of projects and there was rising optimism amongst irrigation 
engineers through the early 1940s about the massive projects that were in offing after the 
war.14  The postwar food crisis which placed a considerable strain on India’s foreign 
exchange position, the feeling that it was unfair to subject the more expensive storage 
schemes to the same criteria as the diversion schemes together with vague ideas about the 
adoption of a “socialistic pattern of society” meant that the financial productivity test, 
                                                          
8 Shah (ed.), River Training and Irrigation, pp. 30-53. 
9 Shah (ed.), River Training and Irrigation, p. 51. 
10 Shah (ed.), River Training and Irrigation, pp. 51. 
11 Shah (ed.), River Training and Irrigation, p. 52. 
12 Committee to Suggest Ways & Means of Improving Financial Returns from Irrigation 
Projects, Report (New Delhi, 1964), p. 20. 
13 Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan (New Delhi, 1952), p. 90. 
14 See the Inaugural Speeches in the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Central 
Board of Irrigation and Power (New Delhi, 1943-47).  
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even at a reduced rate of return was only loosely followed. 15 By the time of the First Five 
Year Plan which began in 1951, the prevailing criterion for sanctioning projects 
effectively was “for increasing the production of food and other agricultural produce, it 
is necessary that irrigation projects should be taken up wherever there are facilities for 
such projects”. Many projects which failed to meet the financial productivity test were 
taken up. 16 
Several irrigation projects were sanctioned in the six years between the end of the war 
and the commencement of the First Five Year Plan. The Central Board of Irrigation and 
Power (CBIP)’s first popular publication dated 1948 mentioned several projects at 
various stages of investigation, sanction and progress in the provinces. While the list is 
not exhaustive and projects were amenable to change (for example, some of the project 
descriptions seem to suggest that either irrigation or power were added as an 
afterthought), it provides an interesting snapshot of projects considered important. Of the 
55 projects mentioned by name, 45 involved storage of some sort and of the rest, 6 were 
irrigation-only projects and 4 were power-only projects. Of the 45 projects involving 
storage, 13 were for power alone, 20 were for irrigation alone while 22 were for both.17 
There is no doubt that the example of the TVA also served to legitimate big dams. The 
TVA’s objectives were power production and flood control (that project had no irrigation 
component) and its influence was particularly felt in eastern India where flood control 
was at least as important an objective as irrigation; though even there, irrigation was also 
an objective.  18 But of the hundreds of irrigation schemes that became part of India’s First 
Five Year Plan, only four (Bhakra Nangal, Harike, Damodar Valley Project and Hirakud 
dam) were classified as “Multi-Purpose” projects and fit the TVA model of being entirely 
federally funded;19 and only the Damodar project was to be built and managed by a 
corporate entity on the lines of the TVA. The nature of India’s irrigation projects were 
                                                          
15 Improving Financial Returns, Report, p. 20. 
16 Improving Financial Returns, Report pp. 20-21. 
17 Compiled from Central Board of Irrigation and Power, New Projects for Irrigation and 
Power (New Delhi, 1948). 
18 It is not insignificant that both of the existing studies on dams in India are on eastern 
Indian projects; see Klingensmith, One Valley and a Thousand and D'Souza, "Damming 
the Mahanadi river” 
19 Planning Commission, Development schemes in the first five year plan (New Delhi, 
1952). Harike is not mentioned in the main text of the Plan. The inclusion of Harike was 
strange as it does not appear to have a power production component at this stage. Work 
on the same only began after the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. 
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indeed changing as the CBIP pamphlet  emphasized; but the change was a shift towards 
building storage structures to utilize the monsoon flows of the rivers to provide perennial 
irrigation, 20 a long standing ambition of irrigation engineers in India whose fruition could 
not be reduced to a mere adoption of the TVA model.  
The Centrality of Irrigation: The First Five Year Plan 
The Planning Commission was set up in 1950 as an advisory body chaired by the Prime 
Minister to launch a programme of planned economic development. The first five year 
plan which was launched in 1952 for the period 1951-56 could only have been a statement 
of ongoing projects, together with a rationale for the same, and comments on long-term 
policy. In Nehru’s own words, “we just took what was there and called it a plan”.21 This 
was particularly true in the case of irrigation, which was a provincial subject. 
The plan made a strong case for increasing irrigation and noted that four fifths of India’s 
land was rainfed with the rains neither timely nor adequate, making frequent crop failures 
an important feature of the Indian economy. 22 The “outstanding feature” of India’s 
rainfall was its unequal distribution through the year and from year to year; the tropical 
climate, with no rainfall for much of the year was seen to make successful cultivation 
impossible in many parts of the country without irrigation. In the absence of irrigation, 
large areas only produced an often deficient and unevenly distributed crop; low yields 
were hence not surprising. Further, the cultivator had to restrict himself to particular crops 
that could be matured during the two or three favourable months. It was expected that 
irrigation could improve yields between an impressive 50 and a spectacular 300%, 
besides enabling large areas of wasteland to be brought under the plough. With irrigation, 
the cultivator could plan a scheme of cropping that kept him busy all year round, leading 
to increased production and perennial employment; two or even three crops a year were 
possible under irrigated conditions. As irrigation mitigated the risk of monsoon failure, it 
would incentivize the farmer to improve cultivation through better seeds and manures, 
hence transforming the entire agricultural pattern of large parts of the country.  This long 
standing felt need for irrigation was strengthened by the loss of India’s best-irrigated lands 
due to partition; with 18% of the population and 23% of the land of undivided India, 
Pakistan inherited a little over half of its canal-irrigated area which produced 32% of the 
                                                          
20 CBIP New Projects, p. 2.  
21 As quoted in Mritunjoy Banerjee, Economic Planning in India (New Delhi, 1981), p. 
23.  
22 Planning Commission, First FYP, p. 31. 
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rice, 35% of the wheat and 25% of all foodgrains. 23  Hence the Planning Commission 
noted that the most effective way of increasing production was an additional source of 
water supply through irrigation, which would form the basis of improved agricultural 
practices such as better seeds, fertilizers and manures. 24 In fact, seen as a basic 
infrastructure such as roads and power, irrigation was placed at the centre of the 
transformation of the Indian economy as a whole. 25 Even the Community Development 
Project, which many have seen as an alternative to technological improvement in Indian 
agriculture, 26 was to depend on irrigation; the most basic criteria for the selection of an 
area for Community Development was the existence of irrigation facilities.27 Over 60% 
of the target for increased food production was to come from extending irrigation and 
over 27% of the total outlay in the first plan was devoted to irrigation and power; in 
addition a substantial portion of the 17% devoted to agriculture and community 
development was also earmarked for small-scale irrigation. 28  
The centrality of irrigation thus settled, the question of scale and technology remained. 
Due to the inflexibility of large projects, this choice had been dictated in part by decisions 
made in the pre-planning era. The Commission was by no means an all-out enthusiast for 
the large irrigation schemes that had been foisted upon the first plan. It rued the fact that 
work on many projects had commenced without detailed economic studies and called for 
periodic reviews. It noted that partly as a result of inflation and as a result of the 
complexity of storage projects such as high dams, costs had soared; this demanded and 
recommended a revamp of the revenue structure. The complexity of managing 
multipurpose river valley projects was also of concern; irrigation, navigation, power 
generation, flood control and fisheries all had often conflicting schedules for releasing 
water. The Commission assigned an expenditure of Rs. 5.18 billion for the completion of 
these ongoing projects, taking pains to emphasize that the commitment did not reflect its 
views on the merit of the projects, and adding that it had impressed upon the states to 
prioritize projects which would have an immediate impact on food production and 
recommended the modification of large projects. 29 In a speech to the Central Board of 
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Irrigation and Power, its Deputy Chairman VT Krishnamachari also emphasized the fact 
that large schemes had been emphasized in the First Plan only because most of them had 
already been committed to.30 However, the Commission did commit an additional Rs. 
400 million for four new large projects (which would cost a total of Rs. 2 billion) in the 
last two years of the plans on the grounds that it would help utilize the technical resources 
that had been built up in the early part of the plan. 31 This total outlay of about Rs. 5.6 
billion during the First Five Year Plan may be compared to the Rs. 1.5 billion that 
represented the total capital outlay on irrigation during the colonial period; a figure which 
had hardly changed since 1932-33.32 While these figures are not corrected for inflation, 
the comparison still emphasizes the massively increased emphasis independent India 
placed on irrigation in comparison to the colonial period. 
Besides these larger schemes, the First Plan laid much emphasis on minor irrigation. 
According to it, small community managed works had several advantages such as 
dispersed employment, smaller outlay, quicker fruition and the possibilities of greater 
public cooperation. However, the recovery of water rates was difficult and small irrigation 
structures often fell into disrepair. The Plan was optimistic about mitigating these 
problems through taking over of the management of the works by irrigation departments 
with panchayats playing a large role in maintenance and repair. It recommended that each 
state carry out a systematic survey of the possibilities of minor irrigation and set up a 
trained corps available to local communities for the execution of these works. Amongst 
works which were of an individual nature, it recommended a continuing programme of 
loans and subsidies for well construction. 33 
In monetary terms, it agreed to an initial outlay of Rs. 470 million for minor irrigation; 
an additional Rs. 300 million for minor irrigation and Rs. 60 million for tubewell 
construction was later allocated to meet a projected shortfall in the food-production target. 
In addition, a third of the community development outlay of Rs. 900 million was expected 
to be spent on minor irrigation, 34 taking the total allocation to about Rs. 1.13 billion, 
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much larger than the Rs. 400 million it allocated for new major irrigation projects. In 
addition, some provinces had included minor irrigation in their outlay for major schemes. 
The plan was expected to bring 19.7 million acres under irrigation, of which about 11.3 
million acres were to come from minor irrigation and the rest from major irrigation works. 
Of the minor-irrigation works, 4.4 million acres were to come from small dams and 
channels, 6 million from wells, 0.7 million from tubewells not included in the major 
programme, 0.8 million from tanks, 0.7 million from pumping installations, and 3 million 
from the additional programme. 35  
From this it is clear that while it is true that Nehru’s elite planners invested heavily in 
large schemes, they were concurrently enthusiastic about small schemes as well. These 
were to contribute over half of the total increase in the irrigated area; a third of the total 
irrigation target of the plan was to be met from private wells alone. Nehru himself was an 
enthusiast for the small-scale irrigation; for example he personally ordered that a 
committee be set up to investigate a district administrator’s advocacy of unlined wells as 
a cheaper mode of irrigation that large dams.36 The administrative challenges of managing 
a large number of dispersed schemes by a largely underdeveloped agricultural 
development machinery, together with the perception that minor irrigation (assumed to 
consist of largely open wells and tanks) was more dependent on rainfall (and hence less 
of an insurance from drought) were the chief reasons dampening that enthusiasm.37 As I 
will show in the next chapter, public tubewell programmes formed a substantial part of 
the outlay on major irrigation schemes in some provinces. 
What were the features of the new irrigation projects? Three were large multi-purpose 
central government projects namely Bhakra Nangal in Punjab, Damodar Valley 
Corporation in Bengal and Bihar, Hirakud in Orissa. Of the provincial surface irrigation 
projects, four cost more than Rs. 100 million namely Tungabhadra (Madras and 
Hyderabad), Bhadra (Mysore), Mayurkashi (Bengal) and Lower Tapi (Bombay). The 
lower Bhavani Project in Madras and the Ghatprabha project in Bombay cost between 
Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 million while two projects in Hyderabad, two in Madras, two in 
Bombay and one in Rajasthan were to cost between Rs. 30 and Rs. 50 million. These were 
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in addition to a vast number of smaller projects. 38 It is significant that two of the three 
large multipurpose projects in addition to one of the four largest state projects were in 
eastern India, which, with its high rainfall had seen little irrigation development during 
the colonial period. Also notable is the large number of projects in Bombay and the 
Deccan which had also seen previously little irrigation development as the storage-based 
irrigation its geography entailed was deemed too expensive in the colonial period. 39 
Irrigation in crisis 
By the late 1950s, the large irrigation projects ran into several difficulties. To begin with, 
there were problems of cost and schedule overruns, sometimes on a monumental scale. 
By March 1956, potential for only 6.3 million acres of irrigation was created under the 
major and medium schemes compared to the target of nearly 9 million acres.40 This 
shortfall was at least in part a result of postwar development enthusiasts having set too 
high a target for themselves in seeking to increase the acreage irrigated by canal systems 
by nearly 50% in five years. A similar relative increase had taken over 20 years in early 
twentieth-century British India.41 Much of the latter increase had taken place in Punjab, 
UP and Sind which had somewhat reasonable administrative systems for irrigation 
development. But postcolonial plans included states such as Madhya Pradesh (the 
Chambal Project) which lacked experience in “this type of work”.42 The last two decades 
of British rule had seen little new development of surface irrigation anywhere, resulting 
in Chief Engineers reaching their positions with experience in operation alone, rather than 
in construction. In any case, the new projects involved reservoir and dam construction 
which presented challenges of an entirely different kind; even the best irrigation 
departments in the country had little experience with the same.43  
But delay in creating potential was not the only problem. Irrigation engineers usually 
deemed irrigation potential to have been created when the structures to store or divert 
water had been built and distributaries to outlets capable of irrigating a couple of hundred 
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acres each had been constructed. The creation of this potential however, did not 
necessarily mean the facilities would be put to use; utilization required the building of 
field channels right upto the cultivators’ fields in addition to preparing and levelling of 
land to receive irrigation.44 Initial figures for the utilization of the potential created during 
the first plan began to emerge around 1957 and only about 4 million acres of the 6.3 
million acres of irrigation potential created was reported to have been utilized; 45 final 
figures published in the Third Plan Document placed the utilization of the new potential 
created at just 48% in 1955-56.46 From the late 1950s to the present day, this crisis 
occupies a large space in the discourse on large-scale irrigation systems in India.  
Again, this perceived crisis was a function of expecting too much too fast. In the late 
1940s, the economist DR Gadgil wrote that at least 30 years were required for an 
irrigation project to produce its full benefit.47 William Stampe too had been apprehensive 
about large irrigation projects as they would take decades to develop. In contrast, the 
Committee on Plan Projects of the National Development Council deemed even ten years 
as a “leisurely pace” only justified “in the olden days” and allocated merely four to five 
years for a project to deliver its full benefit, including the application of improved 
methods of cultivation and more expensive inputs.48    
While many projects lagged in the construction and utilization aspects, the spectacular 
failures of a few projects contributed significantly to the poor all India picture in the 1950s 
and 1960s; a case in point is the Kakrapar project in Gujarat, whose Superintending 
Engineer himself described it in 1957 as a “very expensive one which had miserably 
failed to serve its original objective and utility.”49 It was the only project whose 
construction was carried out by the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC) rather 
than the provincial government. The project was sanctioned by the Bombay government 
in 1949 at a cost of Rs. 62.6 million as a weir project, but at the instance of the Chairman 
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of the CWPC, it was soon modified to into a dam project costing Rs. 310 million. 50  In 
1951, after some of the work had been carried out, it was decided to revert to a weir 
project. This resulted in a situation where different channels had been constructed to 
different design statements making for great difficulties in reconciling the hydraulic 
features of different structures. The design was changed yet again to the construction of 
both a dam (for perennial irrigation, flood control and power generation) and a weir (for 
seasonal irrigation). The weir was constructed by 1953, after which the Government of 
Bombay took over the project resulting in acute staff shortages as most engineers opted 
to return to the CWPC. The Right Bank Canal was completed by 1958 and the Left Bank 
Canal by 1960; 80% of the work on the construction of minors and sub minors had been 
completed by 1963. 51 Irrigation potential was first created in 1958-59, and as late as 1963-
64 less than a quarter of the potential was utilized.52 
There were various reasons for underutilization of the potential. To begin with, the very 
concept of irrigation potential was a contentious one; the prescribed cropping pattern 
might have called for lightly-irrigated crops but cultivators’ preference for wet cropping 
would result in there not being enough water for irrigating tail end fields. But more 
usually, administrators focussed upon the problem of field channels. The responsibility 
for constructing field channels from the government outlets to the fields, sometimes two 
miles away, fell upon the cultivators who often did not have the resources to build and 
maintain field channels. The fact that government channels themselves were ill 
maintained prompted cultivators to ask how they were to maintain their channels with 
their meagre resources, if the government, with all the human and financial resources at 
its call, could not maintain its own. Land acquisition was also an issue; where a farmer 
was not willing to permit construction on his land, either the legislation for acquisition 
did not exist, or the administration hesitated to enforce the same. Even where field 
channels were excavated, improper design meant that water often did not reach the 
fields.53 
While the irrigation bureaucracy often sought to reduce the problem of utilization to the 
problems of constructing field channels, others favoured a different explanation. A study 
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by the Committee on Plan Projects for example emphasized that field channels were a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the utilization of irrigation,  
So long as field channels are not constructed, the problem of field channels is put 
at the forefront and acts as a red herring to divert attention from the real problem, 
namely that of the cropping pattern. If a cultivator can be given a crop that yields 
to him a substantial income, he was willing to construct field channels himself. 54 
The poor agricultural planning of the irrigation projects can again be exemplified with 
the case of Kakrapar. An important reason for slow utilization was project planners’ 
inadequate understanding of local agriculture and their consequent inability to match the 
irrigation to the needs of crops. The project was based on outdated statistics of the local 
cropping pattern which did not account for perennial crops such as sugarcane, vegetables, 
bananas and fruit trees; these were not to receive irrigation from the seasonal weir. Yet, 
these crops accounted for half of the utilized irrigation potential; if these were removed, 
utilization of the potential created was less than 13%.55  The improper agricultural 
planning of the project was reflected in its very concept of irrigation potential which was 
declared annually rather than season-wise; the mere physical availability of water was 
taken as synonymous with potential. As the study noted, the timing of the supply was 
important; unless water was made available well in advance of the sowing season, it could 
not be utilized. 56  
Cultivators across the country showed great variation in their response to irrigation. At 
the macroscale, this was reflected most spectacularly in the fact that only 61% of the 
potential created had been utilized by 1971 in Bihar, which ranked 2nd in irrigation 
potential while Punjab, which ranked a distant 7th had utilized 97% of its potential.57 In 
Coimbatore (Madras), waters of the Lower Bhavani Project were “used as rapidly as they 
could reach the channels” and peasants paid not only for the water, but also heavy fines 
to defy water rationing by irrigating paddy. Raichur in the nearby province of Mysore 
which received water from the Tungabhadra Project, however did not take to irrigated 
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agriculture as enthusiastically. Even farmers through whose property the channels passed 
through sometimes did not irrigate, despite heavy propaganda and water being offered 
free of charge. In Orissa, the Hirakud project was to enable two crops of paddy a year, 
but local belief held that the soil could not take two paddy crops in the same year. In one 
village, the agricultural extension officer had to go on hunger strike to convince farmers 
to sow a second crop. That the slow response to irrigation was not merely due to such 
superstition or a lack of experience was demonstrated by some villages of Andhra’s 
Kurnool district which also benefited from the Tungabhadra project. Peasants in the area 
had long been irrigating their fields from the Kurnool-Cuddapa Canal which had been 
built in 1871. However, they expressed satisfaction with their existing irrigated acreage 
and exhibited no desire to irrigate more land. Some favoured a technocratic explanation 
based on inadequate agricultural planning leading to poor incentive to take up irrigation. 
To others such as the journalist Kusum Nair who wrote an influential study on “the human 
element in Indian development,” the variation of responses to irrigation across the country 
negated the implicit assumption in the planning process that given equal opportunity, 
incentive and resources, all communities would respond similarly in their productive 
efforts.  According to her, the differences were not the result of administrative 
inefficiency, but had deeper roots in traditional beliefs about work, surplus production 
and diet. As she saw it, it was easier to build a million tonne steel plant than to change a 
man’s outlook on the use of irrigation, “one of the oldest and most elementary techniques” 
in agriculture.58 
This crisis of high cost, slow construction and slower utilization was the context for an 
important speech by Nehru. Addressing the Central Board of Irrigation and Power in 
1958, he bemoaned “the disease of giganticism” that afflicted irrigation in India. 
Emphasizing the value of small projects, he touched upon the problem of utilization, 
The cost of a small project has to be judged after taking into account all the social 
upsets connected with the enormous concentration of national energy, all the 
national upsets, upsets of people moving out and their rehabilitation and many 
other things, associated with a big project. Also it takes a long time to build a big 
project. The small project, however, does not bring about these upsets nor does it 
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involve such a large endeavour.... I merely wish if I can to replace the balance in 
our thinking which has shifted too much towards gigantic schemes. State 
Governments are constantly pressing our Government, our Planning Commission 
for various schemes- all huge schemes- and they have a right to do so. But this is 
all the relic to gigantism to which we have fallen a prey. We have to realize that 
we can meet our problems much more rapidly and efficiently by taking up a large 
number of small schemes, especially when the time involved in a small scheme is 
much less and the results obtained are rapid. Further, in those small schemes you 
can get a good deal of what is called public co-operation and therefore, there is 
much social value in associating people with such small schemes... On one side, 
we carry out irrigation and put more and more water for fresh areas, while on the 
other side land goes out of cultivation due to water logging... it is bad engineering 
if you cannot hold what you have already got in the process of acquiring more... 
the engineer may say "I have done my job by creating these resources; it is upto 
somebody else to utilize them". This is partly true, but not wholly true. .. No plan 
should proceed as it did in the old days without the utilization part being worked 
out. I have been hearing of the difficulties as to the utilization part. For instance, 
you dig a canal but the channels to take it to the village areas where they are 
needed are not ready. It is happening all over the place in India. It surprises me 
that there is such lack of coordination. It is not the fault of the engineers; it may 
be the fault of other departments, of State Governments. But I think engineers 
should not keep aloof from them. It should be a part of their work to see that the 
resources are utilized.59  
While Nehru emphasized the value of small projects in his speech, minor-irrigation 
projects were not immune to the utilization problem. In Gujarat for example, utilization 
of minor irrigation stood at a poor 36%.60 State tubewells in particular were also not 
immune to the problem of rising costs, falling revenue and poor utilization.61 By the early 
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1960s, the poor performance of public tubewells had led Punjab to stop building new 
tubewells and instead incentivize private tubewells. 62 
The editors of the Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development took exception 
to Nehru’s charge and argued that it was wrong to single out irrigation engineers when 
“all sections of the national elite… were equally affected by the virus”. This was why 
state governments were engaged in a “feverish race” to get larger and larger projects 
sanctioned. This “craze for bigness” was not confined to India but afflicted the USA and 
the USSR as well; the only difference being they could afford to pay for it and India 
couldn’t.63  
Second and Third Plans 
While the first five year plan had been a mere statement of ongoing development projects, 
the second plan (1956-61) carried a greater imprint of the central government. Authored 
by the renowned statistician P. C. Mahlanobis who developed a model of the Indian 
economy that borrowed much from the GOSPLAN, it was a push for rapid 
industrialization and reflected the aspirations of the technocratic central elite. The 
allocation for industry, which only 7.6% of the total outlay in the First Plan, increased to 
18.5% of the much larger Second Plan.64 But while the Planning Commission pushed for 
the left-Nehruvian ideal of rapid industrialization and was ambivalent towards 
agriculture, it was merely an advisory body; while it had some say in central government 
fund allocation, it could not outright prevent the states from taking up irrigation projects. 
Irrigation continued to claim a significant share of public investment in India and was 
allocated about the same amount of money as had been spent during the first five year 
plan though it formed a smaller share of a larger outlay.65  
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Notwithstanding fund allocations being kept up, the text of the report reflected the 
planners’ frustration about irrigation. The continued inclusion of imperfectly investigated 
projects in the plan was bemoaned and the planners stressed the need for continuing 
investigation for which adequate machinery did not exist in all the states. There was even 
talk of carrying out studies as to what point irrigation would cease to become economical 
with the increasing application of better methods of dry farming and soil conservation.66 
There was disillusionment with minor-irrigation schemes as well; old works were falling 
into disuse, even as more land was brought under minor irrigation. The planners placed 
emphasis on legislation to ensure the maintenance of minor works. 67 
The events leading up to the formulation of the Third Plan (1961-66) reflected the tension 
of public investment in agriculture. A Planning Commission paper submitted to the 
National Development Council in January 1958 felt that the rise in agricultural production 
from 1949 to 1957 “did not reflect adequately the large outlays incurred during recent 
years on agricultural production programmes.” 68  Irrigation shared a large part of the 
blame for this failure. According to the paper, not enough effort had been made to increase 
yields in areas already irrigated and there was a slow progress in utilization of the 
potential created. The minor-irrigation programme, which had been intended to draw 
popular participation had degenerated into a departmental construction programme and 
maintenance was unsatisfactory.69 As a result of unfavourable weather, India’s foodgrain 
production declined by 10% in 1957-58, rose in the subsequent year and marginally 
declined again in 1959-60;70 proving that Indian agriculture continued to be a gamble in 
the rains despite large investments in irrigation, but perhaps also that much more needed 
to be done to make Indian agriculture drought-proof. In the midst of this crisis, the Ford 
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Foundation submitted its influential report India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet it, 71 
which was unambiguous on the importance of irrigation but argued that further 
investment in very large irrigation projects would not be productive. It called instead for 
a programme of agricultural intensification through the application of inputs such as 
fertilizers in areas already under irrigation.72   
By the time of publication of the Third Plan, only 6.9 million acres of the 12 million acre 
target from large schemes in the Second Plan was expected to have been utilized. 73  The 
shortfall was blamed on inadequacy of cement, steel and technical personnel. In addition 
the report blamed the practice of commencing projects “under the pressure of local and 
regional demands” without adequate investigation. 74 Yet again, despite this observation, 
the planners were unable to impose a sense of control on irrigation investment except to 
feebly call for the prioritization of the completion of old projects “right upto the field 
channels” rather than to take up new projects. 75  But the Planning Commission was 
unable to impose this discipline and was forced to continue to allocate resources for new 
projects which would require little money during the Plan itself but much larger resources 
in later years.  
Monies greater than ever before- Rs. 6 billion- were allocated to major and medium 
irrigation in the Third Plan of which only Rs. 1.64 billion was for new schemes. 76 To 
justify investment on new schemes which seemed contrary to its own advice, the Planning 
Commission offered strange explanations that the new schemes had been necessitated by 
particular circumstances. For example, a large scheme on the Beas was specifically to 
utilize India’s share of the Indus waters (which had just been allocated in the Indus Water 
Treaty with Pakistan in 1960). Other schemes were deemed necessary to take up the 
irrigation component of projects that were primarily for power production or were 
necessitated by irrigation programmes undertaken in neighbouring states. Yet, no less 
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than 95 new projects were sanctioned with no such special justification.77 Despite its own 
observation that not enough was being done to utilize the irrigation potential being created 
fast enough, the Planning Commission appears to have had little choice but to accept the 
contention of irrigation engineers and state governments that such lags were inevitable; 
the Third Plan set lower targets for utilization than for potential creation and allowed for 
a considerable margin of time to achieve full utilization.78  
The Third Plan placed much more emphasis than before on minor-irrigation projects; this 
was understandable considering the general atmosphere of disillusionment with large 
projects that had set in by the late 1950s even as frequent drought underlined the need for 
irrigation. The Plan emphasized that the total allocation for minor irrigation was as high 
as Rs. 2.5 billion (nearly half of the allocation for major projects) in addition to loan 
finance to support the efforts of individual cultivators. 79 Alluding to private tubewells, a 
particular emphasis was placed on the role of rural electrification in irrigation; the 
introductory paragraph of the plan for agriculture noted that “rural electrification is 
already beginning to make a significant impact on rural life through extension of irrigation 
and speeding up of technological change”. 80 At Rs. 1.05 billion, the allocation for rural 
electrification for the five years between 1961 and 1966 was higher than what had been 
spent on the same in the preceding ten years. 81 
From the dictates of the market to the planned economy of the welfare state. 
Questions of public finance were at the core of debates about irrigation projects. While 
allowing for considerable flexibility in practice, the Planning Commission had been 
unwilling to formally give up the colonial policy of using financial productivity as the 
primary criteria for sanctioning irrigation projects. Its response to the high cost of storage-
                                                          
77 Planning Commission, Third FYP, p. 142-143. 
78 Planning Commission, Third FYP, p. 142-143.  The plan set a larger-than-ever-before 
target of creating an irrigation potential of 13.8 million acres from old large schemes and 
2.4 million acres from new schemes during the Third Plan. A more realistic target for 
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79 Planning Commission, Third FYP, p. 56. 
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based irrigation was to call for the states to revamp the revenue structures of irrigation 
projects. Suggested measures included increasing water rates and recouping some of the 
capital cost itself by imposing a “betterment levy” on landowners;82 predictably hardly 
any state took up these unpopular suggestions. On the contrary, the proponents of massive 
capital investment in irrigation projects called for rejecting the financial productivity test 
as the primary metric for the sanctioning of irrigation projects, and their arguments went 
to the heart of what it meant to be a welfare state. 
 Irrigation engineers had long argued that there were considerable social benefits of their 
projects which ought to be taken into account while sanctioning projects, but the head of 
the Planning Commission V. T. Krishnamachari opined in 1953 that once such benefits 
were granted legitimacy, there would be “no knowing where to stop”; the financial 
productivity test had “stood the test of time”.83 But in 1959, a study by the newly set up 
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) argued that while the 
financial productivity test was appropriate for a laissez faire colonial economy where 
investment decisions were made according to the “dictates of the market” it failed “the 
planned economy of the welfare state”. 84 A welfare state required investment in 
overheads that were not amenable to marginalist analysis (exemplified by the financial 
productivity test); what was required was total analysis of social costs and benefits. The 
study proposed to replace the financial productivity test with cost benefit analysis which 
took into account the total social costs (both the cost of the project to the government and 
the investment required of cultivators to prepare land for irrigation among other things) 
and the total benefit (increased production etc.); projects were to be sanctioned if the ratio 
of benefits to costs was more than a chosen number. This method had apparently been 
adopted by the United States in 1950. The report criticized the government and the 
Planning Commission for sticking to a “narrow viewpoint” when it came to irrigation, 
though India had declared herself a welfare state and had an expanding public sector 
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where decisions on expenditure and taxation in other domains were made with a view to 
establishing a socialist society.85   
While the NCAER study was about investment decisions, it was explicit in directing its 
intervention at the utilization crisis of the late 1950s. At the suggestion of the Central 
Water and Power Commission, it took up the Sharda Canal in UP to exemplify the merits 
of cost benefit analysis. The scheme, among the last canal projects constructed in colonial 
India was far from typical; the considerable controversy over its sanctioning, its 
indifferent impact on agriculture and the loss it represented to the exchequer have been 
especially highlighted by historians.86 But by arguing that the application of cost benefit 
analysis, together with a full economic survey (which would have noted that the highly 
developed well irrigation practiced in the tract obviated the need for canal irrigation) 
would have resulted in considerably more caution, the NCAER study sought to prove that 
the new method would reject projects that might run into difficulties later. 87 By 
highlighting such an exceptional case of rejection, this made an investment criteria 
favoured by the irrigation engineers (and the provinces) who wanted to build large 
projects more palatable to the Planning Commission and the central government which 
didn’t. 
Another advantage of cost benefit analysis touted by the study was the order it would help 
impose order on the ad hoc, chaotic and subjective decisionmaking process which was 
extant in the 1950s due the dilution (though not outright rejection) of the financial 
productivity test. In 1964, the central government ministry of irrigation appointed a 
committee to go into this vexed question of centre-state relationship. Consisting mostly 
of provincial ministers, the committee predictably opined that the development of 
irrigation in the country was “seriously jeopardized” by the restrictive financial 
productivity test and recommended that it be abandoned in favour of the cost-benefit 
analysis detailed by the NCAER;88 this recommendation was accepted by the 
government. While a crisis of public finances in the late 1960s brought fresh investment 
                                                          
85 NCAER, Criteria, p. 123. 
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in large projects to a virtual halt, the adoption of the cost benefit analysis method played 
a role in the renewed momentum with which new projects were sanctioned in the 1970s. 
Equally vexed was the question of how beneficiaries and the public exchequer at large 
should pay for irrigation. Water rates had been fixed using widely varying formulae in 
the provinces of colonial India but they were large determined by the capital and working 
cost of projects. As a whole, irrigation works in India were making a small profit at the 
beginning of the planning period. By the end of the First Plan, the sector was making a 
loss due to the crisis of utilization, the rising costs of new projects and the provinces’ 
inability to raise rates on existing schemes; these losses grew as the decades wore on. The 
NCAER study argued that in a welfare state, the net benefit of irrigation to the cultivator, 
rather than the cost of the project should be the key metric to determine water rates. 
According to the NCAER, the precise proportion of the net benefit of irrigation 
appropriated by the state was necessarily a political choice which was to be determined 
by what was “convenient and expedient” for the state at any given moment; the study 
recommended that the percentage be between 20 and 50 percent. 89 This would have very 
probably resulted in the raising of water charges to a level more commensurate with the 
rising cost of projects. 90 
In 1964, the committee of provincial ministers agreed with the NCAER that net benefit 
should be the criteria for fixing water rates. 91 But losses on irrigation projects continued 
as the states seldom raised water rates in practice. These losses continued to be central to 
much of the discourse on irrigation and the question of who should pay for development 
which favoured the few refused to go away. In 1985, when B.B. Vohra, India’s first high 
profile crusader against big dams castigated irrigation projects for these losses at a 
seminar on irrigation, Karnataka Chief Minister H. D. Deve Gowda (who later became 
Prime Minister) responded by charging the central government of disfavouring irrigation; 
such a narrow view was not taken when funds were poured into public sector industries. 
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He argued that cost could not be a criterion for development; it was the duty of the state 
to make agriculture profitable.92 
Conclusion 
Nehruvian India devoted substantial resources to irrigation, which was seen as the basis 
of a technological transformation in agriculture. This investment however took place due 
to the commitments made in the late colonial period and due to provincial pressures, 
rather than being imposed by the elites in the central government. Influential technocratic 
bodies such as Planning Commission were circumspect and even critical of investment in 
irrigation, particularly in the case of big schemes but were unable to impose their writ on 
state governments; this resulted in the almost wanton proliferation of large projects. 
Those favouring such projects couched their arguments in terms of the responsibilities of 
the welfare state which the central government was forced to accept. This provides an 
insight into the centre-state in early postcolonial India and raises serious questions of 
whether the development praxis of the era can be characterized by the ideas of central 
elites alone. 
The big dam in India had its genesis not in a fetishization of the TVA but in the quest for 
irrigation in India. Dams had been long proposed in colonial India but few were built as 
they were seen to be expensive and technically challenging. They rose to prominence in 
the immediate postwar era with the perceived exhaustion of the possibilities of 
conventional river diversion schemes, the rise of a developmental state more willing to 
spend money to mitigate continuing food crises, and the rising importance of power 
production which helped make irrigation dams viable. Investment in irrigation in 
Nehruvian India went beyond gargantuan prestige projects to embrace a wide variety of 
small-scale irrigation technologies. The centrality of irrigation in India’s water 
development plans and the significant public investment in small-scale irrigation schemes 
negates the assumption that the ideological example of the TVA (which did not provide 
for irrigation) was the all-important motivation for dam building in India; in any case few 
of India’s dams bore comparison to the TVA. In the next chapter, I will show detail just 
how significant India’s commitment to tubewell irrigation in the Nehruvian era was. 
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By the late 1950s, India’s irrigation projects ran into several difficulties such as cost 
escalation and overrun of schedules. An additional problem was the slow utilization of 
the water impounded at great cost for irrigation; this crisis of utilization has dominated 
the discourse on public irrigation facilities in India.  To the irrigation engineer, this crisis 
was one of building the last-mile infrastructure to deliver water to the fields which was 
usually the responsibility of the cultivator. For others, this crisis was due to a failure in 
planning an appropriate cropping pattern which made irrigation profitable to the peasant. 
But for some critics of planned rural development in India, the crisis had deeper meaning; 
the wide spectrum of successful and failed irrigation projects disproved an assumption 
central to planning and rural development in India. This assumption went that given equal 
incentives and resources, all communities would respond similarly in engaging with 
opportunities for economic development; cultural difference still mattered. In subsequent 
chapters, I will explore how a shift in the intellectual landscape of development studies 




Chapter 4: Tubewells in Postwar India 
In this chapter, I shall tell the story of tubewells in India between the mid-1940s and the 
mid-1960s. I shall argue that postwar India invested substantially in tubewell irrigation 
continuing the colonial-era trend of India being at the forefront of tubewell irrigation. I 
will further show how postwar Indian investment in tubewell irrigation began with the 
execution of Stampe’s grand plans after he left India. 
I shall begin with the story of a small tubewell scheme in UP championed by William 
Stampe in the last few months of his time in India and detail the negotiations over the 
finances of that project between a conservative central government and an extravagant 
provincial government as an example of the centre-state conflict in irrigation 
development I had outlined in the last chapter. I shall go on to detail Stampe’s grand plans 
for tubewells in postwar India and their execution by early independent India. In studying 
the race between British and American firms to win the contracts for that programme, I 
shall argue that the Cold War context was only one reason for the West’s support for 
Indian agricultural modernization; the profits that would accrue to western firms in the 
process was an equally important factor. 
Finally, I shall outline tubewell development in India through the 1950s. I shall argue that 
while irrigation planners were circumspect about the (still very) new mode of irrigation 
and the lack of knowledge about India’s groundwater resources; they nevertheless made 
large investments in public tubewell programmes. In this, they were supported by 
significant American aid, both for tubewell construction and for the All India 
Groundwater Exploration Project which helped increase confidence about India’s 
groundwater resources; both programmes were the largest of their kind in the world. 
Through the decade, the public sector rather than individual cultivators was at the 
forefront of tubewell development. 
I 
Histories of postwar India have characterized gigantic dam projects as central to water 
resources development in independent India. This notion is not confined to specialized 
studies of dams but extends to more general accounts of the period; for example Sunil 
Khilnani has titled his chapter on economic development “Temples of the Future” after 
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the appellation Nehru gave to big dams and has claimed that in the 1950s, India “fell in 
love with the idea of concrete” in the form of dams. 1 
The battle against communism has been seen as primary motivation for the west’s support 
for agricultural modernization in India. Indeed both book length histories of the Green 
Revolution which touch substantially on the Indian case have the phrase “Cold War” in 
the title and argue that American aid for Indian agriculture was motivated by a fear of the 
spread of communism; particularly by the imminent victory of the communists in the 
Chinese civil war in the late 1940s.2 
The Gorakhpur Leopard Tubewell Scheme 
In 1945, the UP Irrigation Branch put forth a proposal to construct tubewells and electrify 
the district of Gorakhpur. Known variously as the Gorakhpur ‘Leopard’ Tubewell 
Scheme and the Trans-Gogra Tubewell Irrigation Scheme, the proposal envisaged the 
construction of a hundred tubewells of the Roscoe Moss design, eighteen of which were 
to be constructed by the Central Groundwater Organisation (CGWO) to demonstrate 
mechanical drilling. Cheap power was expected to be available within five years from the 
Rihand dam; in the meanwhile, Stampe suggested that power be supplied from a nursery 
power plant. The nursery power plant was to be owned and operated by the Government 
of India and power provided to the UP government at a low rate to encourage tubewell 
irrigation; the loss on power production was to be borne by the central government. UP 
was to have the option of purchasing the plants at the end of five years and it was also to 
be indemnified against all losses on the scheme in case the Government of India failed to 
supply power from the power stations in time.3 The cost to the Government of India of 
supplying power at a loss was estimated by Sir William at half a million rupees; on that 
basis, approval for the scheme was granted in principle by the Department of Agriculture 
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and the generating sets were ordered. Soon after this, in August 1946, Stampe fell ill and 
left for the UK. 4 
However, soon after the Department of Agriculture committed to the scheme, it was 
discovered that the estimate was erroneous and that the real cost of the power supply 
subsidy would be closer to the prohibitive figure of two million rupees.5 One may well 
speculate the extent to which the initial erroneous calculation which led all parties to 
commit to the scheme was “honest”; Stampe and the UP Irrigation Branch had a history 
of bureaucratic errors which enabled the sanctioning of projects which would otherwise 
not have been approved.6 To preserve the “honour and good name of the Central 
Government” and put to use the ordered power plants which were already on the high 
seas, various alternative financing proposals made the round in the latter half of 1946 and 
early 1947 between the Finance Department and the Department of Agriculture, with the 
latter firmly on the side of the UP Government in trying to extract the highest possible 
subsidy.7 
UP was to receive several subsidies for the scheme; a free power plant, subsidized power 
and the construction of some tubewells for free by the CGWO. In addition, UP was also 
to receive a subsidy on the construction of its own share of tubewells equal to the 
estimated annual increased food grain production under the Grow More Food scheme. 
The Finance Department discovered this fairly late in the course of the negotiations in 
January 1947 and found it unacceptable that UP was to receive multiple subsidies on 
                                                          
4 K.D. Sanwal, Note dated 16 August 1946, in NAI File: Trans-Gogra Tubewell Irrigation 
scheme. 
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different parts of the same scheme. It also raised concerns over the generally high cost of 
the scheme and suggested that UP not go ahead with the scheme at all even if it were 
financed completely from the province’s own funds. Finally, it raised questions over the 
projected increased food production from tubewells, which would have a bearing on the 
Grow More Food grant. While the project proposal mentioned a yield increase of five 
maunds per acre of wheat, UP’s representative at a Food Conference had casually 
mentioned that such an increase would only take place in conjunction with fertilizers; the 
increased yield by tubewells alone would be about half the amount. After much protracted 
negotiation, the Finance Department agreed to a total subsidy about equal to what UP 
would have been eligible for under the Grow More Food scheme, and the UP Government 
proceeded on that basis.8 The episode demonstrates that controversies over subsidies to 
technology in agriculture have a history that goes beyond the populist politics of the post 
Green-Revolution era. It also illustrates that it was difficult to apportion yield increases 
to particular technological changes.   
The electrification of Gorakhpur district under the project was begun in 1948,9 and 
proceeded slowly, partly because the Rihand Dam which was  to supply power for the 
scheme within five years of 1947 only started producing power in 1962.10 While the initial 
proposal for the dam project in the early 1940s had centred on the energization of 4000 
tubewells, industrial interests (including a Birla-owned aluminium smelter) 
controversially managed to get a large chunk of the power allocated to themselves in the 
late 1950s.11 Nursery schemes would last well into the 1960s;12 the realization of 
Stampe’s Himalayan Dream was to take much longer than he had expected. 
Decolonization 
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Stampe left India on leave due to ill health in 1946, and, having suffered an accident 
during a visit to America in early 1947, gave up his position as Irrigation Adviser. In 1946 
a delivered talk to the East India Association in London outlining the Himalayan Dream, 
saying it could be a perfect example of a new cooperative partnership between East and 
West, 
I am convinced that the ideal way to encourage lasting comradeship between East 
and West is for both parties to take part — the one as owners and custodians of 
their own destinies, the other as possessing longer mechanical experience as well 
as greater factory resources — in fostering India's agricultural economy.13 
In this section, I shall explore the early beginnings of that new partnership. 
In 1946, Stampe had proposed a scheme to sink a few thousand tubewells in UP, Bihar 
and Punjab. He had suggested that a British or American firm be contracted to do the job 
and had even discussed it tentatively with an American firm during his visit to that 
country. According to Stampe, the proposal was “summarily rejected” with the 
involvement of foreign firms being the only reason.14 However, the Government of India 
had not rejected large-scale tubewell construction altogether; for example a plan to build 
6000 tubewells in 6 years was discussed in May 1948.15 The government had also invited 
Clarence Johnston of the Californian firm Johnston Pumps, and Leon Hostetter, a 
professor of agronomy at the University of California for discussions.16 But the newly-
independent government moved slowly and this came in for much criticism; for example 
a retired Secretary of Agriculture from Stampe’s time, Sir Pheroze Khareghat wrote in 
the Times of India that the country could not meet Nehru’s target of food self-sufficiency 
by 1951 as “what hope is there of speedy action when the Government take seven months 
merely to print a report on the feasibility of sinking tubewells.” Khareghat used tubewells 
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to illustrate the “practical difficulties” of agricultural development and wrote of CGWO’s 
difficulties and the obstacles to large-scale groundwater development, 
It is now possible to use power operated boring rigs which can go down to a lower 
level and are much quicker to operate. Some of these rigs were obtained. But there 
were few men who knew how to work them properly. No adequate arrangements 
were made for the supply of the pipes required or for spare parts for dealing with 
the breakages or for the power pumps needed. There was considerable delay and 
little progress.  
A suggestion was, therefore, made that an American firm which has been doing 
this type of work should be entrusted with the work of constructing, say, 1000 
wells and train our men…There is in high quarters a reluctance to entrust work to 
foreign firms, nor are those in charge prepared to admit their lack of competence. 
And so nothing happens for months and years and the people must do without the 
food which would have been available had these tubewells been constructed.17 
But the Government of India did proceed, and in consultation with the American experts, 
drew up a plan for sinking 4,565 tubewells in UP, Bihar and Punjab. While there may 
have been some hostility to collaboration with foreign firms, due to the lack of boring 
equipment, power plants and engines, strainer and casing pipes, and the inadequacy of 
trained personnel, Johnston Pumps was invited to put in a tentative tender. On the grounds 
that that the provinces could not carry out the work fast enough on their own, that the 
Americans would use better quality strainers, and that Indians could be trained on 
mechanical boring equipment better were the contract been given to an American firm, 
the central government preferred foreign collaboration.18 Accordingly, in February 1949, 
the government signed a contract for the construction of 3000 tubewells with the Johnston 
Pump Company.19  An application for a loan to cover the 55 million rupees of dollar 
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expenditure of the total project cost of about 140 million rupees was submitted to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the same year.20 
Stampe visited India in 1949 and argued that the cost estimate submitted by Johnston 
Pumps was “fantastically high”; this cost was also criticized by legislators.21 The 
International Bank also rejected the application for a loan on  the  grounds that “putting  
down a further 4000 tubewells in the Gangetic plain might lower the water table so much 
as to do more harm than good in the long run.” 22 The Bank demanded a geological survey 
before considering a loan, but the Indian government’s opinion was that a survey would 
take years and that they had enough data on which to base the project. There was some 
talk of turning out the groundwater survey carried out by J.B. Auden for Ganges Valley 
State Tube-Well Irrigation scheme in the 1930s which had indicated that supplies were 
ample enough to ensure no depletion;, but the idea was shelved as the government felt 
that the amount of work required was disproportionately high in comparison to the small 
amount of the loan.23 The central government decided to go ahead with a smaller scheme 
of technical and financial support to provincial tubewell programmes. 
For the British, tubewell construction in the new dominion was of strategic importance 
as reflected in communication between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Board of Trade, 
 The trouble with the new dominions is that they so often fail to put first things 
first and they tend to concentrate for prestige reasons on projects which are not 
likely to have any immediate effect in either raising the low living standards or 
even in staving off the recurring famines which threaten them. In the tubewell 
schemes however, we have an instance in which the Government of India are fully 
justified in raising finance wherever they can do so and in pushing with all energy 
with these schemes. It is not only in India’s interest that she grow more food and 
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reduce her dependence on foreign cereals, it is equally her interest that she should 
do so and reduce the calls which she has been and continues to make on her 
sterling balances especially that portion of the balances for which she looks to us 
in hard currencies. 
Apart from economic angle, we can say that it is politically important that the 
Government of India should receive every help possible from us to carry through 
the scheme calculated to prevent unrest through the spread of famine and its 
attendant evils while at the same time enabling the Government of India to claim 
credit for the successful consummation of these projects on which indeed its 
political future at the next election may well depend. In the short term, it is by 
practical measures of this kind that Government of India can best fight 
communism.24 
It would be tempting to conclude, that the West’s support for the modernization of Indian 
agriculture was all about foreign exchange and the fight against communism.25 This was 
indeed a concern and the Indian government was well aware that this could be exploited; 
for example in a telegram to the Indian ambassador in America requesting enquiries about 
reclamation tractors and tubewell equipment, Jairamdass Daulatram, the Minister of 
Agriculture said that while the US was not normally interested in enquiries from India as 
the demand for reclamation tractors was high, “the atmosphere for getting  high priority 
for our requirements has improved” due to “the turn of events in China.”26 But for the 
British, a more immediate concern was the “shrewd suspicion” that the Indians had 
“practically committed themselves to a contract with an American firm” and the feeling 
that India was only trying to obtain from Britain the equipment she could not obtain from 
the United States.27 For the Indians, preference for American goods had at least partly to 
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do with the fact that the Americans had more experience with groundwater development 
than the British did; when asked by the UK Trade Commissioner in New Delhi why the 
government was not purchasing more equipment from the British, Dr. Piplani, a Joint 
Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture bluntly replied that there was no area in the UK 
which had tubewells.28 However, with the failure to get a dollar loan, the Indian 
government was anxious to buy as much equipment as possible from the Sterling areas. 
As no British firm was large enough to take on the entire tubewell programme India 
envisaged, Brush Electric Works had formed a consortium of companies, registered in 
London as a nominal £100 company called Associated Tube-wells Ltd. to collectively 
undertake the job.29 
While Associated Tube-wells progressed reasonably well in its negotiations with the 
Indian government on most matters, Indian engineers’ insistence on the use of borehole 
pumps manufactured by Johnston Pumps was a sticking point; their manufacture in the 
UK by Associated Tube-wells would require substantial dollar royalties which UK 
exchange control would not permit.30 Unlike the submersible pumps manufactured by 
British firms, the borehole pumps had their motor at the surface, permitting easy 
maintenance;31 Roscoe Moss too had noted the preference for borehole pumps in India 
despite their high prices.32 Stampe was consulted by the consortium about the extent of 
                                                          
28 JN McKelvie (UK Trade Commissioner) to F. Doy (Commonwealth Relations and 
Export Department, Board of Trade), 1 February 1949, in British Library File: 
IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
29 JN McKelvie (UK Trade Commissioner) to the Under Secretary (Commonwealth 
Relations and Export Department, Board of Trade), 12 May 1949 and UK Trade 
Commissioner to J Thomson (Commonwealth Relations Office), 12 April 1950, in British 
Library File: IOR/L/E/8/7431. The companies included Mertz and McLellan as 
consultants, and the Reliable Water Supply Company of Lucknow as a contractor (which, 
headquarter in Lahore before Partition had supplied the strainers for the original UP 
scheme).  
30 Telegram from Board of Trade to New Delhi, 14 April 1950 and UK Trade 
Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 15 April 1950, in British Library File: 
IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
31 Telegram from New Delhi to Board of Trade, 26 April 1950, in British Library File: 
IOR/L/E/8/7431. 
32 Roscoe Moss, “A brief review of ground-water potentialities and tube-well technique 
in Northern India”, 19 Mar, 1946, in NAI file: Delegation of powers to the Chairman, 
CGWO. 
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preference for UK and American pumps in India.33 He reported that submersible pumps 
of UK make were better than the American bore hole pumps, but the fact that some 
Harland pumps installed in UP in 1935 had performed poorly may have contributed to 
the poor reputation of British pumps in India. He wrote letters to engineers in UP, Punjab, 
Bihar and Bengal pointing out the superiority of British pumps and suggested that an 
Indian engineer be invited to come to the UK and see the pumps in operation. But his 
efforts on behalf of British manufacturers did not bear fruit and matters were not helped 
by the fact that a submersible pump sent by a British company for trials in UP had fallen 
into the bore after two months of operation.34 It was felt that Stampe’s word no longer 
carried weight in India.35 
But the potential market in India was not to be lost due to Anglo-American competition 
or foreign exchange restrictions. With fears that negotiations with the Indians would fall 
through, Parson-Johnston (a collaboration between Johnston Pumps and the engineering 
contractor Ralph M. Parsons) and the Brush group agreed to collaborate rather than 
compete as their “resources were supplementary”; 36 while the Americans were interested 
in groundwater engineering, drilling and pumps, Brush was interested in electrical 
machinery such as motors and generators for nursery power plants. It was decided that 
the world market for tubewells was to be divided into the Sterling and non-Sterling areas. 
For the purpose of initial sales solicitation, Associated Tube-wells was to take the lead 
and in the non-Sterling Areas, Parson-Johnston was to take the lead, though both were to 
collaborate in all markets. Johnston and Associated Tube-wells were to form a new 
company in England called Johnston-Atwell which would purchase pumps of Johnston’s 
design manufactured by J&H McLaren in the UK to sell to both Associated Tube-wells 
and to Johnston Pumps. Associated Tube-wells was to change its name to Parson-
Johnston-Brush International Ltd. and Parson-Johnston was to change to Parson-
                                                          
33 “Minutes of a meeting held on Tuesday, May 2nd 1950 at 10.30 am in Room 1020, 
Shell Max House.”, in British Library File: IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
34 Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to New Delhi, 12 may 1950, in British 
Library File: IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
35 Telegram from Board of Trade to New Delhi, 10 May 1950, in British Library File: 
IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
36 UK Trade Commissioner to Under Secretary (Board of Trade), dated June 8th 1950 in 
British Library File: IOR/L/E/8/7431. The communication contains the text of the 
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Johnston-Brush International. The royalty and other dollar payments to Johnston were to 
be facilitated by the supply of diesel engines and electric equipment such as motors and 
generators by Brush Electric Works to the Johnston Pump Company.37 
These companies were to have significant impact on groundwater development in India 
in the coming decade. Under the name of Associated Tube-wells, the group got a contract 
to construct and equip 965 tubewells in UP, Bihar and Punjab in 1950,38 which was 
“considered the largest single tube-well construction programme ever undertaken in the 
world”.39 Johnston set up a pump manufacturing unit in Calcutta which continued to 
manufacture under the name Johnston Pumps India until it was renamed in the 1980s. In 
1950, Parson-Johnston-Brush International was also awarded a contract by the 
Government of India to explore the groundwater resources in Orissa, Madras, Bihar, UP, 
West Bengal and Saurashtra, which laid the groundwork for the American aided All India 
Groundwater Exploration Project in the 1950s (which was executed by Parsons),40 
described in later decades as "forerunner of modern concept introduced in India in the 
search for ground water resources with a multi-disciplinary scientific approach."41 
Parson-Johnston-Brush International’s exploration work also led to the identification of 
2000 potential sites for sinking tubewells42 which were developed with American aid in 
the 1950s; that project was again proudly described the largest tubewell construction 
programme anywhere in the world.43 
                                                          
37 UK Trade Commissioner to Under Secretary (Board of Trade) dated June 8th 1950 in 
British Library File: IOR/L/E/8/7431.  
38 Mansinghal Associates, A Project Report on the Location of Information Sources 
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39 Ministry of Agriculture Tubewells in India (New Delhi, 1955), p. 2. 
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Tubewells in the 1950s   
The text of the first five year plan for irrigation had begun with an assessment of India’s 
water resources. While tentative estimates could be made for the utilizable surface water 
resources of the country, in the case of groundwater the Commission could merely note 
that while substantial supplies were available, no inventory of India’s groundwater 
resources had been conducted. While wells had been in use for irrigation since times 
immemorial, large-scale irrigation from the source was only thought possible with power-
operated pumps and supplies for exploitation on a large-scale were only known to be 
available in UP, Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat;  a scheme for 400 large tubewells 
had been sanctioned in the latter in the pre-plan period. The circumspectness is 
understandable in light of the fact that tubewell irrigation had not established itself as a 
primary mode of irrigation on a large scale anywhere in the world in the early 1950s, and 
little was known about India’s groundwater resources. UP still remained the only 
successful large example of tubewells in action and there, they were seen as useful in 
areas with good groundwater supplies not commanded by surface works as they were 
generally more expensive than canals. Nevertheless, the Commission’s cautious 
optimism about motorized groundwater development was reflected in the emphasis it 
placed on the importance of electricity in agriculture. At 105%, the Plan’s forecast for the 
increase in use of power for irrigation pumping over the next decade was the higher than 
for any other category of power users.44  
State tubewell projects were included in the outlay for major irrigation schemes in the 
First Five Year Plan. Uttar Pradesh and Punjab and Bihar was where significant public 
tubewell development had taken place in the pre-plan period; the former two were also 
the leading canal irrigation provinces. Amongst the eighteen state irrigation schemes 
mentioned for UP, seven had to do with tubewells and their total cost accounted for over 
two thirds of the cost of all irrigation projects proposed by the province for the First Plan; 
this included an ambitious plan to build 15,000 state tubewells by 1967. In Punjab, three 
tubewell schemes accounted for over a third of the state government’s expenditure on 
irrigation projects while in Bihar, tubewell projects accounted for over two fifth of the 
                                                          
44 Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan (New Delhi, 1952), p. 92. The report 
also mentioned the large share of energy consumed by tubewells in UP and by the 12,500 
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provincial outlay on irrigation development schemes. 45 Hence in the states where 
tubewell irrigation had proved feasible, public tubewell schemes formed an important 
part of development efforts. 
What did these plans imply for the growth of India’s public tubewell networks? About 
2500 public tubewells were extant in India in 1951, 2300 of which were in UP. As was 
just detailed, a programme to construct an additional 965 tubewells in Punjab, Bihar, UP 
and PEPSU had resulted from William Stampe’s efforts. In addition, the Plan provided 
for the construction of 700 tubewells under the Grow More Food Programme and 2480 
tubewells under other provincial development plans. 46 The availability of American aid 
for tubewell construction provided a further fillip to India’s tubewell programme. The 
Indo-US Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed between the two countries in 
January 1952 and the sixth of the hundred odd operational agreements under the treaty 
was one for the construction of 2000 tubewells in UP, Punjab, PEPSU and Bihar; this was 
later expanded to a further 650 tubewells.  In all, the provincial plans, the Grow More 
Food scheme and the American aided project envisaged the tripling of the number of 
tubewells in India in just five years to irrigate a further 2.2 million acres. Building at the 
rate of about a 100 a month, India was engaged in the early 1950s in the world’s largest 
programme of tubewell construction; as the Ministry of Agriculture proudly wrote, “no 
country in the world has ever attempted something of this magnitude in tubewell 
construction.”47 
The Planning Commission became more optimistic about tubewells in the Second Plan 
which began in 1956, noting that technological advances in tubewell engineering had 
increased the scope for their application. The All-India Groundwater Exploration Project, 
an American aided programme to explore India’s groundwater resources through 
exploratory tubewells (which was again described as the largest such programme of its 
kind in the world48) was underway and more reliable information about subsoil water 
supplies was expected to become available soon. The plan envisaged the construction of 
                                                          
45 Compiled from Planning Commission, Development schemes in the first five year plan 
(New Delhi, 1952). 
46 Planning Commission, First FYP, p. 92. 
47 Agriculture, Tubewell, p. 4. 
48 Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Report (Delhi, 1954), p. 47. 
Chapter 4: Tubewells in Postwar India 
149 
 
3581 tubewells irrigating about a million acres under the minor-irrigation programme. 
While UP, Punjab, Bombay (Gujarat) and PEPSU dominated the programme, almost all 
provinces were allocated some tubewells, though of a smaller size in keeping with the 
availability of subsoil water. At the Planning Commission’s instance, studies of the 
economics of tubewell irrigation had been initiated by some states as it was expected to 
become increasingly important in areas not commanded by canals. 49 
The use of electric power for irrigation increased fourfold in the 1950s, compared to an 
overall increase of 2.5 times in power consumption in India as a whole, reflecting the 
growth of motorized groundwater irrigation from state and private tubewells and pumps 
on open wells.50 While reliable statistics of private tubewells are not available, the growth 
of tubewell irrigation in the 1950s was dominated by the state sector. As late as the early 
1960s, an estimate stated that the number of private tubewells would only soon exceed 
state tubewells; the former also irrigated smaller areas.51  
Conclusion 
Postwar India made substantial investment in public tubewell irrigation programmes. 
This investment began with the execution of Stampe’s grand plans after his departure 
from India by the postcolonial government. Stampe believed that in his scheme for large-
scale development of tubewell irrigation in India lay the potential for a new partnership 
between an industrial West and an agricultural East. The Anglo-American scramble for 
contracts to execute his plan demonstrates that the global fight against communism was 
but one reason for British support for agricultural modernization in India; the profits that 
would accrue  to British firms in the process of that modernization was a more important 
motive. The decision of American and British firms to collaborate rather than compete in 
order to meet Indian engineers’ preference for American pumps despite dollar shortages 
illustrates the importance they placed on getting a foothold in the Indian market. Their 
agreement illustrates how, even as global decolonization was in its infancy western 
corporations were splitting the new market for what could be called “development 
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products” between themselves. These companies would have an important impact on the 
development of groundwater resources in India during the next decade. 
The process of executing Stampe’s plans continued the interest of the central government 
in public tubewell irrigation that had begun during the War. Thus in the 1950s, despite 
the Planning Commission being circumspect about tubewell technology and India’s 
groundwater resources, the country embarked on the largest programme of tubewell 
construction in the world. In this venture, India was aided by American aid both in 




Chapter 5: Transforming Traditional Agriculture 
The historiography of the Green Revolution in India is centred on two themes; besides 
plant breeding, the other theme is the role of the United States in providing aid and 
building pressure on India to modernize its agriculture which played out in the context of 
the Cold War. On economic policy change, the well-known argument is that there was a 
shift in national priorities from industry towards agriculture in the mid-1960s.1 But the 
existing literature neither tells us about the intellectual landscape of development studies 
that underpinned this shift nor provides a coherent account of the details of policy changes 
that would determine how these increased resources would be deployed to induce 
agricultural development.  
In this chapter, I shall give an account of the particularities of policy changes that 
constituted India’s New Agricultural Strategy of the mid-1960s. I shall argue that the 
central idea behind the New Agricultural Strategy (NAS) was that of the peasant as a 
rational economic being who would respond to state-incentives for higher production in 
his hunger for profit; thus his initiative could be placed at the heart of agricultural 
development efforts. Detailing the role played by Indian politicians, the World Bank and 
the United States government in shaping policy change; I shall argue that western 
advisors, particularly those connected with the World Bank’s Bell Mission which visited 
India in 1964-65 played an important role in shaping agricultural policy. 
The NAS’s emphasis on agriculture as an engine of growth, as well as its emphasis on 
scientific research, on modern inputs such as chemical fertilizer and on incentives to the 
rational farmer to achieve that growth were intellectually underpinned by Nobel Prize 
winning economist Theodore Schultz’s theory of the “poor but efficient” Third-World 
Peasant; a theory that itself owed much to economic research in India. At the time, both 
eulogists and critics would analyse the Green Revolution in Schultzian terms; indeed one 
Indian critic called his book “the Bible of the New Strategy”.2  I shall argue Indian 
agriculture was perhaps the first example of the application of the ideas of the Chicago 
School in the developing world. The seeming success of Schultz’s ideas in engendering 
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a “Green Revolution” has been recognized by economists and policy experts (though not 
historians) in playing a crucial role in turning the attention of the World Bank to 
agricultural development; the idea of the “poor but efficient” peasant continues to be 
central to development thought.3 
I shall begin with an overview of postwar economic development theory, aspects of which 
were central to India’s agricultural policy in the 1950s. I shall next detail the challenge to 
this theory posed by Theodore Schultz building on the field work of Canadian 
anthropologist-economist William David Hopper in India. Schultz argued that with the 
aid of research and modern inputs, agriculture could be an engine of growth and that 
peasants would respond to price incentives by adopting new technology to increase 
production. 
I shall next look at new policies for agriculture introduced by the Shastri administration 
in India between 1964 and 1966. These were guided by ideas of Indians, by the advice of 
western economists with the Ford Foundation (including David Hopper) and the World 
Bank. I shall detail the setting up of a public sector trading company called the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) which became one of the largest logistical operations in the 
world and argue that this was a significant and far reaching change, as it enabled the 
procurement of a significant amount of food from the countryside for cheap sale in the 
cities thus obviating the need for wheat imports as a source of central government stocks. 
This was followed by the adoption of new technologies. I shall demonstrate how, in the 
case of chemical fertilizers, there was no consensus on their superiority to organic 
manures whose potential for cheap growth had barely begun to be utilized in India. 
Chemical fertilizers won policy over through intense lobbying, through the propagation 
of entirely imagined advantages over organic fertilizers, through the machinations of the 
bureaucracy’s old boy network, as well as the seemingly fortuitous end of the career of a 
politician who believed that foreign exchange should be reserved for industrialization 
rather than for fertilizers. 
                                                          
3 See for example, Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis, and Richard Charles Webb, (eds.) 
The World Bank: Its First Half Century. Volume. 1: History (Washington, DC, 1997), p. 
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Finally, I shall attempt to answer the question raised in Chapter 1; why were the dwarf 
wheat varieties adopted even though tall improved varieties could produce higher yields 
with lesser fertilizer. The adoption of the seeds was pressed by the Lyndon Johnson 
administration in the secret “Treaty of Rome” with India. I shall argue that in India, the 
choice was motivated on the one hand by enthusiasm for technological novelty. On the 
other hand marginalist analysis was central to decisionmaking and dwarf wheats 
produced higher additional yield for every additional unit of fertilizer than tall varieties 
even if total yield was lower. The real change in wheat production being sought by policy 
makers was to induce the cultivator to use higher fertilizer doses; once the switch to 
dwarfs varieties had been made, increased use of fertilizer was more profitable than it 
would have been with tall varieties. Thus while the new strategy was rhetorically based 
on the idea of universal peasant rationality, in practice, the model of the peasant that 
guided policy made more of his hunger for profit than his rationality in pursuit of that 
profit. Great store was set by the idea of making a psychological impact with 
demonstrations of super-normal (albeit inefficient) yields with the new seeds and high 
fertilizer doses. 
The rhetoric of high science around the new seeds also served to justify larger changes in 
economic policy such as the shift in national priorities from industry to agriculture as well 
as the concentration of inputs and state aid to large farmers in favored regions. Capacity 
for state action in the countryside when it came to infrastructure, credit and extension was 
woefully limited; it thus perhaps made sense to rely for higher production on inefficiently 
high fertilizer use by a few farmers. Thus in practice, the rhetoric of universal peasant 
rationality was replaced by a focus on a few (mostly large) “progressive farmers”. 
I 
Nick Cullather provides a brief outline of the structuralist ideas that dominated 
development in the 1950s but does not mention the evolution of academic ideas and their 
impact on policy in the 1960s. While American aid to India always had a substantial bias 
in favour of agriculture, Cullather has outlined the political and Cold War-related strategic 
reasons which motivated America to further emphasize agriculture in its aid to India from 
the late 1950s onwards. He provides the customary outline of the efforts of the Johnson 
administration and of battles within the Indian establishment to get India to devote more 
resources to agriculture; but mentions the visit of the World Bank’s Bell Mission only in 
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passing. He, mentions the controversy over the “Treaty of Rome” but does not delve into 
the text of the treaty itself. 4 Francine Frankel has suggested that the World Bank mission 
played a significant role in policy formation, and that the new seed varieties enabled the 
Agriculture Minister to claim that his policies were grounded in science.5 
That Green-Revolution policies placed the agency of the farmer at the centre of 
agricultural development efforts has been recognized by Gurcharan Das in his popular 
economic history of India.  According to Das, Jawaharlal Nehru attempted an industrial 
revolution in India but failed due to his distrust of businessmen; instead, India later had 
an agricultural revolution by trusting the agency of the farmer.6 That the Shastri years 
were characterized by a general liberalization of the economy has been recognized by 
Medha Kudaisya who has focused on industrial policy but outlined the souring of 
relations of the government with big business due to the setting up of the Food 
Corporation of India.7 
Theodore Schultz’s “poor but efficient” theory is considered very significant by 
economists; the economist Esther Duflo writes that rejecting or accepting this theory 
means rejecting or accepting all the postulates of neoclassical economics.8 The official 
history of the World Bank (written by public policy scholars) points out that while 
Schultz’s ideas were not particularly novel, his translation of old ideas into an economist’s 
terminology had a huge impact. The authors speculate on whether or not World Bank 
president George Woods had read the book before making a crucial speech which marked 
a turn of the Bank towards funding agricultural activities and go so far so far as to argue 
that Schultz “provided a scenario for the Green Revolution before the phenomenon even 
had a name”.9 His contributions to the development of price theory, to the American farm 
subsidy policy and his general “development” consultancy assignments, particularly in 
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Chile have been noted in a volume on the development of the Chicago School of 
Economics.10 
In his critique of agricultural development theory, economist Terry Byres has briefly 
outlined how Schultzian ideas represented the first challenge to what he has termed “Old 
Neoclassical Development Economics” (usually called the Lewis structuralist model) 
which culminated in the Washington Consensus in the 1980s.11 Ashutosh Varshney has 
credited Schultz with turning attention to agriculture as an engine of growth that came to 
dominate development theory.12   
Postwar Development Theory and Practice 
Pioneers of postwar development theory such as Rodenstein-Rodan and John P. Lewis 
argued that neoclassical economics was irrelevant in the analysis of underdeveloped 
countries. Markets were imperfect, rural interest rates in informal markets were usurious, 
peasants did not respond to price movements and agrarian institutions were unsuited for 
inducing development as the relationship between economic agents was not necessarily 
mutually advantageous. Another key assumption of developmental economics was the 
theory of surplus labour which saw an almost infinite pool of unutilized labour in the rural 
Third World; within India this notion was strong amongst economists who thus felt that 
agricultural production could be massively increased by utilizing labour rather than 
increasing capital inputs. Industry, rather than agriculture was to be the engine of 
modernization.13 
Before the mid-1960s, the primary goal allotted to the agricultural sector in India was to 
sustain the countryside and produce cheap food for a growing industrial workforce. There 
was considerable unease over what moved the cultivator; according to Nehru, “the basic 
problem facing India is that of the peasant. How do we change his mental outlook?”14 In 
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particular, the controversy was about how the peasant would responded to high prices: 
would he produce more to make a profit, or would he produce less; either satisfied with 
maintaining the same profit with less effort, or fearing a crash in prices. The technocratic 
elite including the Planning Commission feared that the peasant would respond 
perversely to incentives; by justifying lower prices, this fear served their goal of 
concentrating resources on rapid industrialization. Thus India in the 1950s pursued a 
policy of ceiling, rather than floor prices.15 
The national left elite sought to incentivize higher production on the cheap through 
institutional changes such as land reforms. In terms of technology, public irrigation was 
at the centre of the strategy and its role in risk mitigation which would encourage the 
farmer to adopt better cultivation fit in well with the perception of the farmer as a risk and 
investment-averse creature. Private irrigation too was encouraged on a small scale 
through programmes of difficult to avail loans and subsidies. Such was the perceived 
importance of irrigation that unlike other inputs, it was never suspected that the farmer 
would not use water. But the availability of expensive working inputs which required 
foreign exchange (most crucially fertilizers) was largely curtailed, while cheap inputs 
such as organic manures and a more intensive labour use was encouraged. 16 In any case, 
the government’s ability to introduce technological changes that required of farmer the 
investment of fixed or working capital was limited, mostly by the thin spread of the state. 
“Community development” was the national rural policy but as late as the early 1960s, 
only about 60% of that system was functional. 17 
From the beginning, many influential Indians were against the squeezing of agriculture 
for industrialization; committee after influential committee recommended steps to 
improve agriculture through better prices. The state-level politicians who marshalled the 
political muscle defeated land reform legislation through indifferent implementation; they 
too favoured higher prices. Almost all of Nehru’s Agriculture Ministers fell out with him, 
including KM Munshi, AR Kidwai, AP Jain and SK Patil, with the latter famously saying 
“whether it was Russia, America or India, experience has shown that any increase in 
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agricultural production could only be brought about through incentives to the 
individual.”18 
How Senapur’s thakurs shaped the World 
This political challenge was soon buttressed by an intellectual challenge as key ideas of 
this model began to be questioned; this challenge culminated in Theodore Schultz’s 1964 
book Transforming Traditional Agriculture. 19 Before outlining the development of 
Schultz’s ideas, I shall outline the fieldwork done by a Canadian researcher W. David 
Hopper in India in the 1950s which became the basis of key Schultzian claims. 
In 1954, William David Hopper, a Canadian student at Cornell University arrived in the 
village of Senapur in the Jaunpur district of eastern UP in pursuit of data for his Ph.D. on 
agricultural economics and cultural anthropology as a Social Science Research Council 
Area Training Fellow. 20 Hopper studied the operation of 43 farms, a sample he described 
as “close to random” but consisting entirely of upper caste Thakur land owners who “did 
not touch the plow”. Using farmer interviews, as well as actual measurement of field 
sizes, of irrigation water lifted by the mot, and human and bullock labour with a 
stopwatch, Hopper collected data on expected yield, and the input of land, labour and 
bullock time and irrigation water to agriculture.21 
Hopper used this data to study how the farmer allocated resources to production 
alternatives (or crop choice). In keeping with the theory of marginal utility, if farmers had 
allocated the inputs to their production alternatives efficiently, the expected commodity 
price times the marginal yield from any input would be equal to the price of the input. 
However, none of the inputs (except labour) were purchased, so an implicit price had to 
be computed from the geometric mean of the data, expressed in barley (or other crop) 
equivalents. The condition signifying efficient allocation thus became that implicit prices 
of inputs derived from each crop was the same. The analysis produced a remarkably close 
correspondence; signifying to Hopper that the average allocation was “efficient within 
the context of the prevailing technical relationships”, 
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It seems likely that in a technologically stagnant agriculture, farmers are 
intuitively aware of the resource substitution possibilities and the production 
responses of their agricultural enterprises. These are embodied in the lore of the 
culture transmitted from generation to generation, and are derived from 
refinements of techniques that arise from the observations and "experiments" 
made by past and present farmers. It is, therefore, not surprising to find relatively 
few allocation errors and a high level of production efficiency within the 
framework of the traditional state of the arts. 22 
A reflexive Hopper admitted many flaws in this analysis. Although he had standardized 
inputs for quality, they would “still depart from the neat precision implied in a static 
production model”. 23 The discrete nature of the inputs was also an issue; land was 
unconsolidated and the average field measured just 0.37 acres. A labour hour varied from 
farm to farm as some landowners were obviously better supervisors than others. Labour 
was in shifts that varied with the task, and had a strong tendency to succumb to 
Parkinson’s Law and spread the work out through the shift. Only cash and kind wages for 
specific labour services were taken into account and no attempt had been made to take 
harvest gifts and land given on low rent to particular responsible labourers into account.24 
Another issue with the model was the constraint placed on free crop choice by the 
availability of irrigation. Wells, though privately owned were “virtually public 
resources”25 which could be used by any farmer who took his place in queue. However, 
the well owner enjoyed the advantage of out of turn irrigation at will; this meant that 
wheat, locally perceived as a drought prone crop automatically got acreage preference on 
the well owner’s land and farmers who didn’t own a well found it optimal to reduce wheat 
acreage. 26 
Finally, only about 40% of the produce was sent to the market, so it was unclear what 
impact market prices had on decisions; but according to Hopper, market prices were 
important as they were central to most discussions in the village. Given these issues, the 
data needed to be regarded with extreme care. Hopper made it clear that he intended to 
                                                          
22 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, p. 613. 
23 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, pp. 611-624. 
24 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, pp. 611-624. 
25 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, p. 616. 
26 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, p. 616. 
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“ignore this caution” though he implored the reader to keep the same in mind while 
interpreting his results. 27 
There were issues in Hopper’s conclusions beyond the ones he admitted. The study had 
been carried out between September and December when the kharif crops were harvested 
and threshed while the rabi crops were sown and irrigated as it was expected that 
allocation decisions would be made on the basis of production response, input prices, and 
expected output prices at this time of “scarcity pressure on resources”. 28 There was 
however no reason to conclude that farmers would exhibit the same care in other seasons. 
Moreover, Hopper’s research gave no indication as to whether the entire stock of the 
identified resources such as labour and bullock power being used to the fullest extent of 
their availability. It is questionable whether the findings suggested that traditional 
agriculture was efficient in general. At best the farmers merely allocated their known 
resources to 4 different crops efficiently, and in no way did the findings suggest that (say) 
traditional wheat production was efficient in itself.  
Hopper did not attempt to take his analysis too far or to forcefully suggest that his specific 
finding was a general trend; indeed while a footnote pointed that the conditions of 
Senapur were typical of the Indo-Gangetic plains, the title of his paper referred “a 
traditional Indian Agriculture” (emphasis added) rather than “traditional Indian 
Agriculture” or even just “traditional agriculture”. 29 While he finished his Ph.D. in 1957 
and produced an early draft of this paper, it was only in 1965 that he published it in a 
journal, even as a continued to publish other work. Had he not presented his work at a 
seminar at the University of Chicago in 1957 where it was heard by Theodore Schultz,  it 
is unlikely that the Senapur study would have made a major impact on the world of 
economics, let alone shape policy thinking as it did. 
David Hopper later joined the Ford Foundation in India and was a very influential advisor 
on agricultural policy to the Government of India and played an important role in the 
evolution of the country’s New Agricultural Strategy.  
Poor but Efficient? 
                                                          
27 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, p. 617. 
28 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, pp. 611-624. 
29 Hopper, "Allocation Efficiency”, p. 611. 
 Chapter 5: Transforming Traditional Agriculture  
160 
 
Early intellectual critique of the postwar consensus in Third-World economic 
development came from Theodore Schultz and his students. Schultz was a South Dakota 
farmboy who earned a doctorate from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1930 on 
the theoretical aspects of the relationship between tariffs and feed grain production. He 
taught at the Iowa State College until 1943 after which he moved to the University of 
Chicago where he served as the chair of economics between 1946 and 1961, and became 
president of the American Economic Association in 1960.30 
Schultz and his students began to work on Third-World agricultural development in the 
late 1950s. In 1961, Raj Krishna (an Indian student of Schultz) used Punjab as a case 
study in his Ph.D. thesis to argue that poor world farmers were rational and responded to 
price movements.31 In the same year, Schultz used the case of the post First World War 
Influenza Epidemic in India (because of which urban India saw higher population growth 
than rural India) to argue against the theory of surplus labour. This foray into development 
economics culminated in 1964 with the publication 1964 of Schultz’s influential book 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture.32  
Transforming Traditional Agriculture was published as one in a series by The Inter 
University Committee on Comparative Economics with support from the Ford 
Foundation. According to the series foreword, “Comparative economics” had thus far 
consisted of a “botanical classification of national economies into a few loosely labelled 
boxes”; it was usually asserted “that “Western Economics” has only limited analytical 
value” in new nations struggling towards economic independence.33 Schultz book 
challenged this and other ideas that then constituted the economic orthodoxy. 
Schultz began, 
The man who farms as his forefathers did cannot produce much food no matter 
how rich the land or how hard he works. The farmer who has access to and knows 
how to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals and machines can 
                                                          
30 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Theodore William Schultz", accessed August 
24, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Theodore-Schultz 
31 Quoted in T.J. Byres, “Agricultural Development”, p. 238. Also see Raj Krishna, “Farm 
Supply Response in India-Pakistan: A Case Study of the Punjab Region”, Economic 
Journal (1963) 73: 477-87. 
32 Schultz, Transforming. 
33 Abram Bergson, Arthur R. Burns, Kermit Gordon, Richard Musgrave, William 
Nicholls, Lloyd Reynolds, “Foreword” in Schultz, Transforming, pp. v-vi. 
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produce an abundance of food though the land be poor… the knowledge that 
makes this transformation possible is a form of capital. 34 
According to Schultz, transforming niggardly agriculture was about investment, and what 
was needed was an understanding of what form this investment must take. But economists 
and countries, had put agriculture aside in favour of industrialization. Economists lacked 
an understanding of agriculture, as studies of the same had been restricted to rich 
countries; there they had chosen to confront all manner of problems except the economics 
of growth. The study of traditional agriculture in poor countries had been left to 
anthropologists who had contributed little of use to policy.35 According to Schultz, it was 
wrong to blame the niggardliness of traditional agriculture on cultural values relating to 
work, thrift, industriousness and aspirations for a better life when “a simple economic 
explanation would suffice”. 36 
He went on to propose that there were few inefficiencies in the allocation of the factors 
of production in traditional agriculture. This he did using two case studies; one of 
Panajchel in Guatemala by the anthropologist Sol Tax and David Hopper’s Senapur 
study. In what would become a very famous phrase, the latter, as yet unpublished (and 
shorn of Hopper’s many disclaimers) work was used by Schultz to claim that the farmer 
                                                          
34 Schultz, Transforming, p. 3. 
35 This was a stark misunderstanding on Schultz’s part, for the economics of agriculture 
had been long studied in India; there were enough professionals as early as 1939 to form 
an Indian Society of Agricultural Economics and some of India’s finest minds had applied 
themselves to the problem. Besides research within universities, in the early 1950s India 
had set up a network of Agro-Economic Research Centres to explore the regional 
dimensions of agricultural economics. Many Indians went abroad to study the discipline, 
some on government scholarships; indeed there were several articles in farm economics 
journals on how to best train this new deluge of students from developing countries. See 
for example Kenneth H. Parsons, "U.S. Training for Foreign Students in Agricultural 
Economics", Journal of Farm Economics (1957) 39:235-249. Schultz himself had guided 
at least 2 students who worked on topic related to Indian agriculture before writing the 
book; Uma Lele, who left to continue her studies at Cornell and the aforementioned Raj 
Krishna who obtained his Ph.D. on the economics of farming in Punjab in 1961 and 
famously coined the phrase “Hindu Rate of Growth” to describe the Indian economy 
under the license-permit-quota raj. Indeed when Schultzian ideas were applied in India, 
there would be a large contingent of Indian agricultural economists well qualified to 
evaluate them. See for example, V. M. Dandekar, "Transforming Traditional Agriculture: 
A Critique of Professor Schultz", Economic and Political Weekly (1966) 1:25-36 and S. 
N. Mishra, "Transforming Traditional Agriculture: Comments on Dandekar's Critique of 
Schultz: I", Economic and Political Weekly (1966) 1:799-802. 
36 Schultz, Transforming, p. 7. 
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in the developing country was “poor but efficient” (Guatemala was “very poor but 
efficient”). Schultz found it “not feasible” to show that these two villages were typical of 
the poor world but as his thesis was a “proposition likely to be widely useful”, 37 he went 
on to develop its implications, two of which were very significant. As farmers were 
rational, they would respond to high prices by producing more and adopting profitable 
new technologies. The second was that given diminishing marginal returns, as traditional 
factors were already being used to the optimum, cheap growth in agriculture could only 
come from modern inputs that would come from research. Plant breeding was particularly 
important and he gave the example of the work being done by the Rockefeller 
Foundation.38 
In Schultz’s prescription, investment in human capital was important; education would 
enable farmers to use new technology. Beyond this more general point, it was important 
to increase the stock of highly skilled workers such as scientists. Old Ricardian ideas 
about land had been rendered irrelevant; land was “over rated” and through research, 
“substitutes for cropland” could be discovered. 39 Investment in human capital was thus 
important to increase the agricultural research capacity of nations. As agricultural firms 
were too small for individual research, investment in science was the responsibility of the 
state.40  
As I will show, these ideas about incentives for a profit-maximizing farmer, and 
agricultural science to enable that profit proved to be very influential in the formulation 
of the New Agricultural Strategy in India. The Agriculture Secretary B. Sivaraman would 
claim that the New Agricultural Strategy was based on “basic assumptions about human 
motivations”; that the peasant was moved by a rational drive for profit. 41 
 
 
                                                          
37 Schultz, Transforming, p. 123. 
38 Schultz, Transforming, p. 141. 
39 See Theodore W. Schultz, "The Economics of Being Poor", Nobel Prize Lecture, 
1979, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1979/schultz-lecture.html accessed online on 17th February 2015. 
40 Schultz, "Being Poor”. 
41 B. Sivaraman, Address by Shri B. Sivaraman on Collector's Role in Indian Agriculture 
at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, on 14th May, 1970 (New Delhi, 
1970), p.7. 
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A New Agricultural Policy for India 
In the mid-1960s, India’s agricultural policy saw a drastic change. Floor, rather than 
ceiling prices were introduced and the high prices were to largely go to the farmer; the 
money was to come partly from higher consumer prices and partly from state subsidies 
through heavy management of the foodgrain economy. These policies were largely 
implemented in regions where the state machinery was well developed. Within these 
areas, this policy, which rested on expensive inputs and private capital investment was 
targeted largely at big farmers. How did this change come about? 
The 1960s was time of economic crisis in India. With just one plan (the second five year 
plan) having been substantially formulated by the Planning Commission and completed, 
planning in India began to fall apart. There were several reasons for this. Based on a 
promise from the World Bank, the Third Plan had placed a substantial reliance on foreign 
aid (30% of the outlay compared to 10% in the First Plan and 24% in the Second Plan); 
this was not forthcoming. The 1962 war with China and the 1965 was with Pakistan had 
led to a doubling of defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP from 2% to 4%. Such 
were the pressures on public finances that the years between 1966 and 1969 saw a “Plan 
Holiday” when long-term planning itself was suspended.42 
 Agriculture remained weather dependent, and the early 60s saw severe drought.  There 
was a drought in 1961-62 but a year of good monsoon in 1964-65 brought foodgrain 
production to an all-time high of 89 million tonnes. The next two years saw severe 
drought which reduced production to 72.3 and 75.9 million tonnes respectively.43 The 
prediction of the 1959 Ford Foundation Report India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It, 
which argued that population growth would outstrip food production44 appeared to be 
coming true.  
In addition to this economic crisis, there was much political instability at the highest levels 
of government. Nehru passed away in 1964 and was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri 
who was did not share his industry-first bias and was amenable to the pressures of state 
                                                          
42 See Banerjee, Economic Planning, pp. 83-102. 
43 From Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area, Production and 
Yield of Principal Crops in India (New Delhi, 1970). 
44 Agricultural Production Team (Ford Foundation) and Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, Report on India's food crisis & steps to meet it (New Delhi, 1959). 
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bosses and big business. After less than two years at the helm, Shastri too passed away 
and Indira Gandhi took over. Shastri appointed C. Subramaniam as Agriculture Minister; 
appointed at a time of crisis, even Subramaniam feared he had fallen into a political trap 
set by the Prime Minister, for the portfolio “had been the Waterloo” of many a political 
career. 45 
Chidambaram Subramaniam was a Madras politician who had started his national career 
in 1962 when Nehru had appointed him to the Steel Ministry. He had been known for 
making “technocratic” decisions in that position, for example by appointing engineers 
rather than bureaucrats to head steel plants. According to Subramaniam, having 
previously worked with industry, he was able to look at agriculture from a new 
perspective. No industry could succeed if it was not profitable, and he came to the 
conclusion that agriculture was a losing proposition for the farmer as a result of price 
policies put in place during the Second World War. Consequently, most investment in 
agriculture, (such as irrigation) had been made by the government rather than the private 
sector. He proposed a “radical change in price policy” which was opposed by the finance 
minister TT Krishnamachari who remained suspicious of high prices and favoured “other 
incentives”. 46 The PM appointed LK Jha, the Cabinet Secretary to go into the matter and 
a 15% increase in prices was agreed to in October 1964. More crucially, a permanent 
Agricultural Prices Commission was set up in in January 1965 to determine a fair 
incentive price for rice and wheat taking the cost of cultivation; 47 this has played the role 
of (officially at least) an independent expert arbiter between urban-industrial and rural-
agricultural interests since then. An early member of the Commission was Schultz’s 
aforementioned student Raj Krishna who had just returned to India.  
If indeed there was a food crisis in India, the second change that Subramaniam brought 
about did more to solve it than perhaps any other technology or policy change of the 
Green Revolution.  According to him, a price policy had no meaning if the state’s physical 
capacity to trade in the market was limited; farmers were under pressure to sell at low 
prices right after the harvest, so traders were in a position to depress prices. A Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) was set up in 1965 with an initial mandate to procure at least 
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46 Subramaniam, New strategy, p. 14. 
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10% of the output. The target took some time to meet, as the logistical infrastructure took 
time to build; in fact a new company called the Central Warehousing Corporation had to 
be set up to design and build storage. In the case of rice, modern rice mills also had to be 
set up at the FCI’s initiative. These measures “became necessary as a chain”, one after 
the other. 48 Despite these difficulties, the procurement of food grains increased from 1.43 
million tonnes in 1964 to 4.03 million tonnes in the next year,49 a statistical leap 
unparalleled by any production growth.  
The veteran journalist Prem Shankar Jha gives an interesting account of early 
procurement operations. The government would target certain districts and even entire 
states such as Punjab, and would throw a security cordon around them at harvest time to 
prevent grain from moving out. Prices fell as a result, and the government could easily 
buy much of the produce from the farmer at a price that was low but much higher than 
what they would have gotten from private traders. By 1971, a fifth of the total wheat 
production was being purchased by the government.50 The FCI soon became one of the 
world’s largest logistical operations; in 2008-09, the FCI and state agencies procured 
nearly 33 million tonnes of paddy, 23 million tonnes of wheat and 14 million tonnes of 
coarse grains.51 
The procured foodgrain was to provide for a buffer stock against price fluctuations and 
to be sold in cities and deficit areas at a reasonable price; this entailed heavy subsidies. In 
the late 1970s, wheat was procured at Rs. 200 per ton and rice at Rs. 100.  Distribution 
costs varied between Rs. 148 and Rs. 234 per tonne. To keep grain cheap, the FCI 
received a consumer subsidy of between Rs. 246 and Rs. 298 per ton while selling to the 
state governments. This was in addition to a reimbursement of the cost of carrying a buffer 
stock for bad years of about Rs. 250 per ton.52 In addition, some state governments 
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introduced their own subsidies while selling to the consumer through the ration shops of 
the Public Distribution System (PDS).  
As is well known but not adequately emphasized, the procurement of grain for the cities 
from the countryside and distributing it cheap was at least as important a problem as 
production alone. The PL 480 food aid that India got from the United States from the 
mid-1950s onwards had thus been extremely important not just in the quantities it 
supplied but also in the fact that it was entirely within the government’s control and could 
form the backbone of rationed supply in the cities.53 It was not just increased production 
but also the setting up of the FCI which enabled India to dispense with imports altogether 
by 1975.  
From the late 1970s onwards, cheap government grains started making their way to the 
rural poor as well, initially through specialized food-for-work programmes and later, 
through the gradual ruralisation of the PDS itself.  Such programmes provided significant 
(albeit limited) security to the rural poor as real their incomes declined in large parts of 
India.54 Significantly, in 1980 Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Commission on World Hunger 
would note that India was the "only developing country in the world which has built a 
solid system of food security";55 emphasizing the more complex idea of food security 
rather than increased production alone. 
Technology and the New Strategy 
In his account of the New Agricultural Strategy, it is only after the discussion of these 
two crucial steps, followed by the food import policy does Subramaniam come to science, 
though it takes up most of the rest of the book. He called for scientists from the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute and spoke of the encounter in his first public speech as 
Agriculture Minister at an agricultural university in his hometown, Coimbatore, 
I heard a tale of woe that the agricultural scientists were considered as second 
class or third class scientists and therefore their scales of pay and their status was 
only on that level. This would naturally mean that second class or third class 
                                                          
53 Nilakanth Rath and V.S. Patvardhan, Impact of Assistance under PL 480 on Indian 
Economy (Pune, India, 1967), p. 13. 
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scientists alone would come to the agricultural scientists' position. Therefore I 
immediately asked department to put up proposals for the revisions of the scale of 
pay of the agricultural scientists' … My attempt has thus been to give a new status 
and the recognition of that status to agricultural scientists…56 
There is thus no indication that scientists proposed any revolutionary or gradual 
technologies to Subramaniam which had been resisted by the political class earlier; in fact 
Subramaniam was inadvertently suggesting that they were “third class scientists”. 
Subramaniam indeed did much to reorganize agricultural science in India and to give it 
“a new status”. But by his own account as mentioned in Chapter 1, it was Dr. Ralph 
Cummings of the Rockefeller Foundation (which had developed the technology) who 
brought him “the message of the new seeds” in October 1964, complaining that Indian 
scientists were resisting the spread of these seeds to the farmers’ fields. 57 
In terms of expensive new technology, fertilizer was really the kingpin. It was to study 
the problems of fertilizer distribution in early 1965 that Subramaniam first brought in 
fellow Tamil B. Sivaraman. An IAS officer of the Orissa cadre, he was soon elevated to 
the position of Agriculture Secretary and was to play a central role in India’s agricultural 
policy. Fertilizers distribution had thus far been the monopoly of cooperatives and 
according to Sivaraman, much of their quota was diverted into the black market; 
cooperatives “were as liable to black markets as free market systems”. He recommended 
an end to the monopoly, confident that establishing a new privately-led system would 
expose the ineffectiveness of the cooperative system.58 As I will show, perceived 
inefficiencies and corruption of public and community institutions was central to other 
policy changes as well. 
To establish that chemical fertilizers were better than organic ones was a difficult task. 
Writing in 1979 nearly a decade and a half after the New Strategy was introduced, the 
only argument that Subramaniam could come up with was that more tonnes of waste 
would be required than available. In addition, timing of fertilizer application was 
important in high-yielding agriculture; while several tonnes could be applied before 
sowing, applications of such a large mass later in the growth cycle would “drown the 
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crop”. 59 This was a specious argument, for countries with an animal-to–land ratio lesser 
than India’s had managed to raise production through the careful conservation of all 
waste; both the Chinese and the Japanese managed to apply much organic fertilizer 
throughout the plant growth cycle without drowning the crop.60  In any case, the intense 
study of the agronomy of dwarf wheat in the late 1960s would show that at low fertilizer 
dosages, a single dose at sowing time was more effective than a split one, and at very high 
doses, the loss in yield due non-optimal timing was less than 10%.61 It is questionable 
whether such a low difference in yields was worth the massive disruption that fertilizer 
imports were expected to cause in the Indian economy. 
Sivaraman was faced with the task of creating a political atmosphere in favour of fertilizer 
imports to influence the Finance Minister TT Krishnamachari to release foreign 
exchange; the latter was of the view that precious foreign exchange should be reserved 
for industrialization. His efforts were not helped by the widely held view that organic 
manures were not only cheap but also better as long as the farmer could be convinced to 
use them. Sivaraman was incensed that the UP government invited MS Sivaraman, an 
older IAS officer to lecture on the benefits of green manure; this apparently proved a great 
hindrance. To B. Sivaraman, MS Sivaraman was a perfect example of "experts who had 
established their credentials long ago in their field but had lost their capacity to advice by 
failing to update their knowledge and basking in past achievements".62 To create a 
favourable atmosphere, Sivaraman fell back on the IAS old boy network. He told Manzur 
Alam Quereishi, the Development Commissioner of UP to “coach” a group of provincial 
legislators on the merits of chemical fertilizers and take them to see Prime Minister 
Shastri. At the same time, he rung up the Prime Minister’s secretary LK Jha, told him 
about the fertilizer problem. The latter told him to prepare a note and appear before the 
cabinet; this apparently breached the protocol on how notes were taken to the cabinet. 
Fortuitously for Sivaraman and Subramaniam, TT Krishnamachari’s political career 
ended over a minor corruption scandal within weeks. 63 The new Finance Minister 
Sachindra Chaudhuri, a man who had previously held no ministerial position, was, by 
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Subramaniam’s account, “more open to influence”. 64 Sivaraman got the necessary 
foreign exchange allocation for fertilizer, while his minister remained a silent spectator, 
having smelt that political intervention “would be fatal.” 65 Thus the basic elements of a 
new agriculture, with higher prices as incentive and fertilizer as technology, together with 
a system of procurement was in place by late 1965.  
The Bell Mission 
The Subramaniam-Sivaraman account of the agricultural policy changes predictably 
emphasize that the new ideas came from within the government of India (mostly 
themselves). But western economists employed by USAID and the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations in India were influential policy advisors; so influential in fact that by 
Sivaraman’s own account, C Subramaniam had selected him at the advice of the Ford 
Foundation. 66 These experts were often consulted on everyday matters; for example as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, when Indian economists produced a devastating public critique 
of the fertilizer allocation policy, it was to David Hopper that Sivaraman turned to for 
advice on the government’s response. Both Subramaniam and Sivaraman formed lasting 
friendships with foreign advisors; Subramaniam’s account of the New Agricultural 
Strategy’s evolution was written as a research visitor at the Australian National University 
at the invitation of its Vice Chancellor J.G. Crawford who wrote the foreword to the book 
and B. Sivaraman also mention his close friendship with Crawford in his memoirs.67  An 
Australian economist and civil servant, Crawford had first met Subramaniam and 
Sivaraman as the head of the agricultural team of the Bell Mission, an important group of 
experts sent by the World Bank to study India’s economic development effort. Other 
members included Wolf Ladejinsky, an eminent American land reform specialist, L. 
Garnier and Louis Goreaux of the FAO in addition to David Hopper. The team spent 
many months in India in 1964-65 just as Subramaniam was cutting his teeth in his new 
portfolio; according to Francine Frankel, he was impressed by their recommendations 
which played an important role in policy formation.68 
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While the primary objective of the Bell Mission was to appraise the upcoming Fourth 
Five Year Plan, the study was motivated “by the fact that all is not well with the Indian 
development effort”, 69 reflecting the growing sense of India as a basket case. Preparatory 
as the fifteen volume report might have been to the subsequent events such as the 
devaluation of the rupee, an IMF bailout in 1966, a general liberalization of the economy 
and the suspension of Five Year Planning itself for three years due to a state of economic 
emergency, it drew attention to the fact that agriculture above all had the potential to make 
or break the development of the other sectors; reflecting the new primacy of agriculture, 
rather than industry in development thought. 
The mission had to first prove that Indian agriculture was a poor performer. Official 
statistics put the rate of growth of foodgrain output in the 1950s at an impressive 4%. 
Casting aspersions on the nature of the data, the mission assessed the growth rate to be 
much lower; David Hopper wrote an extensive appendix to statistically test the hypothesis 
that “growth is declining” which left him with a “profound sense of pessimism”.70 The 
real extent of Hopper’s pessimism is unknown; in a 2004 oral history transcript, he said 
that Indian states of the era actually under-reported production to lobby for central 
government largesse.71 This creation of a sense of crisis by western experts had actually 
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begun at least as early as 1959 with the Ford Foundation report ominously titled India’s 
Food Crisis and Steps to Meet it. 72 Daniel Thorner, an American economist who had 
ended up in India as a result of a McCarthy era job loss said that a reading of the report 
might give one the erroneous notion that India was facing a famine of the 1876-78 scale. 
To him, the Ford Team’s was a “strategy of terror” designed to create a “statistically 
contrived food crisis” in order to shatter public confidence; one that would kill Indian 
industrialization by forcing it to turn “lathes into ploughshares”.73 
Having established that there was a crisis, according to the World Bank mission, its larger 
cause was the fact that since planning had begun, the terms of trade had moved against 
the farmer; this was exemplified with the cost of nitrogenous fertilizer. It extolled the 
benefit of high floor prices and argued against controlling prices by fiat. It saw the 
immediate crisis of high consumer prices as driven by short term speculation and 
consumer behaviour and argued for the creation of a buffer stock to increase consumer 
confidence. But the report was less focussed on food alone and called for floor prices to 
operate in the cash crop economy as well, to mitigate the risk of a shift in the cropping 
pattern away from cash crops and recommended that floor prices operate there as well.74 
As I showed in Chapter 1, there was indeed a shift away from cash crops, but an equally 
crucial factor in increasing food production was be a shift within the foodgrain sector 
towards wheat became the most remunerative crop.  
Fertilizer being most important short term factor, the mission called for a subsidy to 
incentivize fertilizer use. Impressed by the ability of the Indian farmer to innovate by 
adopting fertilizer, the report quoted a lecture given by Hopper and argued that contrary 
to the assumptions of the social science literature on India, Indian farmers would be 
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responsive to scientific methods; if the Indian cultivator had not taken to scientific 
agriculture, the answer lay in more scientific research and inputs. 75 
The report quoted Schultz’s very recent book on the differences in productivity between 
Japan and India. By its estimate, a growth rate of 2.5-3% was achievable by modest 
increases in fertilizer and irrigation. But to reach 5% or more as Indian planners targeted, 
there had to be a “many sided technological advance” through larger application of 
science and technology. 76 It was not quite clear in the report what this new technology 
was to be.  While the development of new fertilizer responsive varieties suitable for Indian 
conditions was to be an important outcome of research, the report also emphasized better 
water management, as well as high quality seeds of existing varieties. 77 
The Treaty of Rome 
Besides the influential advice of these economists, there were other external pressures 
pushing for greater resources to be devoted to agriculture. India’s need for food imports 
was used by Lyndon Johnson to shape her agricultural policy, by (among other things) 
committing only to monthly, rather than annual grain shipments; India was living “ship 
to mouth.” The American pressures culminated in a secret agreement between C. 
Subramaniam and Orville Freeman, the American Secretary of Agriculture at the side 
lines of an FAO meeting in November 1965; this was the famous “Treaty of Rome”.  
Arguing that there was a “disturbing downward trend” in per capita food production, the 
document required the Fourth Five Year Plan to double the investment in agriculture. The 
text of the treaty went so far as to specify that Prime Ministerial speeches were “to 
dramatize and mobilize public sentiment to demonstrate the urgency of action in 
agriculture”. 78 This indeed happened within weeks when Shastri coined the slogan “Jai 
Jawan, Jai Kisan” (Victory to the Soldier, Victory to the Peasant) during the India 
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Pakistan war of 1965 which historians have seen as a crucial linking of food with national 
security which greatly enthused the nation. 79 
Fertilizer policy was at the core of the treaty which required the government to publicly 
endorse an ambitious five year target for fertilizer consumption. To stimulate private 
investment in fertilizer production, the government was to commit to buy any excess 
production at world market prices. It was to reduce its monopoly on fertilizer supply and 
distribution was also to be left in private hands. Procedural modifications were to be made 
in the process of licensing foreign fertilizer firms to shorten the time required for 
negotiations, and a Prime Minister led cabinet level committee was to deal with 
bureaucratic hurdles in licensing. Government participation in fertilizer ventures was to 
be made non-mandatory. 80 
When news of a secret treaty was leaked to the Indian press, Subramaniam claimed that 
these were steps that the government was already taking and the Treaty was merely 
Lyndon Johnson’s way of showing Congress that he was turning the screws on India.81 
This was true to a large degree. But it is important to emphasize that the treaty merely set 
in stone what the Americans had been long pressing for, and it is likely that US pressure 
played a more important role in policy events than Subramaniam was willing to admit. 
For the treaty had many specific and detailed clauses; among them were commitment to 
the new seeds.  
The treaty specified that 32 million acres “of the most productive land farmed by the more 
efficient farmers” was to be devoted to “new fertilizer responsive varieties” which were 
to be planted on the “best irrigated land” applying 100 to 150 pounds of fertilizer per acre; 
this land was to get fertilizer even if cutbacks were required in other areas. 82 As I showed 
in Chapter 1, influential Indian scientists and economists provided good reasons against 
both the adoption of the new varieties and the concentration of all fertilizer on them; and 
it is likely that American pressure played an important role in riding roughshod over all 
objections. 
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The psychological Impact 
But American pressure was not the only reason for the choice of the inefficient dwarf 
varieties. The plant breeders were understandably obsessed with high yields. This was 
not just about a technical achievement; Norman Borlaug wanted to achieve a 
psychological impact to shake the Indian peasant of his old ways with demonstrations 
“spectacular and shocking to both farmers and government officials”, 
We want to kill old ideas and methods, and substitute dynamic new methods in 
one stroke. We want these first semi-commercial demonstrations to be so 
shocking that they will destroy old ideas of wheat production at one sweep.83 
Indian scientists such as Dr. Satya Prakash Kohli, the co-ordinator of the All India Wheat 
Improvement Programme also set great store by “psychological considerations” as he 
revealed in a 1969 interview. According to Kohli, there had been a “hot debate” between 
scientific “hawks” and bureaucratic “doves”. While the latter wanted to merely go in for 
fertilizers without the HYVs and spread the gains over a large area, the former wanted to 
concentrate both in a small area with assured irrigation and “progressive farmers”. The 
hawks were motivated by “psychological considerations”; spectacular results would 
convince “the most tradition bound farmer that his small holding could give him a decent 
standard of living, provided he was ready to follow the new strategy”.84  
This psychological impact was orchestrated by heavy propaganda. Farmers on the rural 
fringes of Delhi were said to have produced implausibly high yields not even achieved 
on research plots; Pandit Govardhan allowed demonstrations on his one hectare plot 
which netted him Rs. 5000 with a reputed yield of six tonnes as against a normal two, and 
Mahendar Pal Singh became a lakhpati by “gambling” with planting his entire 126 hectare 
holding with Mexican seeds and harvesting a world record yield of 8.4 t/ha. 85 They 
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became overnight celebrities visited by VIPs and journalists (and Dr. Borlaug). Such high 
yields needed the new seeds to even be believable; as Dr. M. S. Swaminathan tellingly 
wrote in 1967, had a student of agriculture answered 50 maunds (1850 kg/ha) when asked 
in 1963 about how high wheat yields could be, the college principal would have failed 
him. But with the new varieties, he would not be able to dismiss the answer even if the 
student answered 150 maunds (5550 kg/ha).86 Attaining the spectacular was seen as 
important, as Dr. Borlaug noted in 1969, 
Such spectacular increases in yield destroy, in one stroke, the built-in 
conservatism or resistance to change that has been passed on from father to son 
for many generations in a system of traditional agriculture. Such news spreads 
fast. It is now clear that the rate of adoption of new technology into a traditional 
agriculture is directly proportionate to the magnitude of yield change 
demonstrated, assuming a favourable price-cost relationship.  
The importance of this psychological factor has been overlooked previously by 
scientists, economists, planners, extension specialists and top government 
officials. In the early stages of making the transplant, the plant scientists were 
forced to justify before "economic sociologists" the use of 120 pounds of nitrogen 
per acre on 400,000 acres rather than 40 pounds on 1,200,000 acres. This battle 
of resource allocation was won and the strategy saved ten years in the spread of 
new wheats and the new technology.87 
The simplicity of this idea of a rational, hungry-for-profit farmer was particularly 
seductive for policy makers as William Gaud, the USAID administrator who had coined 
the term “Green Revolution” crudely put it, 
The normally complicated business of development - how to get a country to 
develop, how to get people to change their attitudes- suddenly came down to a 
very simple proposition: one man seeing his neighbour doing better than what he 
was doing.88 
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The real motive of course was to popularize fertilizers; as Dr. Borlaug wrote to the 
representative of a Rockefeller group fertilizer company, the farmers of the developing 
world “would soon start clamouring for fertilizers”. 89 Kohli credited Dr. M.S. 
Swaminathan and Dr. B.P. Pal with convincing the doves and the new strategy committed 
the government to large-scale imports large of fertilizer; this he termed a fitting example 
of the “interaction of science with politics”. 90 Of course, the new Agriculture Minister C. 
Subramaniam had always been an enthusiast for a technocratic agricultural strategy and 
it is unlikely that the new seeds played an important role in the fertilizer import strategy. 
The new seeds also did not prove to be a stepping stone for farmers to start using 
fertilizers; for example, Bihar had as much area planted to HYV wheat as Punjab by the 
early 1970s, but the total fertilizer consumption in the late 1970s was less than what the 
single Punjabi district of Ludhiana consumed way back in 1965.91 
Starting from a low base, the dwarf varieties had a steep curve of yield versus fertilizer 
dosage while tall varieties started from a high base, and a thus had less steep curve. If one 
were measuring the marginal return to fertilizer application rather than the total yield for 
a given dosage, the same would be higher for the dwarf wheats. Hence once the farmer 
was convinced to adopt the dwarfs, every additional unit of nitrogen would be extremely 
profitable, incentivizing the use of fertilizer; even as higher yields could be achieved with 
tall Indian varieties. And persuasion to use the dwarf varieties in at least some cases 
amounted to coercion; in a rice-growing district, researchers found that the supply of 
subsidized fertilizer was made contingent on a commitment to cultivate HYVs and it is 
likely that this was a widespread practice.92  
Abstract studies of profitability from the period would usually focus on the marginal 
return rather than the total yield and hence did not shed light on the issue. Even so, 
strangely a Rockefeller Foundation funded study of wheat production in Punjab during 
the miracle 1967-68 crop year found that the marginal product of fertilizer application to 
old wheat was thrice as high as the new wheats. This was quickly explained away as 
suggestive of a “yield ceiling”; the “seemingly unreasonable” figure was not to denote 
                                                          
89 As quoted in Madhumita Saha, State policy, p. 213. 
90 Times of India January 26th 1969.  
91 For a comparative study of wheat farming in Punjab and Bihar, see Kusum Nair, In 
Defense of the Irrational Peasant: Indian Agriculture after the Green Revolution (New 
Delhi, 1979). 
92 Green Revolution?: The Impact of High Yielding Varieties of Rice in South Asia.  
 Chapter 5: Transforming Traditional Agriculture  
177 
 
any “irrationality” on the part of the producers or “the possibility of increasing the output 
of old wheat by increased fertilization”.93 
Progressive farmers, limitations of state action and the fallacy of scale neutrality  
For the politicians such as the agriculture minister C. Subramaniam the new varieties 
served as cover for the larger changes he was bringing about in India’s economy. These 
were the introduction of remunerative prices to incentivize higher production, investment 
in fertilizer, agricultural subsidies (for fertilizers and tubewells) and a concentration of 
agricultural investment in some regions and large farmers within those regions. These 
represented drastic shifts. Remunerative prices meant an abandonment of the policy of 
securing cheap food for an industrial workforce and a shift of resources from industry to 
agriculture. It was also an acknowledgment that the Indian peasant would respond to 
market incentives, a discomfiting idea not just for Indian socialists but also for many of 
the best western economists. Massive import of fertilizer would have foreign exchange 
implications for industry and increased domestic production of fertilizer would divert 
resources from industries such as steel, which were to form the industrial base. A 
concentration of inputs was unacceptable to Gandhians, Nehruvians and socialists alike. 
Francine Frankel suggests that the claim of having found a “scientific formula; a 
calculated plan for increased production” strengthened Subramaniam’s hand in the food 
debate.94 
The advantages of solving the lodging problem (if indeed it existed) and concentrating 
resources however inefficiently amongst farmers in a small region went beyond the 
rhetorical. This was so as the New Agricultural Strategy was a gigantic logistical exercise. 
Even during the IADP days when inputs were available to a mere seven of the best 
endowed districts, cooperatives lacked staff and suitable buildings for storing fertilizer; it 
was impossible to make available fertilizer “within bullock-cart distance of each 
farmer”.95 Roads were unpassable during monsoon and improvements to the credit system 
were slow. New agricultural staff had to be recruited and the entire district administration 
had to be reoriented towards agricultural production. As an official study of the IADP 
experience pointed out, the availability of modern technology had necessitated “drastic 
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administrative changes” in the IADP districts which would be hard to actuate in other 
areas. 96 Indeed, complaints about the availability of seed and fertilizer would last well 
into the 1970s. The same issues applied at the output end; indeed the imagery of a 1968 
harvest so huge that it had to be stored in schools, cinema halls and government buildings 
has contributed significantly to Green-Revolution mythology. 97 The government had 
committed to buying produce at a minimum support price through the newly set up Food 
Corporation of India; this too was a gigantic logistical challenge. The government had a 
monopoly in the interstate movement of food grains, it would to purchase from farmers 
and supply to the Public Distribution System in other states. Rice being India’s most 
important crop, the FCI’s first district office was set up in Thanjavur, the rice bowl of 
Tamil Nadu. The bulk of its procurement operations moved to Punjab as wheat became 
an increasingly important crop. Punjab soon became the largest contributor of not just 
wheat, but also rice to the central foodgrain pool, thereby greatly enabling easy operation 
of the national food system.98  
Similar considerations operated in justifying concentration of resources on larger farms 
within the region. For example, extension services were limited. Thus for all the professed 
faith in the universal rationality of the peasant, it was acknowledged that there was a breed 
of “progressive farmers” who were more amenable to technology change. The Bell 
Mission had noted David Hopper’s conjecture that farmers with 20-25 acres of land were 
most responsive to extension efforts and thus recommended that they be especially 
targeted. 99 Progressiveness of farmers of this size class perhaps had to do with their larger 
risk taking capacity and easier access to resources such as credit. While officially, state 
and public resources were available to all who requested it, the results of such an 
underlying bias were clear very quickly.  
The package of technologies which constituted the Green Revolution (seeds, fertilizers 
and assured water supply) was ostensibly “scale neutral” and this was often emphasized 
by enthusiasts. While this claim overlooked the active policy of irrigation-expansion 
through encouragement of private tubewells (an indivisible input linked to a minimum 
viable farm size), the limits to scale neutrality went beyond tubewells alone. By the early 
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1970s, even Sivaraman had to acknowledge that it was a fallacy to assume that “scientific 
agriculture is neutral to scale”. 100 He argued that while marginal farmers had not 
benefited at all, both scientific evidence and statistical field study had shown that as long 
as marginal farmers could get inputs on time, they made the same productivity gains as 
large farmers. Credit was a bottleneck; while official criteria for loans had been changed 
from credit worthiness of the borrower to credit worthiness of the scheme in question, 
there were few noticeable results. Administrators felt that in universal schemes of credit, 
fertilizers and extension, rural social structures enabled large farmers to pre-empt 
services; yet, the Small Farmer Development Agencies founded to exclusively serve the 
poor had also shown disappointing results. Sivaraman blamed continuing problems with 
credit and unequal access to communal services such as irrigation and drainage; the 
powerful were able to take unfair share of water and disrupt the drainage of small fields 
by encroaching on drainage structures.101 Thus a production programme based on 
spectacular yields of a few may be seen as an acknowledgment of the inability of the state 
to take on the interests of the rural rich and ensure equitable resource use to benefit all. 
The Irrational Peasant? 
Faith in peasant rationality had a curious career during the “Green Revolution”. Perhaps 
the greatest irony was that the large land owning Thakurs of eastern India, on whom 
Schultz’s theory was based seemingly never responded to new incentives to change their 
methods or increase production. On the contrary, any increase in production was confined 
to the (relatively more) egalitarian society of Punjab. There was no evidence that all 
farmers responded similarly to incentives and even the seeming success of the Green 
Revolution would be accompanied by the resurgence of a narrative about a special 
creature called a “progressive farmer” and his cultural roots in Punjabi history.102 
Of the “culturalists” criticized by Schultz, perhaps only one was mentioned by name; 
Kusum Nair whose influential book on the human element in India’s development had 
come out three years before his own.103 In the late 1970s, when development planners 
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had seemingly lost no faith in the absolute rationality of the peasant, despite it being 
overwhelmingly clear that the Green Revolution was confined to an increase in wheat 
production in northwestern India, Kusum Nair wrote two books attacking Schultz’s 
doctrine, titled In Defense of the Irrational Peasant and Transforming Traditionally.104 
The first book was a study of the massive contrast in wheat cultivation in Punjab and 
Bihar. Conventionally, this difference had been attributed to the fact that most of Bihar’s 
farmers were poor. But as Nair showed, that while 80% of the farmers were poor, the 
remaining 20% owned 80% of all rural assets. Indeed the top 6% of farmers cultivated 
more land than all of Punjab, and it was these farmers that Nair studied. She argued that 
their low productivity was not due to resource constraints but because of a choice they 
had made to be “grossly inefficient”. 105 Nair recommended that rather than getting caught 
up in a discourse on rational and irrational farmers, policy makers should recognize that 
there were simply good farmers and bad farmers. In other sectors such as industry, only 
the efficient and the meritorious could survive, and the government must adopt a policy 
of forcing a similar exit of bad farmers off the land. Instead of assuming that the farmer 
was driven by profit and incentivizing production through high prices (which also 
benefited the inefficient), a better policy was to impose a high tax on agriculture which 
would make it impossible to survive without high productivity.106 
By the late 1970s, the failure of “modern inputs” to make a dent in the problem of 
increasing poor world food supplies, together with the rising cost of crucial inputs such 
as fertilizer led to a quiet acknowledgment that production increases from traditional 
methods had not reached their fullest potential. The 1978 World Development Report 
mentioned that a 30% yield increase on dry land and a 50 % increase in irrigated land 
could come solely from efficient use of existing inputs and infrastructure. 107 In that 
context, Nair went into the question of fertilizer and made the crucial point that in much 
of Asia, chemical fertilizer never replaced organic fertilizer; in Japan, farmers continued 
to use massive cartloads of manure together with cheaply available chemical fertilizer, 
while in the Philippines, chemical fertilizer was perhaps the first attempt to restore soil 
fertility in any way. The global disparities in chemical fertilizer use followed precisely 
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the same trend as the disparities in manure use. Indian policy had always been to 
encourage the use of manures which the farmer never took up unlike the farmers of China 
or Japan; the number of days spent by the Chinese farmer in preparing manure was an 
order of magnitude higher than those spent by his Indian counterpart. By the 1970s, Indian 
policy makers were engaged in an attempt to remove this constraint with a scheme to 
collect and supply farmyard manure which millions of farmers in many other countries 
usually produced themselves at no cost except their own labour. 108  
Conclusion 
Policy change of the mid-1960s was driven by the ideas of Indians, western advisers 
connected with the World Bank and diplomatic pressures exerted by the Johnson 
administration. Besides the larger shift in national resources from industry to agriculture, 
this change had at its heart a faith in peasant rationality, rooted in Theodore Schultz’s 
theory of the “poor but rational” peasant. This theory implied that the peasant would 
respond to higher prices by producing and that the increased production could only come 
from new inputs rooted in research and technology.  
Together with American pressure and an infallible faith in the product of high science, 
the idea of a peasant hungry for profit played an important role in the selection of 
inefficient seed varieties to orchestrate India’s wheat revolution. In the next chapter, I 
shall explore how this idea, together with contingency and expediency shaped the 
tubewell revolution in the 1960s which was the wellspring of the remarkable growth in 
wheat yields. 
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Chapter 6: Private Pumps and the Green Revolution 
The period from the mid-1960s saw a boom in the extension most fundamental technical 
input in Indian agriculture which provided the basis for fertilizer use, namely irrigation. 
There was a largely hidden transformation in the quantity and nature of the water supply 
to Indian farmers, and at the heart of this transformation was a relatively new technology 
namely the privately-owned tubewell. In this chapter, I shall tell the story of how private 
tubewells became central to India’s Green Revolution. 
The question of water supply was central to India’s New Agricultural Strategy, and a very 
particular policy was followed: the promotion of privately-owned groundwater irrigation 
facilities was the central feature. World Bank experts felt that irrigation was a key input 
to productive agriculture in India, but saw India’s emphasis on large-scale canal irrigation 
systems and public tubewells as misplaced in that they were designed to protect the 
maximum possible number of farmers from drought by spreading water thinly over vast 
areas. These systems were seen as unable to provide for the new objectives of intensive 
water application and timely availability of water which was seen as the key to high-
yielding agriculture. The profit-maximization objective of the individual cultivator which 
was placed at the centre the drive for higher production was seen to be in conflict with 
the equity objectives of public irrigation facilities. Hence the World Bank pressed for a 
new irrigation policy, focussed on private tubewells. Influential Indian bureaucrats were 
also in favour of promoting private tubewells, though their reasons had as much to do 
with the paucity of public finance for irrigation, as well as an unprecedented drought in 
the mid-1960s (which required the quick results that tubewells rather than surface 
irrigation could provide), as with any inherent operational advantages of private 
tubewells.  
The active state policy of promoting private initiative in agriculture and remunerative 
grain prices provided a spur to private tubewells, for irrigation not only made for higher 
yields in its own right but also provided an incentive to fertilizer use by mitigating risk.  
The application of the latest methods to optimize irrigation schedules for the new seeds 
in the late 1960s also suggested that private tubewells were better suited to the water 
needs of modern agriculture than canals. I will however show that this marginal 
superiority played a negligible role in increased yields compared to the massive leap from 
rainfed cultivation to having irrigation of any sort; further, well-managed canal systems 
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acquitted themselves in an excellent fashion. I will argue that the correlation between 
ownership of a tubewell and adoption of fertilizers, which was one reason for state 
promotion of tubewells did not suggest causation; the correlation could easily be 
explained by the larger resources of tubewell owning farmers and their higher capacity to 
bear the risk of new technology. 
I 
The few works which have noted the importance of irrigation during the Green 
Revolution are not those of historians but activists and social scientists- for example, 
Vandana Shiva has devoted a chapter on large dams and their socio-ecological impact in 
her study of the Green Revolution, reflecting a common association of irrigation with 
dams in the literature.1 In her early field study of the Green Revolution, political scientist 
Francine Frankel has identified the importance of groundwater irrigation to the new 
agricultural strategy and the availability of credit for tubewell investments as a bottleneck 
to the adoption of the new seeds by small farmers, contributing to rural inequity. 2 In other 
work, she has also mentioned in passing the important role played by the advice of World 
Bank experts in the adoption of the private-tubewell strategy.3 Later works by economists 
focused on groundwater irrigation have noted the importance of precisely-timed irrigation 
and have identified the need for an end user controlled water source as an important driver 
of farmer investment in groundwater irrigation.4 
The Bell Mission and Indian Irrigation: Privatization and Intensification 
Through the 1950s, while there was some provincial government support for private 
groundwater-irrigation efforts, the overwhelming emphasis was on public systems. This 
changed in the 1960s with the Third Plan (1961-66) committing increased funds to minor 
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irrigation and rural electrification. In the mid-1960s, two factors intensified this emphasis 
on private tubewells. The first was the advice of the World Bank’s Bell Mission. 
Throughout the 1960s, observations in the Bank’s annual reports on the economic 
prospects of India touched upon irrigation issues; early on it recommended a reorientation 
of the Community Development programme towards production, emphasizing the 
importance of minor irrigation.5 The 1964 volume reflected the growing frustration in 
India’s policy circles with the inefficiency of large-scale irrigation projects. It felt that 
insufficient attention had been paid to the economic criteria for the selection of irrigation 
projects, resulting in the misdirection of foreign exchange. Too much capital and talent 
was locked up in the long gestation periods of these projects. It also lamented the lack of 
coordination between the irrigation departments in charge of supplying water and the 
agriculture departments which were to ensure its optimal use. Finally, the bank criticized 
the general tendency to spread water too thinly over the maximum possible area without 
regard for the ability of farmers to use the water. 6 
This critique was further articulated by the World Bank’s Bell mission that studied India’s 
economic development efforts during the same year. Various chapters and sections in this 
long report were authored by different economists with both the general introduction and 
the chapter on irrigation emphasizing the fact that it could not be fully regarded as a team 
effort.7 There were at least three distinct threads of thought about irrigation in the report 
which I shall summarize here.  
                                                          
5World Bank, India - Current economic position and prospects. Asia series; no. AS 83 
(Washington, DC, 1961), p. 23. Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1961/03/724479/india-current-economic-
position-prospects on 23rd February 2015.  
6World Bank, India - Current economic position and prospects. Asia series; no. AS 105 
(Washington, DC, 1964), pp. 19-20. Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1961/03/724479/india-current-economic-
position-prospects on 23rd February 2015. 
7 Bernard R. Bell, Report to the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Development Association on India’s Economic 
Development Effort, Volume 1, Main Report (Washington, DC, 1965), p.ii. Accessed 
online at  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1965/10/12648064/report-
president-international-bank-reconstruction-development-international-development-
association-indias-economic-development-effort-vol-1-14-main-report on 23rd February 
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Prior to the Bell mission, a joint FAO/IBRD mission headed by M.L. Garnier had 
reviewed India’s irrigation experience and his report was appended to the report of the 
Bell Mission of which he was also a member. This report was clearly aimed at dispelling 
the cynicism about irrigation that gripped many Indian and western observers by the early 
1960s. While previous observers had criticized the long gestation period of large schemes, 
Garnier emphasized that in all countries, the “revolution” from dry to irrigated farming 
took 20-30 years no matter how well the scheme was planned, 8 and he asserted that few 
other spheres offered an opportunity equivalent to irrigation in providing lasting results 
for improving agriculture. Even though India had three times as much irrigated area as 
the United States did and accounted for a fifth of the total area under irrigation in the 
world, the oft-criticized large outlay on irrigation in the five year plans was, according to 
Garnier, too low considering India’s monsoonal climate, which concentrated rains to a 
small portion of the year. His main conclusion was that India had “reached a cross roads 
in irrigation” and he argued for a further acceleration of irrigation efforts, albeit with a 
change in policy. 9 According to Garnier, the main problem was that the extension of 
irrigation had an insufficient impact on agricultural production in India and he made the 
case for perennial, intensive irrigation whether it be from large or from small systems. 
According to him there had been a tendency, both in the case of major projects and state 
tubewells to spread the benefits too thin with protection from drought, rather than 
intensification of cropping or the promotion of high value crops in mind.  According to 
Garnier, the cropping intensity in India was too low and it was in addressing this problem 
that irrigation schemes must be directed; a concentration of irrigation benefits on smaller 
tracts of land would enable diversification and intensive cropping. The inability of large-
scale systems to keep to a schedule of water delivery meant that farmers had to spend 
much human and animal labour to get a low discharge from private wells, which had the 
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advantage of being perennial. The way forward then, were intensive rather than extensive 
irrigation works, with the benefits concentrated over a lesser area where plentiful water 
would be available at will throughout the year. Tubewells could also provide water 
perennially at will though he cautioned against investment in them until sufficient 
groundwater surveys had been conducted.10  
Strictly speaking, Garnier was wrong to characterize drought protection for the many as 
Indian irrigation’s main aim. From the colonial era, irrigation schemes were classified as 
(drought) protective or productive, and the latter had accounted for an overwhelming 
share of the irrigation expenditure. Intensification of agriculture had also long been an 
aim for irrigation in independent India. However, the method of selecting irrigation 
projects, whose essential metric was capital cost per acre had persisted, despite much 
conversation about alternatives. It was this metric, rather than flawed policy that had 
partly resulted in the thin spread of water, as the irrigation bureaucracy preferred to inflate 
the acreage benefiting from a project to reduce the per-acre cost. 
The chapter on irrigation in the Bell Mission’s report drew in large part from Garnier’s 
report but emphasized that they were not in complete support of his views, noting that 
while nobody would disagree over the importance of water in Indian agriculture, in no 
other aspect of agricultural policy this important was there “so little that is conclusive in 
the way of water research or economic appraisal”. 11 It pointed out that both experiments 
and field studies had demonstrated the critical importance of irrigation in enabling the 
full impact of fertilizer use; in fact, the chapter on fertilizers had a section titled “the 
importance of irrigation in relation to fertilizer use”. 12 Elsewhere in the Bell Report, the 
production functions used by the government planners were systematically critiqued by 
David Hopper who argued that enough work had not been done to establish the joint 
production function of water and fertilizer, leading to an understatement of the importance 
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of irrigation.13 While Garnier had largely skirted the question of a preference for either 
canals or tubewells, the main report had a distinct bias in favor of groundwater 
development. Commenting on Garnier’s conclusion that agricultural intensification and 
diversification should be the objectives of irrigation, the authors agreed that the ability to 
command water when and in the volume he desired was important to the cultivator. To 
them, this pointed to the importance of small private tubewells which could enable double 
or even triple cropping and were cheaper than large systems. The main report conceded 
that when water availability was limited, the question of best use (extensive or  intensive) 
was open, but on the whole they leaned to the view “that in many areas it will be found 
that best results will come from encouraging private investment and management.” 14 
While they agreed that rigorous studies of environmental and economic impact must take 
place before investment in surface irrigation, they disagreed with the same view in the 
case of minor irrigation; the short term exigencies of Indian agricultural policy justified 
the risk of infructuous investment in groundwater as long as surveys took place 
concurrently with development and a close watch was kept on tell-tale signs of 
depletion.15 
Perhaps the most interesting and direct approach to the tubewell vs. canals problem was 
an appendix on the factors of production in Indian agriculture by W.D. Hopper, the 
economist with the Ford Foundation in New Delhi, who had perhaps the closest 
connection to India of the various authors of the report.16 The primary but unstated 
innovation in Hopper’s analysis was the application of marginalism to water as an input 
in agriculture. Indian planners saw irrigation as a binary characterized by its presence or 
absence, with no regard to the quantity of water applied. A strict mathematical analysis 
of the role of irrigation in agriculture was hard; in previous work, Hopper himself had 
                                                          
13 W. David Hopper, “Production Coefficients: The “Yardsticks” for Planning” in Bell, 
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14 Bell, Volume 2, pp. 74.  
15 Bell, Volume 2, pp. 74-75. 
16   Hopper acknowledged that he had drawn liberally and without citation from the work 
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admitted that the (extremely hard) inclusion of rainfall into the analysis was crucial in 
scrutinizing the value of irrigation. In the same work, he had found that while the number 
of irrigations applied was somewhat important, the total quantity of water applied was a 
statistically insignificant variable in the prediction of yields; 17 this would imply that the 
quantity of water was not amenable to marginalist theory. Nevertheless, he applied 
marginalism to water in his crucial policy advice. 
According to Hopper, the problem was that irrigation planners did not visualize water as 
an input to agriculture. This was reflected in the fact that irrigation potential was measured 
in additional irrigated acres, rather than in the quantity of water supplied, crucially 
neglecting the water needs of various crops. 18 While the actual water needs of crops was 
an unsettled matter, Hopper’s assertion was something of a sweeping mischaracterization. 
The policy in most states presumed a cropping pattern and (based on what was known 
about water needs) calculated the acreage it was possible to irrigate in a project. While 
implementation was poor, some states even had a policy called localization whereby the 
cropping pattern was specified by regulation; this was to restrict the cultivation of water 
intensive crops such as rice and sugarcane. Perhaps what Hopper really meant was that 
the supply of water did not fully enable choice of cropping pattern by the cultivator. 
According to Hopper, be it tubewell or canal, the crux of the irrigation problem was the 
differing view of the object of system design between the engineer and the agriculturist. 
Engineers saw total water as the fixed quantity and tended to optimize agricultural output 
per unit volume of water than per unit of land. If there were initially increasing and then 
diminishing marginal returns to water application per acre beyond a point, more total 
agricultural production could be obtained by serving additional acres after supplying the 
optimum amount. However, the yield as a function of water application was usually an 
“inverted dish” parabola with constants such that marginal returns would diminish from 
the application of the very first unit of water. Given a fixed quantity of water, the 
bureaucracy’s traditional strategy of  maximizing area served was the best solution from 
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not just a social and political point of view, but even from the economic point of view of 
maximizing agricultural production;  there were of  course limits to this strategy as water 
losses increased with the area served.19 
This model of utility-maximization where total water was a fixed quantity and acreage 
was to be maximized conflicted with the profit-maximization model of the enterprising 
cultivator; for him land (rather than water) was the fixed quantity and water was a variable 
to be varied. As the marginal cost of additional water was lower than marginal returns in 
the case of public tubewells (and zero in the case of canals where there was a flat per acre 
charge), it made sense for the cultivator to apply as much water as possible even as 
marginal returns diminished. Hence there was conflict between the system and the 
individual. In the case of public systems be it tubewells or canals, water application was 
limited by rationing. But there was a tendency to supplant this regulatory rationing with 
a “price-based system”; gains could be made by “perceptive cultivators” tempting the 
“human frailties” of canal supervisors and tubewell operators with bribes to supply more 
than their allotted quota. This, according to Hopper was the reason that public tubewells, 
despite being designed for 400 acres, public tubewells were irrigating barely 150 acres 
on an average and often less than 100 acres due to “legal, illegal or accidental” means. 
Private tubewells of the same capacity irrigated only 60-120 acres.20 
Hopper’s model of a conflict between the yield-maximization strategy of the cultivator 
and the social objectives of the irrigation planner was apparently shared by Indian 
irrigation engineers. Their collective recommendation was to continue on a policy 
favouring extensive rather than intensive irrigation, with groundwater being to 
supplement supplies to promote intensification; they did not however go in the question 
of ownership of tubewells. 21 As irrigation engineers controlled only large public schemes, 
it was natural that they would argue in favour of the same. Nevertheless, Hopper’s 
analysis did not show that public tubewells were inherently unsuitable for intensive 
agriculture, only that their designed command area was too large to do so. Just as he had 
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20 Hopper, “The Factors”, p. VI-42. 
21 Central Board of Irrigation and Power, Recommendation of the Ninth Irrigation and 
Power Seminar (New Delhi, 1964), p. 21. 
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found that corruption and favouritism could reduce their command area, this could also 
be done by design, as UP had been attempting to do.22 It is notable that he used the public 
tubewells amenability to corruption to serve the needs of the few as an argument for 
giving up the equity objective altogether with a policy favouring private tubewells.  
According to Hopper, while engineers saw water as supplemental to rainfall in the case 
of drought and sought to maximize the area served, agriculturists saw this policy as 
inconsistent with the object of yield-maximization by the application of non-water 
inputs.23 While politics meant that a contraction in canal-irrigated area was not possible, 
according to Hopper, the operation of private tubewells had demonstrated the possibilities 
of intensive irrigation. Evidence from Punjab, Bihar, Madras, UP and Rajasthan where 
farmers controlled their own water supply pointed to intensive land use with the raising 
of three or even four crops a year. This assured, perennial water, 
Seems to be the key that opens up the way to a multitude of opportunities increase 
annual product per acre…by an intensive agriculture that involves the use of 
complementary inputs like fertilizer and plant protection measures in a cropping 
pattern significantly altered from that followed before the acquisition of the new 
facility. 24 
According to Hopper, “accumulating evidence, much of it unpublished” showed that 
private tubewells made for intensive farming; this was in sharp contrast to data which 
showed that cropping intensity in canal commands was actually less than in areas without 
irrigation. 25 The latter was an entirely erroneous impression that had to do with the way 
irrigation and land use statistics are presented in India. The published data gives the gross 
cropped area (which includes area cropped more than once) and the net cropped area; the 
ratio of the two yields the cropping intensity for India as a whole. Also presented are the 
gross irrigated area (which includes the area irrigated more than once) and the net 
irrigated area; the ratio of these yields the irrigation intensity, rather than the cropping 
intensity and the former was possibly confused to be the latter by Hopper. Irrigation was 
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24 Hopper, “The Factors”, p. VI-45.  
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often applied only to an extra dry season crop (which could not have been raised without 
it) with the monsoon crop grown under unirrigated rainfed conditions; thus increasing the 
cropping intensity but not the irrigation intensity. A decade after Hopper, the economist 
VKRV Rao would make the same mistake in a public lecture, prompting a seminar on the 
role of irrigation in Indian agriculture; it would be many years until the erroneous 
impression was decisively corrected.26 
To explain this idea that land under public irrigation was cropped less intensely than dry 
land, Hopper turned to the farmer’s psychology of risk. In the absence of canal irrigation 
cultivators grew multiple inferior crops every year while canal irrigation had resulted in 
the extension of sugarcane and wheat cultivation. Sugarcane and wheat were reasonably 
high value crops which needed irrigation but could withstand some drought in the case of 
supply problems; fields bearing these crops however could not have a second season.  
“Independence of government authority” whether canal supervisor or tubewell operator, 
with the concurrent reduction in risks associated with timing and volume of water would  
lead to a domination of high input, high return crops and multiple cropping. This was not 
borne out by existing data; as I will show, Punjab’s private tubewell-irrigated districts in 
fact irrigated more wheat than its canal districts. To Hopper, it was clear that private 
tubewells were the way forward to intensify agriculture, even as he acknowledged that 
the almost complete lack of data on irrigation and its organization at the village level gave 
all discussions on irrigation a “wonderful dreamy quality, uncluttered by facts, dominated 
by vague opinions that are strongly held and deeply entrenched in custom and traditional 
rivalry”, 27 referring perhaps to the rivalry between agricultural departments and irrigation 
departments.  
To summarize, all three sets of opinions in the Bell report agreed on the need for 
intensification of water application and for the availability of water at the cultivator’s will 
to promote multiple cropping, fertilizer use and yield-maximization. Garnier focused on 
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the reform in the design and execution of large-scale systems and was cautious about 
tubewells pending knowledge of groundwater availability. The authors of the chapter on 
irrigation leaned towards private tubewells as the solution. Hopper felt that spreading 
irrigation benefits as thinly as possible was actually the most optimum way to use scarce 
water to maximize production from public systems. This greater good however conflicted 
with the private yield-maximization strategy of the individual cultivator who was more 
likely to go in for multiple cropping and adopt modern inputs like fertilizers if he had 
access to an assured plentiful supply of water free of government control. Making the 
implicit assumption that the problem of equitable distribution did not exist in the case of 
groundwater as it did in the case of surface water, he effectively called for the 
privatization of the resource by the promotion of private tubewells to subvert the 
regulatory distribution which limited supplies in the case of public tubewells. Vesting 
control of volume and timing of irrigation to the profit-maximizing cultivator was seen 
as an enabler of high-input, high-output agriculture. 
In passing, Francine Frankel has seen the advice of these experts as crucial in the decision 
to go in for private tubewells, which became a central technology of the Green 
Revolution.28 While this is likely true, it must be emphasized that the World Bank advice 
was more about an agricultural problem than a food problem; their emphasis was on cash 
crops. The advice was about convincing India to shift its priorities from industry to 
agriculture, and less about a shift within agriculture from cash crops to food crops. Both 
Garnier and Hopper emphasized “high value crops”, and at least to Hopper, wheat, the 
most expensive of foodgrains in India was clearly not high value enough. Very soon, 
however, India’s problem would soon be seen as a food problem, and the most visible 
success of tubewells would be in raising wheat yields. 
Drought, economic crisis and a private tubewell boom 
The submission of the Bell Mission’s report in 1965 coincided with the beginning of a 
severe crisis of food production in India. The years between 1965 and 1967 saw severe 
failure of the monsoon and consequent exceptional drought. Surface irrigation systems 
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were unable to help; official figures show that the area irrigated by both government 
canals and small tanks actually fell in absolute terms 1965-66.29  
To mitigate the impact of the drought, governments and cultivators in India turned to 
privately-led groundwater development as had been the case during several droughts in 
British India. The crisis of public finances which precluded the commencement of new 
large surface irrigation schemes also intensified the focus on tubewell schemes. In a 1967 
speech, Indira Gandhi argued that India needed to double its irrigated area and that the 
focus be on minor-irrigation schemes in view of the paucity of funds and the quick fruition 
they promised. Pointing out that the country had failed in utilizing its tremendous 
groundwater resources, particularly in the Gangetic plains, she argued that as irrigation 
was cheapest of all inputs, focus on it (rather than tractors or fertilizers) could enable a 
social levelling in the countryside.30 Subsidies and loans were to be provided for 
constructing wells, tubewells and putting up pumps. The Congress Party manifesto of 
1966 emphasized reliance on minor irrigation and rural electrification for lifting water 
from open wells and tubewells.31 In 1965, the National Development Council had directed 
that the energization of pumpsets be made the focus of the rural-electrification 
programmes.32 While this had always been the case in practice, the decision was 
important in shifting even the rhetoric away from rural industry. A target of electrifying 
100,000 villages in time for the Gandhi birth centenary of 1969 had also been set.33 
These initiatives intensified the emphasis on rural electrification and minor irrigation that 
had begun during the Third Plan and the 1960s (particularly the latter half) was a time of 
great investment and achievement in India’s groundwater sector. During the Third Plan 
(1961-66), for the first time, the actual expenditure on rural electrification, at Rs. 1.53 
billion exceeded the already high allocation of Rs. 1.05 billion. This was to be dwarfed 
by spending during the Plan Holiday (1966-69) when Rs. 2.38 billion was spent on rural 
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electrification; a sum marginally higher than the total expenditure on the same in the 
fifteen preceding years. The minor-irrigation head also saw similarly high levels of public 
investment.34 Together with the private efforts of individual cultivators, often financed 
by government backed loans, this inaugurated the period when the growth in Indian 
irrigation was led by groundwater extraction and there was a considerable growth in the 
number of tubewells and pumps in the 1960s as the National Commission on Agriculture 






















Wells in use N.A. 3624.0 4474.0 5111.0 5908.0 
Annual growth rate  4.3 2.7 4.9 
Diesel pumps 66 123.0 230.0 465.0 721.0 
Annual growth rate 13.3 13.3 15.1 15.7 
Electric pumps 21 56.0 199.0 513.0 1089.0 
Annual growth rate 21.7 28.9 20.9 28.5 
Private tubewells including filter 
points 21 30.0 49.0 113.0 246.0 
Annual growth rate 7.4 10.3 18.2 29.6 
State tubewells 3 7.0 10.0 13.0 15.0 
Annual growth rate 18.5 7.4 5.4 4.9 
 
Table 6.1: Groundwater irrigation structures in India, 1951-1969.  
Sources and Notes: National Commission on Agriculture, Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, Part V: 
Resource Development (New Delhi, 1976), p. 31. The figure mentioned for private tubewells in the pre plan period, 
being equal to the electric pumps likely includes pumps on open wells. There was little private- tubewell development 
in the pre-plan period. It is probable that the figures for electric and diesel pumps include figures for the respective type 
of private tubewell. 
Matching Irrigation to crops and climates 
In colonial India, irrigation projects were classified as productive or protective; the former 
could be expected to produce revenue for the state while the latter was expected to be run 
at a loss to prevent famine. Compared to productive works, there were few protective 
works and many of these turned out to be productive, in part due to conservative British 
                                                          
34 Rs. 2.7 billion was spent on minor irrigation during the Third Plan (1961-66), almost 
half the Rs. 5.83 billion spent on large schemes. During the 1966-69 triennium, about Rs. 
3.14 billion was spent by the government on minor irrigation, compared to Rs. 4.27 billion 
on major and medium projects; this was the closest that spending on minor irrigation had 
come to the spending on major projects. See National Commission on Agriculture, Report 
of the National Commission of Agriculture, Part V: Resource Development (New Delhi, 
1976), p. 30. 
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policies. Most irrigation works built in independent India were also designed to be 
productive. But in the 1960s, an idea was born that somehow all the irrigation works built 
in India were protective rather than productive and this had to do with evolving ideas of 
the water needs of various crops in diverse climates.  
The quantity and scheduling of irrigation had been determined by the colonial irrigation 
bureaucracy by varying the depth and intervals of irrigation and picking combination that 
gave the best yield with a reasonable total water use. The extent to which these results 
were used to plan irrigation, if at all, is not known, but it is likely that due to the very 
small number of trials, the optimum combination had not been struck even in research 
fields; the state of the art in the case of wheat as late as the 1960s came from a couple of 
trials at Lyallpur in the early 1930s. This depth-interval-yield approach continued to 
constitute the bulk of the research on irrigation in India until the mid-1960s, even as ideas 
about irrigation science were changing as the result of agricultural scientists taking an 
increasing interest in the problem. From 1956, scientists at the Indian Agricultural 
Research Institute began to compute the soil moisture deficit in the root zone of the crop 
and varying irrigation in accordance with the same. But to cover the entire range of soil 
types and weather conditions present in India was impossible, particularly as expensive 
equipment such as tensiometers and resistance meters were needed; soil sampling too was 
an expensive affair. Another technique new to India was the climatological approach; its 
central idea was that it was meteorological factors, rather than the plant or the soil which 
was the fundamental determinant of water consumption. As isocline maps were easy to 
pot with a relatively small number of cheap evaporimeter readings, the technique had 
“high extension value”. But given limited water supply, this still left the open question of 
the optimal timing of water application.35 
Under the moisture deficit approach, the critical period when water application was 
absolutely necessary was taken to be the period when the most water was consumed. But 
as per the new climatological approach, this was merely the time when it was hot; 
naturally, there was evaporation. The critical period thus had to be determined by the 
tolerance of the plant to moisture stress at various periods, by studying the effect on yield 
of withdrawing irrigation at various stages of plant growth. 36 Such experiments, together 
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with other agronomic studies were conducted on the dwarf wheats as part of the 
Coordinated All India Wheat Improvement programme by the American soil scientist BC 
Wright and others in the late 1960s. They found that yields were dependent on the timing 
of irrigation and the periods when water was critical were determined. 37 The tall varieties 
had never been optimized for yield in such a fashion; this led to the idea that the HYVs 
required “more precise and scientific water management” 38 than local varieties. That the 
performance of tall varieties could be improved through “scientific water management”39 
was not even considered. Making a plea for productive (or  rather, more suited to the 
HYV), rather than protective irrigation to a general audience, J.S. Kanwar, the first 
Deputy Director General for Soil Agronomy, Water, and Engineering of the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research produced a five stage schema for increasing yields. The 
first was the addition of irrigation, next was HYV followed by fertilizer, then came better 
water management followed finally by pest control. That better water management could 
follow irrigation before HYVs and fertilizers were introduced was not considered. It was 
perhaps assumed that the best practices with tall varieties had already been adopted and 
there was no need for research; as Dr. Swaminathan said in a different context, there was 
no need for control studies with local tall varieties as his control was the “entire lived 
memory” of the Indian peasant.40  
The Rise of the Tubewell 
Much of the increased wheat irrigation came from tubewells, though as I showed in 
Chapter 1, the extent of domination by tubewells was far from total. Wheat had never 
been thought of as a crop that would benefit peculiarly from tubewells; indeed while plans 
for the pioneering UP tubewell scheme assumed a cropping pattern identical to that of the 
Upper Ganges Canal, if any crop was expected to be disproportionately grown, it was 
water-intensive sugarcane rather than wheat.41 In early years, public tubewell irrigation 
was preferentially used for sugarcane cultivation in western UP, with the crop accounting 
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for 35% of the total tubewell-irrigated area during the programme’s infancy in 1934-35 
as compared to just 16% of the area irrigated by the Upper Ganges Canal. However, the 
proportion of tubewell-irrigated area devoted to sugarcane quickly reduced to just 13% 
in 1938-39 compared to 12% on the Upper Ganges Canal in the same year. If the tubewells 
preferentially irrigated a particular crop, it was wheat which accounted for nearly 57% of 
the tubewell-irrigated area in 1937-38 (compared to 24% on the Upper Ganges Canal in 
the same year) and 55% in 1938-39 (24% on the Upper Ganges Canal).42  
In the late 1930s, this cropping choice may have simply been the result of the global fall 
in the prices of cash-crop commodities. Yet over the next 30 years in northwestern India, 
groundwater-irrigated tracts devoted a greater proportion of their areas to wheat than 
canal-irrigated tracts.43  This may have been because the cost of irrigation from tubewells 
(public or private) to the cultivator was a function of the volume of water withdrawn, 
rather than the area irrigated (as in canal tracts). Irrigated wheat was a reasonably high 
value crop which did not require too much water, unlike a crop like sugarcane; the latter 
might have produced greater gross return but at a high cost. In other words, for wheat, the 
marginal return to water application was high. 
After the mid-1960s, the availability of fertilizer (which was only used with irrigation) 
increased the differential in yields between irrigated and unirrigated wheat, and 
government support prices for wheat also increased, making wheat irrigation hugely 
profitable. Together with increasing support for tubewell irrigation through loans, 
subsidies and rural electrification, this not only propelled a tubewell boom but likely also 
made wheat the most profitable crops to be irrigated, even with canals. Punjab as a whole 
lost two fifths of its irrigated sugarcane acreage between 1966 and 1972; in comparison, 
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the much lamented decline in the irrigation of pulses, an important source of protein in 
the Indian diet was barely 8%.44 
To Kanwar, productive irrigation meant careful use of limited water supplies on HYVs; 
indeed he emphasized that spectacular production gains could be achieved without 
increasing water supply.45 Thus making Indian irrigation productive had multiple 
meanings; as I showed, the World Bank experts whose recommendations preceded the 
adoption of HYVs saw the intensive application of large quantities of water as crucial. 
This was the change they recommended to transform India irrigation from protective to 
productive; this had led to substantial government support for private tubewells, which 
Kanwar was in agreement with. This notion that the rise of the private tubewell was due 
to the failure of canal systems to supply the precise and intensively timed water needs of 
modern agriculture and that tubewells were somehow inherently more suitable to HYV 
seeds is prevalent to the present day. 46   
It is true that groundwater irrigation had always been associated with somewhat higher 
yields; before the advent of the HYVs, this was usually attributed to careful cultivation 
and judicious and sparing (rather than excessive) use of hard won water.47 But the role of 
the better quality of irrigation (whether that meant more water or more precisely timed 
water) from tubewells must not be overemphasized. To begin with, such was the sheer 
scale in the rapid expansion of irrigated acreages that the marginal improvement that came 
from precise timing were overwhelmed by the massive leap in productivity that came 
from the shift to irrigation of any sort from rainfed cultivation; at least in the medium 
term, quantity mattered more than quality. The superiority of tubewells in enabling 
precise timing is also questionable; production shortfalls in the 1970s were regularly 
explained not just by the failings of canal irrigation but also by the upsetting of tubewell-
irrigation schedules by power cuts, diesel shortages (this was the era of energy crises) and 
pump breakdowns.48 On well managed systems at least, canals held their own and were 
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entirely consistent with high-yielding agriculture; this is demonstrated by the experience 
of Haryana, which was carved out of Punjab in 1966. Groundwater’s share in Haryana’s 
irrigated area was only 38% compared to 53% in the rest of Punjab in 1971-72.49 Yet 
Haryana too had a remarkable growth in wheat production and productivity (as did 
Western UP which had few private tubewells) in the late 1960s with an average yield of 
1.74 t/ha (with 61% wheatland irrigated) compared to Punjab’s 1.87 t/ha (with 71% 
irrigation) and the all India average of 1.11 t/ha (with 43% irrigation) in the miracle 1967-
68 year.50 
In the long standing rivalry between the Irrigation and Agricultural bureaucracies, the 
emphasis on issues of quality and plentiful supply51 served to further the interests of the 
latter which had gained the upper hand in national priorities in the mid-1960s. Greater 
coordination between the Agriculture and Irrigation departments had been a standard 
recommendation of all studies of Indian irrigation beginning from the Indian Irrigation 
Commission (1901-3) to the studies of utilization of irrigation in the 1950s and beyond. 
Rarely was this recommendation implemented perhaps in large part due to irrigation 
engineers’ vision of themselves as the custodians of precious water which agriculturalists, 
and by extension, the agricultural department were unduly extravagant with. This was 
exemplified by a collaborative experiment in the 1940s between the UP Agriculture and 
Irrigation Departments to determine optimum water requirements for sugarcane. In the 
Central Board of Irrigation reports, poor yields were put down to the extravagant use of 
water by the Agriculture Department which the irrigation staff had been unable to curtail; 
they promised experiments in subsequent seasons would be carried out with controlled 
supplies of water.52 In the 1960s, extravagant use finally found justification with the idea 
of productive irrigation.  
An important study of the effect of source of irrigation on productive agriculture was 
made by T.V. Moorti of the UP Agricultural University (Pantnagar) in collaboration with 
JW Mellor of Cornell University as part of the latter’s Prices Research Contract with 
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USAID. It studied the performance of state tubewells, private tubewells, Persian wheels 
and the more traditional charsa water lift in Aligarh (UP). Seeking to examine the 
competition between private tubewells and state tubewells, it concluded that “cultivators 
prefer to buy private tube well water” even as the study was conducted in two tracts, one 
will only state tubewell water available, and one with only private tubewell water. The 
study found that farmers with private tubewells planted three times as much Mexican 
wheat as those with public tubewells. On desi wheat, they applied twice as much fertilizer.  
Any differences in yield, productivity and fertilizer use were put down to “better control 
and timeliness of water application” even with no data presented to show whether farmers 
were indeed getting less water from public tubewells than they demanded. 1966-67 was 
the first year of the HYV programme, and it was perhaps natural that rich farmers (as 
reflected in their tubewell ownership) would first take to the new seeds and fertilizers, but 
the study did not consider the possibility and went to criticize the large losses to the 
exchequer from public tubewell operation.53 
The association of tubewells with HYVs and fertilizer usage had to do more with 
correlation than causation, though this was not often recognized. Tubewell irrigation was 
seen to play a dual role in the New Agricultural Strategy; as a productive innovation on 
its own and as a “stimulus to further innovation”. 54 Study after study noted that farmers’ 
response to the new seeds and increased fertilizer use was critically dependent on whether 
or not they possessed a tubewell and this made them seem crucial tubewells to the Green 
Revolution. As mentioned previously, great efforts were made in increasing private 
tubewell irrigation in the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme (IADP) wheat 
districts where tubewell technology was cheap and locally well known. This was perhaps 
less due to any failings of canal irrigation and more due to the extension of irrigation more 
generally being seen as the most important means of increasing production. The positive 
results of the IADP in Ludhiana (and to a lesser extent in Aligarh), as compared to rice 
districts, with the only apparent difference being that the district was primarily irrigated 
by private tubewells must have contributed to the impression that tubewells were 
inherently more suited to modern agriculture than canals. When the HYV seeds were first 
sent out into the field, a guideline to the state governments was that these be preferentially 
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grown in areas where private irrigation predominated. This might have been because in 
the early phase, any cultivation of HYVs was something of a demonstration; this was 
particularly true before 1967-68 when 18% of the wheat area was sown with HYVs. 55 
Tubewells were seen as more reliable than canals, and any loss in yield due to delayed 
irrigation “even if not catastrophic would lead to a loss of confidence” in the new 
technology.56  
This psychological aspect was very important; even those who claimed fertilizers 
produced higher returns than irrigation conceded that possession of irrigation facilities 
increased the “rate of innovation adoption”. 57 Long before the adoption of HYVs became 
a sign of the innovative and progressive farmer, construction of wells and tubewells had 
long been seen as indicative of progressiveness and enterprise. In her study of the late 
1950s, tubewells in Punjab and wells in Gujarat, indicative of peasants helping 
themselves is central to Kusum Nair’s argument about the success of development in 
these states as compared to some others, where peasants sometimes even refused to take 
government canal water brought up to their fields. Wells seemed to signify a desire for 
change so great that expensive private investment was undertaken. 58 Besides the fact that 
well owning farmers were typically richer (and more able to invest in fertilizer), perhaps 
it was also the case that tubewell owning farmers were more open to new methods. 
That irrigation (of any kind) was central to incentivising improved practices, including 
the use of fertilizers for the risk averse Indian farmer was old; in fact this was the 
justification for the large sum spent on irrigation in the First Five Year Plan. But farmers 
had long complained, even before the HYVs that canal water delivery was inadequate 
and unreliable, though experts (including not just irrigation engineers) alleged that on the 
contrary, the Indian farmer was wasteful in his use of water. Private tubewells, by 
mitigating some of that perceived risk in the cultivator’s mind, may have played a role in 
the adoption of expensive inputs such as fertilizers. But in the ultimate analysis, the chief 
advantage of the tubewell in the wheat revolution was the same as had been seen by 
William Stampe in the interwar years; its ability to offer quick expansion of irrigation.  
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No more gigantism? 
The tubewell boom fuelled by the drought and new ideas about irrigation and private 
initiative was sustained from the late 1960s onwards by loans to cultivators provided by 
the public sector Agriculture Refinance Corporation with increasing support of the World 
Bank which I will detail in the next chapter. Groundwater’s success in precipitating a 
Green Revolution attracted many supported and a key proponent of tubewell irrigation 
was B.B. Vohra, a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture.  
Vohra had been instrumental in setting up the Central Groundwater Board attached to the 
Ministry of Agriculture as a nodal agency to coordinate groundwater development as 
institutional finance from Indian banks and the World Bank became available for the 
purpose; he also served as its first chairman. Vohra was known for his popular writings, 
and one of his first articles, published in 1973 in the Economic and Political Weekly titled 
“A Charter for the Land” is often seen as the first visible sign of official concern at 
environmental degradation; a concern that led to the setting up of embryonic 
environmental protection agencies in which Vohra himself played a prominent role.59 
That article, along with his other writings made a case not just for promoting groundwater 
development but also for an end to large surface irrigation projects.60 
According to Vohra, India’s most pressing problem was to protect the soil and prevent 
the degradation of the land; water management was key to the same. To protect the soil, 
it was crucial to prevent erosion by surface run off as well as to prevent waterlogging; 
both these problems were in large part caused by big dams. According to him, surface 
water was difficult to store and manage: big projects were expensive, took decades to 
build, submerged large areas of land, were subject to serious water losses and created 
significant threats to the very lands they were meant to serve through waterlogging. 
Further, their storages were threatened by siltation, their command areas were expensive 
to develop, they entailed high annual financial losses and their operation required large 
staffs. Yet they could not satisfy the farmer and above all, they were wasteful of water.  
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By contrast, storage of water for indefinite periods in the form of groundwater cost 
nothing, was not subject to evaporation or seepage losses, and could easily be tapped as 
individual tubewells within weeks if not days. Once developed it was available as and 
when required by the mere pushing of a button, lending itself beautifully to modern 
agriculture. 61 Hence to Vohra, it seemed logical to conserve as much water as possible 
insitu in the form of groundwater, rather than rely on storage in expensive reservoirs. He 
called for water use to be planned on a sub-catchment basis to ensure that water flowing 
into rivers (which could be used for storage projects) was not only free from silt but also 
genuinely surplus to local requirements. By relying on groundwater and intensifying 
agriculture in its irrigated areas rather than extending surface irrigation; India could raise 
all its crops on a fraction of the cultivated land, reducing the pressure on its forest and 
other resources. 62 Thus Vohra called for strong efforts to encourage the development of 
groundwater resources through land reforms, consolidation of holdings, technical 
assistance, loan assistance and making sure tubewells did not remain idle for want of 
power or fuel. It was equally important to promote its recharge, investigate the limits of 
safe pumping and to legislate on its control. 63 
According to Vohra, what was needed was a vision of water resource management as 
something inseparable from the overall management of land and soil rather than as a 
problem of civil engineering alone. The task facing the irrigation departments was to 
utilize to the fullest possible extent the water that had already been impounded thus far at 
great cost; a task which would require a drastic reorientation in the attitude of the 
irrigation engineer. Instead of “dreaming of building more gigantic structures” he would 
have to undertake the “numberless small works” required to maximize production and 
prevent the wastage of water and damage to the soil. Fields needed to be reshaped and 
levelled, distribution systems needed to be extended to so as to reach the last field and 
adequate drainage works needed to be provided. Emphasis on this comprehensive 
approach, called Command Area Development would not only lead to better utilization 
of water but would also induce engineers to take an interest in the problems of siltation 
and involve themselves in soil and water conservation measures. 64 
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While Vohra emphasized that these new challenges stemming from a turn to the small 
would enhance rather than curtail job opportunities for civil engineers, he did not seek to 
hide his motive of cutting irrigation departments to size. By forcing Irrigation 
Departments to confront the total cost of the projects which included Command Area 
Development, adequate drainage and the protection of reservoirs by afforestation, the new 
approach would “bring them down to earth - both literally and metaphorically - and 
dampen their ardour for taking up big projects.” Irrigation Departments “thought it below 
their dignity to even look at projects costing below Rs. 30 lacs” which were left to local 
governments and Agriculture Departments; it was precisely these that were most 
important to Vohra, and irrigation engineers needed to be cured of “the disease of 
giganticism”.  65 
For a while from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, it seemed like this vision of an end to 
gigantism was coming true. Groundwater became prominent in India’s Five Year Plans 
from the Fourth Plan onwards, which began after the plan holiday in 1969. It was the first 
of India’s plans where more money was allocated to minor irrigation and rural 
electrification than for large schemes; this was in addition to a stimulus for groundwater 
irrigation in the form of cheap loans from the expanded activities of the Agricultural 
Refinance Corporation.66 The increasing unease over the massive losses in irrigation 
finance, and the feeling that the results were not commensurate had led to the setting up 
of an Irrigation Commission in the late 1960s. Among the primary recommendations of 
the Commission was the undertaking of a large-scale programme of Command Area 
Development, which Vohra had first proposed in 1970 to cut down the irrigation 
departments to size. Public opinion was also in favour of the agriculture, rather than the 
irrigation departments. A recommendation, that the Central Groundwater Board be 
attached with the Ministry of Irrigation rather than Agriculture was criticized in the press 
as “Undoing the Green Revolution”; irrigation engineers were no longer trusted with the 
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responsibility for food production.67 The recommendation was never carried out; in fact, 
recognizing the importance of agricultural expertise in irrigation development, the 
Department of Irrigation was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, and a new 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was formed. Finally, the National Development 
Council (consisting of the chief ministers of the provinces) had adopted a resolution that 
the irrigation sector must no longer be a burden on the public purse; this resolution carried 
enough weight to be printed in the Fifth Five Year Plan.68 Vohra’s 1975 article, published 
in the FAO journal CERES thus bore an optimistic tone, confident that the country’s 
leaders had woken up to the problem of resource management as several hard decisions 
had already been taken. 69 
And yet, large-scale irrigation projects were back on the agenda in a big way by the mid-
1970s. As I argued, irrigated agriculture, even of the kind enabled by canals and deemed 
as insufficient and inefficient did lead to significantly higher productivity; the 
characterization of canals as entirely unsuitable for modern agriculture was unfair. Not 
all areas of the country were suitable for groundwater irrigation and not all farmers could 
afford the substantial private investment necessary. The applicability of its most 
successful mode, the tubewell, was largely confined to the Indo-Gangetic plains. Finally, 
state governments continued to press for large projects, and the established momentum 
of the irrigation bureaucracies and the entrenched power of what Vohra would later 
describe as the “contractor mafia” would not falter that easily. 
More immediately, the Irrigation Commission, whose recommendations were awaited for 
planning irrigation policy published its report in 1972. Its boundless faith in the power of 
science to control nature was reflected in an introductory comment that seasonal shortages 
could be one day tided over by melting glaciers with nuclear power. With an attitude that 
natural resources that could be developed must be developed, it recommended a large 
programme of surface irrigation development to last a few decades. It also recommended 
the modernization of old canal systems to better serve the needs of the modern agriculture 
and placed great emphasis on Command Area Development;70 perhaps there was a hope 
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that the irrigation bureaucracy would clean up its act with the new policy. External aid 
for irrigation also became more freely available; the World Bank began to lend for 
Command Area Development in the 1970s, enabling new projects by taking up some of 
the burden of expenditure. After India agreed to go in for International Competitive 
Bidding, the Bank also began lending large sums to improve the main systems of existing 
irrigation projects and to new large projects.71  
Thus together with groundwater development, new large-scale irrigation projects 
continued to be taken up in the Plans even as lip service was paid to the idea of not taking 
up new irrigation projects before the old ones were completed. Performance continued to 
be below expectations; in 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi echoed his grandfather’s 
words from nearly 30 years ago in a speech to a State Irrigation Ministers’ Conference,  
The situation today is that since 1951, 246 big surface irrigation projects have 
been initiated. Only 65 of these have been completed. One hundred and eighty 
one are still under construction... Perhaps we can safely say that no benefit has 
come to the people from [Post 1970 projects]. For 16 years we have poured money 
out. The people have got nothing back: no irrigation, no water, no increase in 
production, no help in their daily life.72 
From the late 1970s, a popular movement against big dams began in India. The movement 
had its first success in 1983 when, at Indira Gandhi’s instance, a hydroelectric project in 
the Silent Valley was abandoned and the area was declared a National Park. Vohra, who 
served in the early 1980s as the Chairman of the new National Committee on 
Environmental Planning lent his support to the rising activism, terming the havoc played 
by large irrigation schemes as “one of the greatest unrecognized environmental problems 
in the world”.73 The anti-dam movement picked steam through the 1980s with the Sardar 
Sarovar Project on the Narmada and the Tehri hydroelectric project on the Bhagirathi 
dominating the discourse. Writing in a non-official capacity, Vohra became perhaps the 
most senior establishment figure crusading against big dams in the popular press.74 An 
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important opponent of his arguments was BD Dhawan, a pioneering economist of 
groundwater irrigation in India. Dhawan argued that that both major and minor irrigation 
was necessary; a full accounting of the public and private costs of groundwater irrigation 
would prove that tubewells were not as cheap as they seemed. In addition, big dams 
enabled cheaper withdrawal of groundwater due to a rise in the water table as a result of 
seepage from canals.75  
The extent to which these considerations played a part in the continued momentum of the 
large-scale irrigation sector in the 1980s is not known. But fresh investment in the major 
and medium irrigation sector finally slowed down in the 8th Five Year Plan (1992-97) 
when only one new project was to be taken up (though two eventually were). Large-scale 
irrigation systems had suffered their first setback during the economic crisis and partial 
liberalization of the Indian economy between 1966 and 1969. It was perhaps entirely 
appropriate that the slowing down in the 1990s came in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis and liberalization of the economy in 1991. The Eight Five Year Plan (1992-97) 
neatly summarized the experience of planning irrigation in independent India as follows, 
The biggest single malady in the major and medium irrigation sector right from 
the First Plan has been the continued tendency to start more and more new projects 
resulting in wanton proliferation of projects, thin spreading of resources and 
consequent time and cost overruns. Though all the Plans, without exception, 
declared their intention to give priority to complete the ongoing schemes, the 
addition of new schemes continued unabated.76 
Conclusion 
Despite criticism of the low returns on investment in large-scale irrigation systems in 
India, according to the experts who were part of the World Bank Bell Mission, irrigation 
continued to be the most important input to Indian agriculture, particularly as it enabled 
the full benefit of fertilizers. It argued for a change in emphasis in favour of perennial, 
assured irrigation to enable multiple cropping and intensive water use. The experts felt 
that this was not possible in the case of government controlled irrigation sources as their 
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social welfare objectives led them to maximize the area of land irrigated with a fixed 
amount of water. This conflicted with the strategy of the individual cultivator, who, 
having a fixed amount of land, sought to maximize water input to increase his profit. Even 
as it was acknowledged that maximizing the area served was the best use of scarce natural 
resources from both a social and production-maximization point of view, it felt that a 
plentiful, assured supply of water free of government control was the key to promote 
multiple cropping and the use of other riskier inputs such as fertilizers by the cultivator. 
Based on this vision of a conflict between a self-interested cultivator and the social good, 
it placed the former on a pedestal and argued that private tubewells were the way forward 
to maximizing yields, implicitly assuming that the problem of equitable distribution did 
not exist in the case of groundwater. 
This advice came at a time of almost unprecedented drought in India which demanded 
quick creation of capacity for irrigation. Private tubewells were well suited as the solution 
and these were promoted through loans, subsidies and rural electrification; more was 
spent on the latter between 1966 and 1969 than had been spent in the preceding fifteen 
years. At the same time, the optimization of irrigation schedules for the dwarf wheat 
varieties in the late 1960s suggested that tubewells were better suited for the needs of 
modern agriculture than canals. However, the marginal advantages of tubewells over 
canals played a minor role in increased productivity than the quick leap from rainfed 
agriculture to irrigation (of any sort) offered by tubewells; well managed canal systems 
held their own when it came to increasing yields. The most important reason for policy 
to favour tubewells was the correlation between tubewell ownership and higher fertilizer 
use which had more to do with mitigating perceived risk in the cultivator’s mind as well 
as the general larger resources of tubewell owning farmers. 
Tubewells made a substantial contribution to the Green Revolution. Big dam projects on 
the other hand seemed mired in financial and capacity utilization problems which largely 
had to do with a thin spread of resources. Thus in the early 1970s, many called for an end 
to the era of the large dam, seeing the tubewell as an alternative. India however continued 
to build large canal systems while also enabling and subsidizing private tubewells despite 
much criticism of the former as inefficient, environmentally damaging and unsuited to 
modern agriculture. This was due to several reasons, including the unsuitability of 
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tubewells in large parts of India, the availability of World Bank loans for big dams as 
well as the established momentum of the irrigation bureaucracy. 
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Chapter 7: Financing a Tubewell Boom 
Histories of late twentieth century Indian agriculture typically focus on two sets of 
institutions. On the one hand are Indian government organizations such as the agricultural 
research system and government ministries. On the other hand, they also tell the story of 
international actors such as the American government and the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundation.1 In this chapter, I shall tell the story of a third kind of development institution.  
At the domestic level, this institution was the public sector finance company; the 
Agricultural Refinance Corporation (ARC). At the global level, this institution was the 
World Bank whose hands on role in what is called the Green Revolution is scarcely 
known. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the World Bank’s Bell Mission (1964-65) had 
successfully pressed for an irrigation policy focused on private tubewells. In this chapter, 
I will show how the government began a programme of supporting bank loans to 
cultivators for groundwater development through a public sector company called the 
Agricultural Refinance Corporation (ARC) 2 in the late 1960s. This programme was 
massively scaled up with World Bank aid from 1970 onwards and the ARC became the 
largest financier of private groundwater development in India. 
I shall argue that the sacrifice of equity was a conscious choice of elite development 
actors. Irrigation facilities could be publicly owned with the objective of both increased 
production and social equity, or privately owned with the objective of profit 
maximization. The World Bank explicitly favored and promoted the latter and influential 
Indian bureaucrats were also in favour of promoting private tubewells, though their 
reasons had as much to do with the paucity of public finance for irrigation as with any 
inherent advantages of private tubewells.I shall demonstrate that these elite development 
actors were well aware of the potential impact of their choice on rural inequality. While 
they tried to take steps to target loans to the poor through policy changes that made the 
                                                          
1 See for example John Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat Genes 
and the Cold War (New York, 1997) and Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s 
Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, Ma, 2010). 
2  The corporation was renamed the Agricultural Refinance and  Development 
Corporation (ARDC) in 1975 and reconstituted in 1982 in its present form the National 
Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). However the name ARC is 
used throughout this chapter.  
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programme very similar to what is today called microfinance, their attempts to ensure 
equitable access to groundwater resources had a limited impact, in large part due to their 
bias in favor of individual, rather than cooperative or public ownership of tubewells. 
I 
The World Bank’s role in Indian agricultural development, while hinted as being 
significant, is not fully known. In his diplomatic history of the Green Revolution, 
Cullather mentions that the World Bank doubled loan outlays to India and Pakistan after 
the 1968, quoting McNamara as to how the miracle harvest had dispelled institutionalized 
confusion as to what had gone wrong with development efforts in the past and what the 
path ahead should be. He then quickly shifts to the turn to the “Basic needs paradigm” 
that focused on social goods such as education and healthcare, neglecting the Bank’s 
activities centered on agricultural production. 3 
Secondly, we have the literature on the World Bank and the International Development 
Association, one of its constituents. The official history tells the story of Bank’s turn 
toward supporting agricultural projects in the 1960s; the largest and earliest receiver of 
such loans was India.4 Goldman’s recent work on the International Development 
Association is focused on lending to poor world governments for large state-controlled 
water resource development projects with a large foreign exchange component, unlike 
the lending programmes targeted at private individuals for investment largely in local 
currency studied in this chapter. More generally, Goldman and others have focused on 
big dam projects pushed by the World Bank through loans to governments; rather than 
on the Bank’s substantial lending to cultivators (through domestic financial institutions) 
for small well projects.5 
Besides government publications and the memoirs of the civil servant B. Sivaraman, this 
chapter draws from two key sets of sources. The first are printed reports of the World 
Bank; these include annual commentaries on the state of the Indian economy titled India 
- Current economic position and prospects (or variant thereof) written in by consultants 
and the Bank’s South Asia Department, the report of the World Bank’s 1964-65 study of 
                                                          
3 Cullather, Hungry World, p.  236.  
4 Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis, and Richard Charles Webb, (eds.) The World Bank: 
Its First Half Century. Volume. 1: History (Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 385-390. 
5 Michael Goldman, Imperial Nature: The World Bank and the Struggles for Social 
Justice in the Age of Globalization (New Haven, Ct, 2005). 
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the Indian economy headed by Bernard Bell an external consultant, as well as Staff 
Appraisal Reports for particular loans extended to India which contain key information 
about the loans and the conditions attached. Usually stamped Confidential or Restricted, 
these were largely for internal use, though they would have been shared with key Indian 
agencies and officials who provided inputs for their preparation. The other set of sources 
for this chapter are publications of the Agricultural Refinance Corporation, such as annual 
reports, key circulars and evaluation studies which were sourced from the library of its 
successor institution, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development in 
Mumbai. 
The Agricultural Refinance Corporation and groundwater irrigation 
A key agency in promoting private tubewell irrigation was the Agricultural Refinance 
Corporation which was set up in 1963 to support the agricultural lending programmes of 
banking institutions. Credit had long been seen as an important bottleneck for agricultural 
improvement in India. During the Raj, a system of taccavi loans had been set up. This 
was supplemented by the rise of various formal banking institutions such as cooperative 
and land mortgage banks, though the overwhelming majority of credit was still provided 
by the local moneylender. The setting up of the ARC was a step to support formal banking 
institutions in making credit for agricultural investment more easily available. Such a 
financial development corporation had precedents in the Indian subcontinent. For the 
industrial sector, the World Bank had financed the setting up of the Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation of India in the 1950s. Pakistan had set up the Agricultural 
Development Finance Corporation in 1952, motivated in large part by the mass migration 
of Hindu moneylenders during Partition.6  
The Agricultural Refinance Corporation (ARC) was founded in 1963 by an Act of 
Parliament to support the financing of agriculture. It had an authorized share capital of 
Rs. 250 million (about $ 52.5 million) of which Rs. 50 million (about $ 10.5 million) 7 
was to be fully paid up to begin with by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), cooperative 
and commercial banks, and other financial institutions such as the Life Insurance 
                                                          
6 Mumtaz Mirza, "The Pakistan Agricultural Development Finance Corporation", 
Middle East Journal (1958) 12: 324-332 
7 Exchange rates are as per World Bank, Economic Situation and Prospects of India 
(Washington, DC, 1964). Subsequent exchange rates are from the same publication of the 
appropriate year.  
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Corporation of India (LIC); a minimum dividend was guaranteed by the government. It 
was governed by a board consisting of three nominees of the Government of India, one 
by the RBI, one by the land mortgage banks, one by cooperative banks and one by other 
shareholders such as the LIC. A deputy governor of the RBI was to be the chairman of 
the board and the Managing Director was to be appointed by the Reserve Bank of India.8 
In its own words, its job was to refinance the preparation of land for irrigation; the 
development of plantation crops such as arecanut, coconut, cashew net, cardamom, coffee 
and  tea;  the development of mechanized farming and the use of electricity for tubewells 
and pump sets; and the development of  animal husbandry, dry farming, pisciculture and 
poultry farming.9 It was permitted to raise money up to twenty times the paid up capital 
by borrowing from the government, the Reserve Bank and from the market by issuing 
bonds and debentures. With this money, it was to support loans to cultivators for capital 
investment in agriculture by buying debentures issued by cooperative banks, land 
mortgage banks10 and scheduled banks to finance their lending programmes in case of 
“compact and worthwhile schemes of agricultural development with the economics 
thereof clearly proved“.11 
Despite the mention of tubewells and pumpsets as one of its main areas of activity, it did 
not fund any minor-irrigation schemes in the first four financial years of its existence. 
The focus had been on the preparation of land for major irrigation schemes, plantations, 
horticulture and other cash crops.12 But B. Sivaraman, the secretary of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, who was one of the directors of the Corporation, saw the importance of 
irrigation-expansion. According to him to the New Agricultural Strategy which he had 
co-written “was based on irrigation”, even fertilizers were merely “another aspect of the 
                                                          
8  Government of India, Agricultural Refinance Corporation Act (New Delhi, 1963) 
9  Agricultural Refinance Corporation, Annual Report 1963-64 (Bombay, 1964), p.1. 
10  Land Mortgage Banks, also referred to as Land Development Banks were also 
cooperatives. Unlike “cooperative banks” which mostly financed small short term loans, 
they financed capital investment with larger loans on longer terms. 
11  ARC, Report 1963-64, p.1. 
12  From ARC, Reports 1963-67. 
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programme”. 13 Sivaraman was a great proponent of private tubewells for two sets of 
reasons. The first which he articulated in a lecture to trainee administrators in 1970 was 
the limitation of public finance. In the first three five year plan plans, irrigation investment 
had largely been in the state sector and was limited by plan allocations; subsidies for 
private pumps had been limited by the surplus in the revenue accounts of budgets. Turning 
the programme over to the private sector supported by loan financing enabled the 
programme to be “multiplied manifold”.14 
The other reason was on the lines of Hopper’s thinking which emphasized the tubewell 
as an enabler of profit-seeking agriculture; this was emphasized in his memoirs. 
Sivaraman argued that a rapid increase in irrigated area would be crucial for increasing 
yields as planned in the new agricultural strategy. As per his account, statistics showed 
that cropping intensities on canal-irrigated land were only marginally higher than on rain-
fed land, and studies in Western UP had demonstrated that the farmer’s profit from private 
tubewells and government tubewells was six times and two times respectively the profit 
from government controlled surface sources. According to Sivaraman, “The method for 
maximizing yields was staring us in our face.” 15 Profits, cropping intensities and yields 
of course don’t necessarily map into one another. But these statistics provided an 
empirical basis for the apotheosis of the private profit motive as a means to increasing 
production that was central to the ideology of the New Agricultural Strategy. It seemed 
clear that private investment in irrigation would yield the quickest return and the 
government’s task was to provide farmers with the necessary credit.16 
However, Sivaraman felt that the existing cooperative credit system could not handle the 
large sums involved on its own. By his account, on being pressed for the ARC’s 
involvement, its chairman Dr. D.R. Gadgil (an economist who had conducted a 
pioneering study of costs and benefits of large irrigation projects published in 194817) 
claimed that that the states should finance minor-irrigation schemes; this was not the 
                                                          
13 B. Sivaraman, Address by Shri B. Sivaraman on Collector's Role in Indian 
Agriculture at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, on 14th May, 1970 
(New Delhi, 1970), p.7. 
14 B. Sivaraman, Address, p.7. 
15  B Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet: Governance of India in Transition (New Delhi, 1991), pp. 
404.  
16  Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, pp. 405.  
17 D.R. Gadgil, Economic Effects of Irrigation (Poona, 1948). 
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responsibility of the ARC or the cooperative banking system. 18 This was strange as 
tubewells had been mentioned as being a part of the ARC’s remit in its very first annual 
report. 19 However, as a result of pressure exerted by Sivaraman, it was agreed that 
groundwater development would be pursued as a trial. According to Sivaraman, the 
Corporation’s Managing Director, civil servant M.R. Bhide, having been secretary of the 
Department of Cooperation “had very ancient ideas” about cooperatives,20 which is 
perhaps why, in September 1965 the corporation merely clarified that while ARC finance 
would not normally be available from the ARC for well construction, the ARC would be 
willing to consider schemes where “large sums are involved and the schemes are prepared 
for a compact area through the formation of irrigation cooperatives instead of leaving  the 
development to take place through individual efforts alone.”21 Bhide’s successor P.N. 
Damry, however presented no such trouble22 and “at the instance of the Government of 
India” the ARC agreed to consider lending schemes relying on individual efforts. 23 
Thus cooperation, the rhetorical centerpiece of Nehruvian agrarian strategy was near-
officially discarded within a couple of years of the leader’s passing, in keeping with the 
new agricultural strategy’s larger sacrifice of equity in favor of higher productivity. In a 
telling comment on the lack of cooperation between farmers which had defeated the 
modernization of the ancient Cauvery delta irrigation system, Sivaraman rued the fact 
that, “the idea of a common good has no meaning in a democracy. It is the individual and 
his selfishness that ultimately counts.” 24  
1967-68 was the first year in which the Corporation financed groundwater irrigation. In 
the four years ending in June 1967, the ARC had sanctioned a total of 39 schemes having 
                                                          
18  Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 405.  
19  ARC, Report 1963-64, p.1. 
20  Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 406. The ancient ideas that Sivaraman refers to may be the 
notion that irrigation facilities should be state owned or cooperatively owned. 
21  Circular No. OPS. 794/L-1-65/66 from V Sivaraman, Managing Director to All 
Eligible Institutions dated 10 September 1965. 
22  B Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 406.  
23  ARC, Report 1965-66, pp. 9-10. 
24 Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 407.  
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a total outlay of $ 51.2 million (of which its own commitment was $ 40.7 milllion).25 In 
the year 1967-68 alone, it sanctioned 89 schemes totaling $ 88.6 million (of which its 
own commitment was $ 76.2 million). Of these, 54 schemes were for minor irrigation and 
had a total outlay of $ 68.6 million (of which its own commitment was $ 61.1 million). 26 
To put it simply, in the very first year the corporation began financing groundwater 
irrigation, the outlay on it accounted for nearly four fifths of the total outlay that year, 
nearly half of the total outlay on projects sanctioned by it in its five year existence and 
more than the total amount sanctioned in the previous four years. These 54 schemes which 
lay in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal envisaged a total of 59,981 
wells and tubewells together with 40,845 pump sets. ARC support for groundwater 
development was to rise in subsequent years and by the financial year ending in 1975, its 
commitment to minor irrigation accounted for $ 600 million, over three fourths of its total 
commitments.27 Lending to groundwater development was initially seen as a 
diversification of the corporation’s business,28 even as it arguably became its core 
business in the very first year. But by the early 1970s, the phrase “diversified lending” 
would actually come to refer explicitly to lending for any purpose but groundwater 
development.29 Tubewells, dugwells and pumps were clearly where the largest demand 
for long-term private investment in rural India lay.  
By mid-1980, the ARC had financed 325,000 tubewells, 523,000 dugwells and 755,000 
electric or oil engine pump sets. By the year 1977, for which we have an estimate of the 
total groundwater-extraction structures in India, it had financed 254,300 tubewells (close 
to 15% of a total of 1,744,300 tubewells then extant in India) and 390,000 dugwells (5% 
of a total of 7,691,700). 30 This was in addition to a growing share of tubewells financed 
by commercial banks after their nationalization in 1969, initially through a joint company 
                                                          
25  The rupee figures are Rs. 39.41 crores and Rs. 31.95 crores respectively converted at 
the 1968 exchange rate of  Re 1=US $ 0.13. 
26 Compiled from ARC, Reports 1964-68. 
27 Compiled from ARC, Report 1974-75. 
28  ARC, Report 1967-68. 
29  See for example, ARC, Report 1972-73, p. 5. 
30  ARC, Report, 1976-77& 1979-80 and B.D. Dhawan, “Trends in Tubewell Irrigation, 
1951-78”, Economic and Political Weekly (1978) 14: A143-A154.   
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confusingly called the Agricultural Finance Corporation, and later with each bank 
operating on its own. As is well known, institutional finance has a very low penetration 
in India with most capital raised from family and money lenders; it is safe to say that 
modest as its contribution was, the ARC was the largest financier of groundwater 
investments in India. Ever the eulogist of private enterprise, Sivaraman in fact saw the 
small share of government supported systems as reason to celebrate farmers’ initiative, 
citing a case in Karnataka where farmers had sunk 7000 wells even as government 
supported loans had only financed 300 as a “symbol of the farmers’ contribution to the 
Green Revolution.” 31 
Channelizing World Bank Money to the Cultivator 
By 1968, the year the term “Green Revolution” was coined and the first productivity gains 
of the strategy had been proven in India, the World Bank’s report on India’s prospects 
identified irrigation and farm credit as important bottlenecks for the expansion of the 
strategy. As smaller farmers entered productive agriculture, credit requirements for 
tubewell development would grow, and efforts were needed to both increase the flow of 
institutional credit and to strengthen cooperative banks in states where they were weak. 
It also felt that maximum groundwater development could only be safely approached with 
a precise evaluation of water resources; a thorough study of India’s aquifers “was long 
overdue”.32  
In the next year, the chapter on agriculture had a section titled The Water Constraint, the 
only farm input with so ominous a title. It noted that with the exception of northern India, 
lack of adequate water control had turned out to be an important obstacle to the 
penetration of the new technology, and expensive canal systems continued to fail in 
delivering timely supplies of water. This called for more investment, research into better 
utilization of water in the fields, research in well design and a better understanding of the 
aquifers.33 In the same volume, a section titled The “Other” Cultivators emphasized that 
                                                          
31  Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p.407.  
32   World Bank. 1968. India - Current situation and short term prospects. Asia series; 
no. AS 131 (Washington, DC, 1968), p. 15-17. Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1968/01/1559609/india-current-situation-
short-term-prospects on 23rd February 2015. 
33 World Bank, India - Economic situation and prospects. South Asia series; no. SA 3 
(Washington, DC, 1969) World Bank, pp. 18-20. Accessed online at 
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the elements of the new technology included not only seeds and fertilizers but also 
adequate water and water control; the latter “severely circumscribes the area suitable for 
technological breakthrough” and would exclude 80% of the cultivators from the Green 
Revolution’s benefits. 34 A “kind of trichotomy” was developing in rural India, consisting 
of large farmers, small farmers who were nevertheless physically well situated to exploit 
surface or groundwater with some assistance and finally, small cultivators outside the 
“favored water regions” who could only be helped with research into dry farming. 35 It 
was the second category (of small farmers in water favored regions) who could be 
substantially helped to participate in the Green Revolution with credit, extension and land 
reform. 36 
The Bank did not have a strong tradition of lending for agriculture or small-scale 
irrigation development in India. Since its inception up until the late 1960s, the World 
Bank had financed about 60 projects in India. While the second loan to be approved in 
1949 had been for the reclamation of three million acres of land, projects of an industrial 
nature dominated the Bank’s programme in India until the end of the 1950s; covering 
sectors such as railways, power, aviation, steel, ports and industrial credit. The sole 
exception was a loan to part finance the Damodar Valley Corporation, the first of the 
multipurpose river valley development projects taken up by independent India which 
included both power production and irrigation.37 The Bank’s support for agriculture in 
India through the financing of irrigation picked up in the early 1960s with the formation 
                                                          
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1969/04/1555527/india-economic-situation-
prospects on 23rd February 2015. 
34 World Bank, India - Economic situation and prospects. South Asia series; no. SA 3 
(Washington, DC, 1969) World Bank, p. 25. 
35 World Bank, India - Economic situation and prospects. South Asia series; no. SA 3 
(Washington, DC, 1969) World Bank, p. 26. 
36 World Bank, India - Economic situation and prospects. South Asia series; no. SA 3 
(Washington, DC, 1969) World Bank, p. 26. 
37 Compiled from the World Bank projects website http://www.worldbank.org/projects 
accessed on 23rd February 2015. 
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of the International Development Association (IDA)38 which financed some projects in 
Gujarat, Orissa, Bihar and Maharashtra in the early 1960s. 39 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) had rejected India’s proposal for a loan to finance a public tubewell project in the 
late 1940s on the grounds that India’s groundwater resources had not been sufficiently 
surveyed. The Bank in its early years was however not altogether uninterested in 
groundwater irrigation; in 1951, it granted a $1.3 million loan to the government-owned 
Fomento Corporation in Chile for a groundwater exploration and development project in 
the Rio Elqui valley. The circumstances surrounding this loan differed significantly from 
the Indian project in as the development phase of the project would not go forward unless 
adequate supplies were proven by investigations, and the fact that the enhanced food 
production would be in a mining district and hence of strategic importance to the national 
economy.40 There was a long lull in the World Bank’s engagement with groundwater 
irrigation until a $ 3.7 million loan was sanctioned by IDA to Taiwan for a tubewell 
scheme in 1961. 41 This was closely followed in the same year by a $ 6 million loan to 
Uttar Pradesh (UP, formerly United Provinces) which was the first IDA project in India. 
The loan was to finance the expansion of UP’s public tubewell programme to irrigate a 
further 320,000 acres with tubewells of “virtually the same” design and specifications as 
the William Stampe scheme of the 1930s.42 
                                                          
38    The World Bank group presently consists of the IBRD (which lends to low and middle 
income countries), the IDA (founded in 1960 which gives interest free loans to the 
“poorest countries” using donor country resources rather than money raised on the 
markets), the International Finance Corporation, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
39   Compiled from the World Bank India Projects Website.   
40   World Bank, Chile - Technical report on development of groundwater resources of 
the Rio Elqui Groundwater Resources Project. Loan series; no. L 136. (Washington, DC, 
1951). Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1951/08/1558351/chile-technical-report-
development-groundwater-resources-rio-elqui-groundwater-resources-project on 23rd 
February 2015. 
41   World Bank, China - Ground Water Development Project (Washington, DC, 1961). 
Accessed online at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1961/08/1554265/china-
ground-water-development-project on 23rd February 2015. 
42    World Bank, India - Uttar Pradesh Tubewell Irrigation Project (Washington, DC 
1961), p. 2. Accessed online at 
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Having encouraged private tubewells in India with its advice in the mid-1960s, the World 
Bank did not immediately put its money where its mouth was. In fact, according to 
Sivaraman, the World Bank had refused credit for a massive tubewell-irrigation project 
in eastern UP in 1965, on the ostensible grounds that granting a loan might be seen as 
taking sides in the dispute over Ganges waters with (East) Pakistan as the development 
would be in the Ganges Valley. 43 The excellent wheat harvest of 1968, with tubewells 
playing a large part in the same must have played a role in the process of softening the 
World Bank towards agricultural projects which was taking place in the 1960s; clearing 
institutional confusion by illustrating a possible route to success. In late 1968, an IDA 
mission visited India to review agricultural credit institutions and identify high priority 
farm investments in the country with the assistance of the FAO. 44 According the 
Sivaraman, the real turn took place in 1970, when during a visit to India, Robert 
McNamara was impressed with the impact of tubewell development in Purnia (Bihar) and 
declared the Bank’s intention to support India’s groundwater programme,45 but loans for 
groundwater were already in the pipeline by this point. 
The first World Bank-ARC projects began in 1969-70 for the production of high quality 
seeds in the Tarai region ($ 14. 61 million, of which the IBRD contributed about half), 
credit to farmers in Gujarat ($ 35 million provided by IDA which was equivalent to $7.7 
million of the foreign exchange and about half of the rupee costs. Of this $27.3 million 
was for minor irrigation) and the Punjab project ($ 27.5 million from IDA for tractors and 
harvesters).  The money would be extended to the Government of India which would lend 
it to the Agricultural Refinance Corporation (ARC) on standard terms, and they would 
disburse the money to Land Development Banks for lending to cultivators.46 These were 
                                                          
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1961/08/1554253/india-uttar-pradesh-
tubewell-irrigation-project on 23rd February 2015.  
43 Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 410.  
44  World Bank, India - Gujarat Agricultural Credit Project. Agriculture projects series; 
no. PA 34 (Washington, DC, 1970), p. 1. Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1970/04/722553/india-gujarat-agricultural-
credit-project on 23rd February 2015. 
45  Sivaraman, Bitter Sweet, p. 410. 
46 Compiled from the staff appraisal reports: World Bank, India - Gujarat Agricultural 
Credit Project. Agriculture projects series; no. PA 34 (Washington, DC, 1970), p. 1. 
World Bank, India - Terai Seeds Project, Technical operations projects series; no. TO 
689 (Washington, DC, 1969). Accessed online at 
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quickly followed by eighteen other projects to be executed by the ARC, one of which was 
for agro aviation (and was later dropped), two for the development of market yards, three 
for dairy development, one for apple development and the rest were for crop agriculture. 
While only over a third of the bank’s contribution to the first four schemes was for minor 
irrigation, the latter quickly constituted the lion’s share of the loans for crop agriculture 
















                                                          
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1969/05/1554290/india-tarai-seeds-project-
india-terai-seeds-project on 23rd February 2015. World Bank, India - Punjab 
Agricultural Credit Project. Agriculture projects series; no. PA 48 (Washington, DC, 
1970). Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1970/05/722537/india-punjab-agricultural-
credit-project on 23rd February 2015. 
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45 24.4 59 57 
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Haryana  44.5 25 27 18 
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Tamil Nadu  62.3 35 70 65 
1971-
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Maharashtra  52.4 30 79 76 
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39.8 12.1 0 0 
1973-
74 
Bihar  60 32 100 100 
1974-
75 
West Bengal  67 34 60 59 
Total   591.2 308.5 64 64 
Table 7.1: World Bank loans to the ARC for crop agriculture, 1970-75. 
Source: Compiled from Agricultural Refinance Corporation, Annual Reports 1970-75 (Bombay, 1970-75). 
Minor irrigation did much better than the other sectors in terms of actual disbursements 
as a proportion of the outlay; in fact IDA credit meant for other purposes was being 
diverted to minor irrigation by 1973-74, 47 again demonstrating the central role of 
groundwater in the rural credit economy. However, World Bank funding to the ARC for 
irrigation activities, while overwhelmingly focused private tubewells, pumps and wells, 
it was not restricted to these. From the mid-1970s the Bank also began to lend to the ARC 
for India’s Command Area Development programme, which was aimed at building the 
                                                          
47 ARC, Report 1973-74, p. 12. 
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field channels for the last-mile delivery of water for various projects. After 1979, when 
India agreed to the concept of International Competitive Bidding, the Bank also began to 
fund improvements to the main canal system of various projects.48 
In 1973-74, the ARC submitted a proposal for a large all India project which was accepted 
by IDA during the next year. This was distinct from other IDA projects as the 
responsibility for identifying and appraising schemes and committing funds was left to 
the ARC. The eventual loan was for $75 million of which $69 million was to be allocated 
to minor irrigation. This was followed by a second general line of credit for $200 million 
in 1977 (the total cost of the project was $ 583million of which 75% was for minor 
irrigation. A further $1 million was for a study of groundwater resources), a third line in 
1979 for $ 250 million (total project cost of $ 1005 million of which about half was to be 
for minor irrigation) and a fourth line of credit of $350 million (total project cost of $2086 
million of which about 60% was for minor irrigation). 49 General line of credit loans 
continued to be extended by the World Bank into the 1980s when the ARC was merged 
with the Agricultural Credit Department of the Reserve Bank of India to form the National 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). While there was indeed 
diversification from a focus on groundwater alone, the latter continued to be central to 
the rural credit economy. 
A typical groundwater credit scheme 
The World Bank placed great emphasis on the techno-economic evaluation of the 
cultivator’s profit from its projects, and lamented the fact that none of the directors of the 
ARC had degrees in agricultural engineering or agricultural economics. The Bank also 
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emphasized studies that evaluated the economic impact of the ARC’s schemes; 50 an 
evaluation cell was set up in the ARC and starting in 1977 it published several “ex-post 
evaluation studies” of various local schemes. These studies provide much information on 
the working and impact of groundwater credit schemes and were quoted in World Bank 
loan appraisal reports to assure lenders of the viability of the new sector.51 
Among the first four schemes taken up for study was one for the installation of 3,600 
tubewells in Karnal (in Haryana) between 1967 and 1972 through credit extended by the 
Haryana State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank. This scheme, which was approved for 
refinance by the ARC board in September 1967 was to be supervised by the deputy state 
director of agriculture in charge of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme. A 
farmer seeking a loan to sink a tubewell was to become a member of the cooperative bank 
by purchasing one share of Rs. 100 and was to subsequently purchase additional shares 
to the extent of 5% of the loan sought. The loan was typically for between five and seven 
thousand rupees, carried an interest of 7.75%, was to be paid back in six annual 
installments beginning from the second year and secured by mortgaging land of twice the 
value of the loan. 52 
The impact of the scheme demonstrated that while tubewells did greatly enhance 
production and cultivator incomes, this was nowhere close to the spectacular assumptions 
made while drawing up the schemes. While each tubewell was to irrigate 10-15 acres with 
a discharge of 0.5 cusec, 53 the actual irrigated area was only about 9 acres; this was 
attributed by the evaluation study to the fact that the actual discharge obtained was only 
0.3-0.4 cusec, in addition to the unwillingness of farmers to spend money on lining water 
courses to prevent seepage losses. It had been assumed that the cropping intensity before 
the investment was 70% with each acre yielding 3 quintals of wheat and 4.5 quintals of 
dry fodder and a net income of Rs. 50 per acre. After the investment, the cropping 
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intensity was expected to rise to 180% with a yield of 18 quintals each of wheat, paddy 
and fodder, yielding a net income of Rs. 1464 making for an incremental income of Rs. 
1414 per acre. The study, like several others conducted by the ARC demonstrated that 
there had been had been both an underestimation of the baseline production and an 
overestimation of the post- tubewell production in drawing up the scheme. Yields did 
rise, from 6 to 10 quintals per acre in the case of wheat and from 7 to 13 quintals per acre 
in the case of paddy; this was far from the four fold increase expected. Cropping 
intensities before the investment, at 139% were already twice those assumed while 
planning the scheme; many borrowers had prior access to irrigation from wells, tubewells 
and canals. The cropping intensity after the investment did rise to 179%, practically 
achieving the target. Taken together, these statistics made for an incremental income of 
about Rs. 688 per acre; while this was enough for the farmer to pay off the loan and retain 
a handsome return, it was less than half the incremental income assumed while drawing 
up the scheme. 54 
Of the Karnal scheme’s many shortfalls in meeting targets, perhaps the most interesting 
was in the incomplete transformation of the cropping pattern. It had been expected that 
high value wet crops such as wheat and paddy would entirely take over once assured 
irrigation was in place. However, farmers continued to grow low value dry crops such as 
maize, gram, millets and barley even as the area devoted to wheat increased from 32% to 
40% that to rice from 12% to 30%;55 Project planners had clearly overestimated the role 
of the profit motive as the sole driver of cultivator behavior. 
Chasing Equity 
An interesting statistic that emerged from the Karnal study was that only two of the 118 
beneficiary cultivators studied could be classified as small farmers. Equally interesting 
was the tendency of beneficiaries to increase the size of their holdings after the 
investment; the  average holding increased by over a quarter from 10.43 acres to 13.25 
acres with the trend particularly pronounced in the case of farmers who already had 
holdings larger than 20 acres (see Table 7.2). 
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Size of holdings (acres) No of cultivators before 
investment 
No of  cultivators after 
investment 
Less than 5 4 2 
5-10 47 42 
10-20 57 55 
20 and above 10 19 
Total 118 118 
Table 7.2: Impact of the Karnal tubewell finance scheme on landholding patterns 
Source: Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation, Evaluation Study of Minor Irrigation Scheme- 
Installation of Shallow Tubewells in Karnal District, Haryana (Bombay, 1977), p. 31. 
 
While the low coverage of small farmers was blamed by the Karnal study on the 
inadequate efforts of the state government, 56 the attention paid by the researchers to small 
farmers appears to have been more a function of concerns of the 1970s when the study 
was conducted, rather than one from the time of scheme sanction. In fact, the project had 
been sanctioned assuming a viable farm size nearly twice the threshold of landholding of 
farmers classified as small. 57  Domestically, the concern for small farmers was a function 
of an increasingly populist leftward turn by Indira Gandhi from 1969 onwards; this turn 
culminated in the 1971 election slogan Garibi Hatao (remove poverty), a brilliant 
response to the opposition’s Indira Hatao (remove Indira). One of the many moves which 
affected agriculture in this context was the nationalization of the banks ostensibly to serve 
agriculture and the poor. An influential review of the credit system was also carried out 
(though this concentrated mostly on issues that had little to do with the ARC which was 
relatively new) which found that small farmers and the landless were hopelessly 
underserved by the system; even the formula used by the ARC to define small farmers 
owed its genesis to that review. 58 
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From about 1970 onwards, the ARC attempted to reorient itself to better serve small 
farmers; this coincided with the entry of the World Bank in agricultural lending. The 
Bank’s annual reports on India’s prospects, with the section on agriculture often written 
by consultants such as land reform expert Wolf Ladejinsky expressed great concern about 
the issue of equity. While the Karnal study made no comment on the trend of tubewell 
owners to increase land holdings, the Bank’s reports had noted that the new agricultural 
strategy had exacerbated tenurial problems and rural inequality. With farming becoming 
increasingly profitable, land owners got rid of tenants and cultivated their land with wage 
labor. According to the Bank, small farmers and tenants could “be left to fend for 
themselves only at the price of overt discontent” which no longer lay “in the realm of 
theoretical assumptions of interested reformers”.59 The World Bank promoted 
concessions to small farmers through conditions on its credit to the ARC; at least 50% of 
the total credit was to be allocated to small farmers. 60 While these targets were met fairly 
easily in terms of the overall lending programme, it is unknown what proportion of minor-
irrigation loans went to small cultivators. 
The ARC and the banking system as a whole attempted to attract and service small 
farmers as part of their normal lending programmes. In keeping with the conditions of the 
“Treaty of Rome”,61 the agricultural finance sector had been instructed in 1967 to offer 
credit on the basis of the projected incremental income from the investment, rather than 
the capacity to pledge land for mortgage.62 This was quite certainly not the case in the 
Karnal scheme, which required farmers to mortgage land; World Bank loan conditions 
continued to specify that incremental income be the basis for credit sanction well into the 
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late 1970s, indicating that this condition continued to not be met.63 At best, the inability 
to target small farmers was a result of the local cooperative land mortgage bank branch 
not having the technical personnel who could evaluate the projected incremental income. 
Together with World Bank conditions that credit only be extended to banks which had 
low overdues, this must have forced recourse to the traditional strategy of using the ability 
to pledge collateral as the criteria for sanctioning credit, thereby excluding the poor. At 
worst, the inability was a function of entrenched biases within the cooperative and rural 
banking system whose leadership was often close to the provincial large-landowning 
political class. The conditions that came with cheap World Bank money might be seen as 
a tool of the Central Government to circumvent provincial politics and direct the rural 
banking system to serve its own egalitarian goals. 
The ARC made several concessions for lending to small farmers beginning from the end 
of the 1960s including lower down payments by cultivators, lower interest rates, longer 
loan tenures and providing refinance to the extent of 100% in the case of small farmer 
credit schemes. 64 The overall impact of the new small farmer bias is unknown; however, 
one independent study in Bihar in the early 1970s found that credit institutions were 
actively discriminating against farmers with holdings of less than 5 acres as they doubted 
their capacity to repay; high overdues would result in ARC credit to local banks being cut 
off. ARC schemes administered by cooperative banks, with their hierarchical and 
bureaucratic processes offered great obstacles to access for the poor and illiterate. Finally, 
while it was definitely the case that tubewell technology could not be scaled down beyond 
a point, local banks exacerbated the problem by committing to larger sized tubewells in 
their schemes even as smaller ones were available on the market. On the same lines, banks 
were strangely reluctant to finance bamboo tubewells, a local innovation which cost about 
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a seventh as much as the smallest metal tubewell, even as they officially recognized the 
value of the innovation.65  
The early 1970s saw the beginning of schemes specifically targeted at the poor as the 
administrators felt that rural social structures enabled larger farmers to pre-empt the 
services of non-targeted programmes.66 These included the Small Farmers’ Development 
Agencies (SFDA) and the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers (MFAL) 
programmes; both saw active participation of the ARC. Economic equity was not the only 
consideration; there was a growing realization that a productive leap could not come 
through increasing the yields of large farms alone. Crudely speaking, the SFDAs were 
targeted at smallholders who produced only a little for the market, but who could increase 
their yields with a small loan (often for a tubewell). MFAL was aimed at the landless and 
at holdings too small to be “viable” (or produce for the market); these loans were usually 
for subsidiary occupations such as poultry, dairying etc.67 While not portrayed as such, 
this was no less than an attempt to remake the countryside by providing an exit route for 
the landless and for cultivators deemed too small for modern agriculture. The targeting 
of small loans at the poor, together with the doing away of the ability to offer collateral 
as a criteria for lending meant that such a programme would today be classified as 
microfinance. 
Perhaps the inescapable root of the issue of inequality was the very solution that the World 
Bank advisors and the Indian bureaucratic elite had chosen to solve the scarcity-
distribution problem of the Indian irrigation sector. The problem was seen as one of water 
provided by public systems being too little for high-yielding, intensive agriculture, and 
of the ability of the powerful to unfairly circumvent the regulatory distribution of public 
systems. Scarcity and corruption were to be banished by private investment in tubewells, 
though corruption had proven that public tubewells were not inherently unable to provide 
water in adequate quantities; it was just more public systems were needed, together with 
better enforcement of regulatory distribution. Once private tubewells were applied as a 
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solution, equity became a problem; the solution to the new problem was seen in widening 
the reach of credit to enable the smallest farmer to own a tubewell. To begin with, this 
approach neglected the fact that while the technology had shown a rapid propensity for 
downscaling, tubewells were simply not viable below a certain size of holding. For 
example, small farmers as defined in Karnal were those holding a maximum of 3.5 acres 
of dry land or 2 acres of irrigated land, but the viability of the scheme had been worked 
out on the assumption of a 7 acre holding. 68 Further, even a small tubewell for a holding 
deemed viable from the point of view of incremental income had much spare capacity as 
compared to a public tubewell which functioned annually for far longer hours; the 
proliferation of private tubewells represented much overinvestment, though this was often 
partly mitigated by water-sales to neighbors. 
In contrast to the World Bank experts who saw privatization as the solution to the scarcity 
problem, a group of British development scholars focused on making public irrigation 
work for the poor. The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex had been 
founded by Dudley Seers in 1966 and quickly established a radical reputation; in 1969 
Seers attempted to turn the discipline on its head by attacking the “growth fetish” that had 
characterized it since its inception. In the 1970s, a group of researchers led by the biologist 
Robert Chambers founded something of a sub-discipline that would later be called 
irrigation sociology; this included Robert Wade who had produced one of the earliest 
studies of India’s Command Area Development Programme. Their initial focus was on 
canal irrigation and the general solution proposed by the IDS scholars was well 
characterized in the title of a paper by Wade on an innovative experiment in south India; 
On substituting management for water. South India’s canal systems were based on 
continuous flow, meaning all outlets in the system were open simultaneously; this was in 
contrast to the heavily managed systems of northwestern India based on rotational flow 
whereby each outlet got a pre-scheduled turn. Continuous flow was wasteful (as 
evaporation losses were constant) and inequitable as farmers in the head reach managed 
to appropriate more than their fair share. During a drought in 1976, rotational flow was 
adopted on a South Indian canal together with more equitable distribution, requiring the 
mobilization of the irrigation bureaucracy, local administration and the public. Broadly 
the programme was successful, with a more equitably distributed yield loss of only 25%, 
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despite more than 50% shortfall in water supplies.69 In general though, attempts to 
disseminate rotational water delivery to south India made little headway in in the 1970s, 
though the progress was an improvement over the lip service of the previous decades. In 
the case of tubewells, the IDS scholars did much to propagate community-owned 
tubewells, but such programmes were miniscule in comparison to the boom in individual 
ownership. 
Closely related to the targeting of small farmers were the ARC’s attempts to target the 
“backward” eastern states; it set up a consultancy unit in the early 1970s to help banks 
and governments in these states to draw up groundwater irrigation schemes.70 The eastern 
states of West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were described in World Bank reports as “floating 
on water” as they contained a quarter of India’s groundwater resources. 71 With barely 5% 
of the groundwater potential in this region developed by the mid-1970s (as compared to 
an all India average of 35% and 65% in the agriculturally advanced states), a great 
unrealized potential for enhanced food production was seen in this region. Optimistic as 
the Bank was, it was well aware that mere availability of plentiful groundwater supplies 
could not make for an agricultural revolution. The Eastern region was seen as being 
characterized by small and fragmented land holdings which could not justify individual 
groundwater investments; tenant farming also predominated in the region making for 
difficulties in providing security for loans. It was realized that some “group basis” would 
have to be evolved to organize groundwater development in the eastern states rather than 
the individual ownership and use which predominated in the boom states. However, 
public tubewells were notoriously inefficient and cooperative ownership came with the 
risk of domination by larger farmers. A final option would have been the installation of 
high capacity tubewells by large credit worthy farmers who would sell water to small 
farmers; this would risk exploitation of and discrimination against small farmers, besides 
unreliability. 72 
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Even as its consultants commented in its reports that individual ownership was 
inappropriate for the smallholder dominated eastern states, the Bank made only token 
gestures towards state and cooperatively-owned tubewells. In the West Bengal 
Agricultural Credit Project for example, the outlay was for 18,000 private tubewells and 
merely a hundred public tubewells despite explicit requests by the provincial government 
that the public tubewell component of the project be significantly expanded. The Bank 
cited the poor financial performance of public tubewells programmes which faced 
difficulties in collection of water charges with a consequent decline in the quality of 
services. While a further 200 tubewells were allocated to cooperative ownership as an 
experiment, the programme was never scaled up. 73 With the prejudice towards public 
ownership and the inability to develop cooperatives, the basis that groundwater 
development inevitably took in Eastern India was the one of water-sale by large farmers; 
a system whose potential to exploit small farmers by “replacing landlords with 
waterlords” was well known to the Bank. 74 By the early 1980s, ARC impact studies 
regularly used the terms “borrower beneficiaries” and “non-borrower beneficiaries” 
referring respectively to sellers and buyers of water. In a typical ARC tubewell scheme 
in Bihar, 75% of borrowers reported significant income from the sale of water; priced as 
it was at nearly 25 times the cost of electricity (which was the only marginal cost to the 
seller), 75 the business of selling water was extremely lucrative. By the 1990s, the equity 
impact of the development of “groundwater markets” would be a controversy amongst 
economists; opinion was split as to whether the markets were efficient and contributed to 
rural poverty alleviation or whether they were merely a source of accumulation and 
power. 76  
                                                          
73   World Bank, India - West Bengal Agricultural Development Project (Washington, 
DC, 1975), p. 10. Accessed online at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1975/04/725223/india-west-bengal-
agricultural-development-project on 23rd February 2015. 
74  World Bank, India- Economic situation and prospects (Washington, DC 1975), p. 32.  
75   Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation, Minor Irrigation in Bhojpur 
District, Bihar: An ex-post evaluation study (Bombay, 1982). 
76 For the opposing viewpoints see Tushaar Shah, Groundwater markets and irrigation 
development: Political economy and practical policy (New Delhi, 1993) and S. 
Janakarajan, Trading in Groundwater: A source of Accumulation and Power (Chennai, 
1995). 




Indian bureaucrats such as B. Sivaraman, saw irrigation at the centre of the new 
agricultural development strategy in the mid-1960s. The placement of the private profit 
at the centre of the drive for higher yields put private tubewells at the centre of irrigation 
policy; arguments about the inherent advantages of private ownership also proved useful 
in the quest for extending irrigation with limited state resources. In making a choice of 
the appropriate irrigation system, elite development actors explicitly apotheosized the 
role of the private profit motive in increasing production at the cost of the notion of social 
good. 
Sivaraman pushed a programme of loan to cultivators to finance private tubewells from 
the cooperative banking system backed by the Agricultural Refinance Corporation. But 
lending to cultivators for the development of private groundwater irrigation facilities was 
not an automatic, demand driven choice for the Agricultural Refinance Corporation. The 
institution was initially averse to the idea, perhaps based on the traditional notion that the 
irrigation was the domain of the state, or at the very least of cooperatives, rather than of 
private initiative. Pressure from the government led the ARC to begin financing of private 
groundwater irrigation facilities in the late 1960s and groundwater quickly became its 
central business, demonstrating that groundwater development was where the largest 
demand for capital investment in Indian agriculture lay. From 1970 onwards, the 
programme was scaled up with massive loans from the World Bank which saw private 
irrigation and credit for the same as key bottleneck for improving agricultural production. 
Internal studies of the ARC’s early schemes highlighted a bias in lending in favour of 
large farmers which the Government of India and the World Bank were well aware of. 
While they tried to increase the flow of credit to small farmers for groundwater 
investments, their attempts met only with limited success. This was particularly true of 
eastern India, which had the most plentiful groundwater resources in the country but was 
dominated by small land holdings. While the World Bank realized that individual 
tubewell ownership and use was inappropriate for smallholder agriculture, it was biased 
against government and cooperatively-owned tubewells. The form of access to 
groundwater resources for small farmers which the ARC and the World Bank ended up 
promoting was one of purchase of water from larger farmers who owned tubewells; being 




The case of wheat in India forms the central story in the historiography of the global 
Green Revolution. From the mid-1960s onwards, the production and yield of wheat 
increased at a rate faster than it had in the preceding period. This thesis argued that that 
the increase in yields was driven by an expansion in the area of wheat irrigated; an 
expansion which took place largely due to an increase in the number of privately-owned 
tubewells. Not only did irrigation make for higher yields on its own but it also formed the 
basis for the use of other yield-enhancing inputs, most crucially fertilizers, which were 
normally only used in conjunction with irrigation. The dwarf or High Yielding Varieties 
(HYVs) had no role to play in the increased wheat yields though they were indeed in use 
in India during the boom. As this thesis showed, the advantages of HYVs over tall 
varieties developed in India were far from certain. HYVs did produce higher yields at 
extremely high fertilizer doses but tall Indian varieties performed better at moderate 
doses. There is no evidence that any substantial section of Indian wheat cultivators 
applied a high-enough fertilizer dosage to be at the threshold where they might benefit 
from switching varieties; there is in fact much evidence to the contrary. At any dosage, 
the dwarf varieties made for inefficient use of fertilizer which was a very expensive and 
scarce input; a cheaper “revolution” could well have been orchestrated by spreading 
available fertilizer thin on tall Indian varieties rather than concentrate high doses on a few 
fields growing HYVs. Thus not only were dwarf varieties not necessary to increase wheat 
production; their adoption very likely made for a more inefficient agriculture. 
The standard stories of the Green Revolution imply that the state neglected agriculture in 
favour of industry during the Nehruvian period; this resulted in indifferent production. 
Food production was rescued from this stasis when Indian agriculture embraced science, 
particularly the HYVs, resulting in spectacular strides in the production and yield of 
foodgrains in India during the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. By examining 
the statistics, this thesis showed that the Nehruvian period saw a substantial growth in not 
just the production but also the yield of foodgrains in India. The performance of food 
production during this period was in fact better than during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
which is implicitly assumed to be a period of high growth in studies focussed on the Green 
Revolution. I thus argue that a period of high growth in production and yield began more 
or less at the end of the colonial period rather than the mid-1960s as is usually implied. A 





seeing something of a revolution in the late 1960s and 1970s has typically been taken to 
represent Indian food production and even Indian agriculture as a whole, though it was a 
relatively minor part of India’s food basket. And as argued earlier, the newly-developed 
HYVs had little to do with the boom in wheat yields which were driven largely by 
irrigation. 
Having challenged our productionist and innovation-centric picture of the Green 
Revolution, this thesis sought to reconceptualise our understanding of the period with it 
focus on irrigation. It showed that there was a shift in emphasis from public irrigation 
facilities to privately-owned tubewells in the mid-1960s; the latter largely accounted for 
the rapid rise in wheat irrigation. The strategy of publicly-owned irrigation systems which 
had formed the thrust of India’s irrigation efforts was to spread water thin over a large 
area; this not only served the objective of social equity by benefiting a large number of 
farmers but also made optimal use of scarce water to maximize total production. 
However, in the mid-1960s, the idea of the rational peasant took hold and his profit-
maximization objective was put at the centre of the drive for higher production. Intensive 
use of water and its timely application were seen as the key to higher yields and profits. 
Public irrigation systems were seen as unable to enable the intensive water use the 
cultivator demanded; there was a conflict between the objectives of private profit and of 
social equity. The World Bank hence recommended that the way forward for irrigation 
development was a greater reliance on private tubewells which would enable a plentiful, 
unrestricted supply of water to the cultivator at will; independence from the regulatory 
rationing of water inherent to public systems was also seen as the key to promote the use 
of new risky inputs such as chemical fertilizers. Aided by the World Bank, and through a 
public company called the Agricultural Refinance Corporation, the Indian government 
began to extend cheap loans to cultivators for groundwater irrigation in the late 1960s, 
precipitating a tubewell boom. It was well known that even with loans not all cultivators 
could afford tubewells; thus the sacrifice of equity objectives was a conscious choice of 
elite development actors during the Green Revolution. Their attempts to mitigate rising 
inequality by targeting loans at the poor met with only limited success in large part due 
to the bias in favour of individual, rather than community ownership. 
This thesis argued that the idea of the rational self-interested farmer was central not just 
to the reform of irrigation; it formed the general thrust of the New Agricultural Strategy 





intellectual landscape of development studies. On the one hand, there was the well-known 
shift in emphasis from industry to agriculture which was seen as capable of being an 
engine of economic development. But this showed that there was also a lesser known 
shift, one in the idea of how agriculture might be developed. Its genesis lay in the theory 
of the “poor but rational” Third-World peasant most clearly articulated by the Chicago 
economist Theodore Schultz. The peasant’s rationality implied that Third-World 
agriculture was amenable to standard economic theory and that the peasant would respond 
to price incentives to increase production; his continued poverty despite being rational 
implied that he had already optimised the use of traditional inputs and any further 
productivity gains could only come from new inputs grounded in scientific research. I 
argued that this theory was central to advice the World Bank gave to India in 1965 which 
became the basis of India’s New Agricultural Strategy. This theory was applied to 
decisions beyond irrigation; most obviously in the case of incentive prices. Reliance on 
the profit motive of a limited number of “progressive farmers” to drive production was 
also central to the choice of the HYV wheat seeds; the objective was to induce a few 
farmers to use very high and perhaps inappropriate fertilizer doses in the quest for super 
normal yields and thus shake up traditional wheat cultivation. 
Thus this thesis argued that the defining feature of India’s agricultural policy in the period 
since the mid-1960s was that the profit motive became more central to agricultural policy 
than it had before; this was despite an acute awareness that such a policy risked rising 
inequality. In doing so, it emphasizes the issues of unequal access to resources that 
underpinned policy and the consequent rising inequality, both central to critiques of the 
Green Revolution but only mentioned in passing in the historiography which puts 
scientific research and innovation at the centre of our picture of the Green Revolution. It 
thus underlines the fact that inequality was not an odd side-effect of the Green Revolution; 
it was built in to both economic policy and technology choice. This thesis thus argued for 
the need to look beyond technology alone to the larger shift in the political economy of 
Indian agriculture. As the economist CH Hanumatha Rao argued in the early 1970s, the 
use of High Yielding Varieties of seeds together the concept of “productive irrigation” 
merely served to justify the appropriation of fertilizer and water resources in an 
economically inoptimal manner by a few farmers who were already resource rich.724 In 
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other words a certain type of economics much more important than a certain type of 
science.  
But while it points to the centrality of the idea that the private profit motive would lead 
to higher production in policymaking, this thesis also argues that the state played the 
central role in the Green Revolution; and this role was not confined merely to the research 
carried out in the public sector. Incentive prices meant to enthuse the profit-hungry farmer 
not only helped orchestrate a shift to wheat cultivation in the richest irrigated lands of the 
Punjab, but also spurred the expansion of irrigation with private tubewells. In fact this 
thesis argued that that attainment of notional food self-sufficiency in India had as much 
to do with procurement and distribution as it had to do with production alone. The state 
took to heavy intervention in the foodgrain market with the setting up of the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) which procured food from the surplus districts for subsidized 
distribution in the cities and deficit areas. The FCI also built up a stock of foodgrains to 
tide over years of low production; it was these cyclical crises rather than merely low 
production that perhaps constituted India’s real food production problems. The role of 
procurement in managing India’s food economy was particularly important in the case of 
rice which saw no sharp rise in productivity during the Green Revolution years. Installed 
to irrigate wheat, Punjab’s tubewells were used to cultivate rice during the monsoon; the 
crop had little local demand and the region, which had no history of rice cultivation 
quickly became the leading supplier of rice to the FCI. The massive investment in rural 
electrification, together with subsidies and the provision of cheap credit which fuelled the 
tubewell boom also point to the crucial role of the state in enabling the use of the central 
technology of the Green Revolution. Indeed, the limited capacity of the state to engage 
with the financial and logistical challenges of intensive rural action may well explain a 
policy focussed on a few large or “progressive farmers” in a small region already 
advanced in state facilities cultivating a relatively minor crop. 
In shifting the focus away from the story of the miracle seeds and fertilizers alone and in 
pointing to the role of tubewells, this thesis has made important additions and corrections 
to the historiography of the Green Revolution. To begin with, it has underlined the crucial 
role played by advice and support from the World Bank in the evolution of  India’s 
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agricultural strategy; thus expanding our picture of the role of external agencies in the 
Green Revolution beyond the Rockefeller Foundation, which has typically been the centre 
of attention. In doing so, it has pointed to the important role played by economists and 
economic argument in the Green Revolution; a role which has been inadequately 
examined in the historiography.  
Largely by omission, the historiography has implicitly characterized irrigation as a 
colonial-era technology seemingly outstripped in importance by the input of “science” 
with the coming of the miracle wheat seeds; this thesis has argued that irrigation was in 
fact the real driver of yields in the so-called Green Revolution. The emphasis on the role 
of private tubewells in increased productivity provides a powerful corrective to the focus 
on plant breeding in our accounts of twentieth-century agricultural development, and in 
doing so, it critiques the uncritical acceptance by innovation-obsessed historians of the 
early claims of the Rockefeller Foundation, which was quick to attribute India’s 
spectacular performance in increasing its wheat production exclusively to the dwarf 
wheat varieties it had developed. By arguing for the centrality of an old input (irrigation) 
in driving what is usually characterized as a “modern”, research and innovation-driven 
revolution, this thesis has not only challenged the specific accounts of the wellsprings of 
Green-Revolution productivity growth but also sought to provide a more general critique 
of innovation-centric accounts of science and technology histories. It has argued for 
paying attention not just to innovation or first use of a technology but also to use more 
generally. It has showed that such a refocussing can contribute to a better understanding 
of the changing relative importance of old and new technologies through time, as well as 
answer historical questions beyond the question of technology alone. 
This thesis argued that the novel miracle seeds just happened to come into use at a time 
of incentive prices, a liberal fertilizer policy and above all, an expansion in the area of 
wheat irrigated were contributing to increased wheat production. On the same lines, it has 
been careful not to characterize the private tubewell as some kind of definitive 
technological breakthrough in the history of irrigation. I argued that while privately-
owned tubewells did indeed have some advantages over public irrigation facilities, most 
of the increase in yields took place due to the general expansion in irrigation facilitated 
by the private-tubewell boom rather than any specific technological advantages of private 
tubewells. Private tubewells showed only a marginal advantage over the well-managed 





revolution; it was thus unfair to characterize canals as entirely unsuited to modern 
agriculture. While there was a high correlation between the ownership of a tubewell and 
the intensive use of fertilizers, this was more due to the generally larger resources 
possessed by tubewell owners and less due to any inherent advantages of private 
tubewells. This thesis thus argued that the private tubewell irrigation boom in wheat was 
the result of conscious policy choices rather than technological superiority; as the 
irrigation engineer Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung Bahadur argued during the late colonial 
period, only under special conditions of “crops, climates and markets” could groundwater 
irrigation be viable on a large scale. The perceived advantages of tubewell irrigation 
varied through the twentieth century; they were seen primarily as a means of extending 
irrigation in areas uncommanded by canals and for quick extension of irrigation in times 
of crises. Only in the 1960s did the idea of tubewell irrigation as a better means of 
irrigation take hold. This adds to my argument about paying greater attention to 
technologies in use to better understand both the changing meaning of technology and of 
the wider social questions they reflect. 
This thesis thus tells the neglected history of irrigation in twentieth-century India with a 
particular focus on the tubewell beyond just the Green Revolution period when the 
technology became very important. It showed that irrigation was seen as the most 
important means of agricultural improvement as it enhanced yields, promoted multiple 
cropping and incentivized the use of other inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizers and 
generally improved cultivation by mitigating risk; this perceived importance resulted in 
substantial investment in irrigation technologies of all kinds throughout the period. While 
both canal and groundwater irrigation have expanded substantially during the period, the 
latter has gained in relative importance during the twentieth century. The policy emphasis 
on the mode of irrigation was shaped by a conflict between the utility of large and small-
scale technology, between public and private ownership and between agriculture and 
industrial investment; these conflicts came to a head during the wartime food crisis and 
the drought and economic crisis of the mid-1960s both of which saw an emphasis on 
tubewells rather than large surface irrigation schemes as the key to quick results. While 
the wartime crisis put the public tubewell on the central government’s agenda, the 1960s 
saw an explicit valorisation of the private tubewell resulting in its quick rise to the most 
important contributor of irrigation in India even as canal irrigation continued to grow 





I began by showing that wells were an important source of irrigation in turn of the century 
India and that they had received significant albeit sporadic state support in some Indian 
provinces. The Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) placed an emphasis on private 
wells rather than large expensive surface irrigation projects as the means to extend 
irrigation. In the next three decades, provincial governments led by UP supported and 
incentivized private investment in new motorized groundwater extraction technologies 
such as tubewells. Under the leadership of Sir William Stampe during the interwar years, 
the UP Irrigation Branch embarked upon the first rural-electrification programme in 
India, using small canal-falls power plants to energize a network of state-owned 
tubewells, pioneering the large-scale use of tubewells in India and indeed the world. 
During the Second World War, Stampe was appointed the Irrigation Adviser to the 
Government of India and he pushed tubewells as a solution to India’s immediate and 
long-term food problem; this put tubewells on the central government agenda and his 
plans would be executed by postcolonial India. These developments demonstrate that the 
interest of the colonial state extended beyond large-scale technologies such as canals to 
embrace a variety of small-scale groundwater irrigation systems such as the tubewell. 
Thus tubewells progressively emerged as an important technology at the local, regional 
and national level during the last half century of colonial rule; tubewell schemes were an 
early exemplar of global postwar development.  
In the historiography of technology in India, the interwar period has implicitly been seen 
as something of an interregnum with little material development as the focus has been on 
discursive analysis around the theme of science, technology, development and 
nationalism. By showing that the use of the central technology of the postcolonial Green 
Revolution was pioneered during this period, this thesis argued for the importance of 
focussing on material developments in this period as well. Similarly, this thesis illustrated 
that an examination of developments during the interwar, wartime and immediate-
postwar colonial years can show that independent India’s heavy commitment to big dams 
was not merely a result of the fetishization of the TVA model but was led by the concerns 
of irrigation. It showed that irrigation engineers in India had long proposed dams for 
irrigation, seeing them as the logical conclusion of India’s long engagement with water 
management.  While the prohibitive cost meant that few were built during the colonial 





and a perceived exhaustion of opportunities for conventional canal schemes leading to a 
push towards storage (dam) based schemes. 
The utility of such an approach however extends beyond the specific telos of Nehru’s 
dams or events such as the Green Revolution.  This thesis argued that expanding our focus 
beyond general nationalist pronouncements on technology to include the activities of 
actors within an increasingly heterogeneous colonial state can shed light on questions 
beyond a general linking of technology with nationalism to questions such as technology 
for what, for whom and of what kind. Thus it showed that while both Sir William and 
nationalist technocrats such as Meghnad Saha were enthusiasts for electrification, Sir 
William’s was a vision which embraced a small-scale, rural-agricultural modernity which 
was in stark contrast to the large-scale, urban-industrial vision of nationalist technocrats. 
The historiography has characterized the Nehruvian period as one which saw a neglect of 
agriculture. This reading is based on the low relative share of public resources devoted to 
agriculture which changed in the mid-1960s, as well as an uncritical acceptance of the 
arguments of those who called for specific changes in agricultural policy. This thesis used 
the case of irrigation to argue that the Nehruvian period in fact saw a significant 
investment in agriculture; the period saw a massive scaling up of colonial-era 
commitment to public irrigation systems even as the relative share of public money 
allocated to agriculture may have been higher in later periods. This investment during the 
Nehruvian period took place as a result of provincial pressures and commitments made 
during the last years of colonialism; influential central government technocratic bodies 
such as the Planning Commission were sceptical of investment in irrigation, particularly 
in the case of very large projects. The big dam was less central to water resources 
development during the Nehruvian era than is usually assumed; public tubewells were an 
integral part of irrigation investment during the period which saw some of the largest 
programmes of tubewell construction in the world. So great was this scaling up of 
colonial-era irrigation investment of all sorts that resources were stretched thin and 
projects progressed very slowly; this made for considerable disillusionment with public 
irrigation systems by the mid-1960s. The mid-1960s also saw a period of severe drought, 
which together with a crisis of public finances contributed as much as shifting ideology 





This thesis was ultimately about colonial and postcolonial economic development. It 
showed that there was considerable continuity in development praxis through the end of 
colonialism and the early postcolonial period. This praxis was shaped by ideas and 
debates, but also by past commitments and responses to crises. Changes in ideas as well 
as praxis was a slow and negotiated process with the two often seemingly unlinked. Thus 
for example while the state gradually loosened its purse strings on an ad-hoc basis when 
it came to irrigation investment from the end of the Second World War, there continued 
to be considerable scepticism among the central technocratic bodies such as the Planning 
Commission which played the role of the fiscal conservative attempting to keep irrigation 
investment in check, just as the India Office in London had during the Raj.  Officially 
replacing the revenue-centric development philosophy of the colonial era with a criteria 
some felt was more suited to the planned economy of the welfare state was thus a long 
and contested process. While the Irrigation Commission had favoured a policy centred on 
private wells in the early twentieth century, the public irrigation systems favoured by the 
well-entrenched irrigation bureaucracy continued to form the rhetorical emphasis of 
irrigation development well into the postcolonial period even as state support for private 
irrigation investment continued to grow slowly; it was only in the mid-1960s that the 
emphasis of state efforts shifted decisively in favour of private tubewells.  
Despite considerable disappointment, agricultural development as reflected in food 
production saw much success in postcolonial India. Spectacular successes reflecting a 
breakthrough were few and far in between and of a minor and circumscribed nature like 
the case of wheat in northwestern India. At the macroscale, this success was only 
discernible the form of a slow and unsteady (but faster-than-before) growth in production 
and yields over a few decades, rather than a sharp increase in a short well-defined period. 
The lack of a sharp overall increase had to do not with lack of technology but with limited 
capacity of the rural state; this was reflected in the slow execution of the last-mile 
infrastructure of irrigation projects, meeting the logistical challenges of delivering inputs 
and developing markets, credit delivery and limitations of extension services.  
The importance of services such as extension over research has been noted by others such 
as Jonathan Harwood. While Harwood argues that an understanding of the turn of the 





in the work of Third-World development practitioners today, 725 this thesis has argued 
that our understanding of the classic case of the Indian Green Revolution itself is severely 
flawed. To the extent that the term itself has any purchase beyond its use by historical 
actors, we need to reconceptualise it as a slow process of postwar agricultural 
development rather than a sudden break suggested by the seductive term. This requires a 
clearer understanding of postcolonial agricultural development before the arrival of the 
HYV seeds, an extension of our focus to technologies and inputs other than improved 
seeds, and indeed to extend our focus beyond technology alone.  
Thus the first direction in which the insights of this thesis may be extended is in 
developing a more detailed understanding of technical and economic changes in Indian 
agriculture during the Nehruvian period to understand how the break from the colonial 
period took place, and what effect this break had on the countryside. In particular, while 
this thesis has engaged more substantially with the important case of rice than other 
histories of the Green Revolution in India, an even clearer understanding of the 
impressive productivity growth in India’s most important food crop in the 1950s is called 
for.  
This thesis may also be extended in other directions. It contains but an outline of the rich 
history of groundwater irrigation in India, focussing on one mode (the tubewell) and crop 
(wheat) which was most prevalent in the alluvial river basins of northwestern India. 
Besides extending a focus to other regions (for example Gujarat, West Bengal and Tamil 
Nadu), other technologies (such as pumpsets, borewells and dug-cum-borewells) and 
crops, there is much scope for a larger contribution to the history of science and the 
environment. One may tell the story of the development of groundwater science and 
geohydrology in India or of how actors engaged with the concepts of risk and 
sustainability in groundwater development. An initial survey reveals that the Geological 
Survey of India (GSI) took increasing interest in questions of water supply in the 
twentieth century, initially for industrial and military installations and then for irrigation; 
it advised on the question of a safe limit of pumping for the Ganges tubewell project in 
the 1930s. Its groundwater-related activities greatly expanded during the war due and 
culminated in the setting up of an Engineering Geology and Groundwater Section after 
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the war. The question of mapping India’s groundwater resources was considered crucial; 
an American aided All India Groundwater Exploration Programme in the 1950s was the 
largest such effort in the world. Yet, even as geologists and the new discipline of 
geophysicists adopted sophisticated instrumentation and methods of analysis, both the 
colonial and Nehruvian state employed traditional water diviners at the highest levels and 
there was considerable scientific and political debate about the efficacy of divining and 
scientific geology. An exploration of these issues can on the one hand extend the history 
of the GSI, as well as how the state engaged with and used science and rationality. 
The scaling up of groundwater irrigation efforts in the 1960s was accompanied with rising 
concern about determining the safe long-term limits of pumping and regulating 
groundwater development. These concerns came from banking institutions led by the 
World Bank concerned about the return from their investments; conditions limiting the 
density of tubewells as well as funds for developing provincial groundwater investigation 
bodies were an important part of its loans to the ARC. An explorations of these concerns 
of sustainability and the production of scientific knowledge to serve the banking industry 
can add much to our understanding of the history of the World Bank as well as of the 
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